Sanctions and Authoritarian Counterinsurgency: The Case of Rhodesia

The international community continues to impose incredible sanctions against the Russian state. The Russian economy faces severe degradation if not economic collapse. Many questions remain regarding the impact of sanctions against Russia. One question stands out. As the conflict in Ukraine devolves into a guerrilla war, to what extent will wide-ranging international sanctions affect the Russian COIN strategy? This paper suggests that international sanctions may shape the decision path of governments towards an authoritarian COIN model. 

The enemy-centric conception of COIN focuses less on winning hearts and minds and more on the infliction of pain and suffering beyond the cost/tolerance level of both the insurgencies and population (Shultz, 1979). For example, Hazelton points "that counterinsurgency success is the result of a violent state-building process in which elites engage in a contest of power, popular interests matter little to the outcome, and the government benefits from the use of force against civilians” (2017, p. 81).

I apply aspects of Ucko’s (2016) theoretic conception of authoritarian counterinsurgency to the Rhodesian case. The Rhodesian enemy-centric model prohibits dissent, engages in mass mobilization, and engages in mass violence. Prohibition on dissent addresses an incumbent's ability to curtail popular criticism. Mass mobilization captures the regime’s ability to mobilize sections of the population against the insurgency. Lastly, mass violence encompasses the incumbent’s use of force against a civilian population (Ucko, 2016).

After years of failed negotiations, Rhodesia formally declared independence from the United Kingdom. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965 ensured a severe weakening of relations with the United Kingdom and much of the international community. The freezing of relations led to international sanctions and the cutting of military and economic aid. Although designed to force the Rhodesian state to adopt an internal settlement with nationalist leaders (Bax, 2013, p. 428), international sanctions led to second order effects that structured the choice sets of COIN strategies available to the Rhodesian state. Second-order effects include the emergence of an anocratic regime, an emigration of White Rhodesians, and a rise in international support for guerillas.  

First, abandonment by the international community led Rhodesia to move from an anocratic regime to a more authoritarian government. Many of the “against the tide of history cases” were neither democratic, nor authoritarian. Rather, they fall somewhere in between. The Rhodesian and South African states were anocracies, or “a regime that mixes elements of democracy and autocracy” (Byman, 2015, p. 65).

In order to maintain a minority government in the face of rising insurgent threats, white Rhodesians elected the supremacist Rhodesian Front (RF). An early founder describes the Rhodesian Front, "'Our purpose was to keep Rhodesia as it was. To avert the chaos of a quick handover'" (Caute, 1983, p. 88). 

The Rhodesian Front adopted increasingly authoritarian institutions. By the end of the war, Rhodesia was largely under martial law, with a severely weakened parliament, and nearly all emergency powers lying with the executive (Karekwaivananace, 2011, pp. 336-337). As a result, the Rhodesian regime adopted an authoritarian COIN strategy and tactics that would have proved unacceptable to democratic regimes.

Emigration

International sanctions, and the cutting off of military and economic aid, were designed to force the Rhodesian government to participate in settlement negotiations with nationalist leadership (Bax, 2013, p. 428). Mass emigration of the Rhodesian middle class proved a second order effect of international sanctions. Mass emigration hampered the Rhodesian economy and limited manpower available for military service. In 1965 the population of white Rhodesians stood at approximately 250,000 (White, 2004, p. 103). As the conflict intensified, emigration increased. Between 1976 and 1980,  approximately 20 percent of the white population emigrated from Rhodesia (Caute, 1983, p. 29).

 International sanctions and the subsequent exodus of white professionals damaged the Rhodesian economy and increased pressure on the Rhodesian regime. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) made particular note of the increasing white emigration and the effects on the domestic economy. CIA found that white emigration was instrumental in a 13 percent decline in GDP between 1975 and 1979 (CIA, 1979).

Not only did emigration dampen the Rhodesian economy, but emigration severely limited the number of young males available for national service (White, 2004). The traditional axiom posits that the government must maintain a 10 to 1 ratio of counterinsurgent to insurgent forces. The Rhodesians fielded a proportion of approximately one-to-one throughout much of the conflict (Hoffman, Taw, & Arnold, 1991, p. 46). In spite of such numbers, the Rhodesian Security Forces combated the insurgency for over 10 years. However, by the end of the war, Rhodesian security forces could call upon only 2,300 white Rhodesians for national service (White, 2004, p. 120). 

In addition to lacking manpower in the field, international sanctions significantly limited the Rhodesian ability to import necessary materiel to successfully combat insurgencies. Although some have argued that the limitations of Rhodesian Security Forces material capabilities were never as dire as the government contended (White, 2009, p. 251), others contend that equipment was in dreadfully short supply.   A contemporary CIA study contends that “Major weaknesses of the armed forces are limited reserves, aging equipment, and uncertain sources of supply of spare parts, and new equipment” (CIA, 1979, p. 9).

As the Rhodesian military weakened, ZIPRA and ZANLA strengthened. American support for international counterinsurgency efforts declined significantly between 1968 and 1980 (O'Neil, 2005, p. 8). International condemnation from Western democracies indirectly encouraged expanded support from the Soviet Union, China, and the Front Line states to ZIPRA and ZANLA (White, 2009, p. 248). As a result of increased aid to guerrillas, Rhodesia adopted increasingly coercive COIN tactics in the hopes of averting a cataclysmic defeat. 

Existential threat

International sanctions allowed little negotiation space for the Rhodesian state. The Rhodesian government lacked the resources, time, and inclination to implement population-centric counterinsurgency strategies (CIA, 1979). As a result, Rhodesia was limited in the type of COIN warfare it could wage. As Downes points out, "Even in the most promising circumstances…low-violence counterinsurgent strategies are very expensive and time consuming" (2007, pp. 440-441). As a result of international sanctions, the Rhodesian regime lacked the resources and time necessary to engage in low-violence COIN. As a result, the Rhodesian state engaged in lower cost coercive COIN strategies (Byman, 2015, p. 79). 

In addition to limited resources and manpower, the coercive nature of Rhodesian COIN strategy stems from the state’s battle for its own existence. Rhodesia – as both a state and construct – faced an existential crisis. 

The Rhodesian leadership knew that an insurgent victory would (and did) result in the complete destruction of social, political, and economic institutions. The Rhodesian state faced a limited set of choices. The costs of traditional population-centric or "hearts and minds" COIN strategies proved cost-prohibitive. The Rhodesian government simply did not have the blood, treasure, nor the public will to fight a prolonged counterinsurgency. As a result, the Rhodesian state adopted a coercive COIN strategy. That is, the regime adopted low levels of civilian protection, high levels of civilian control, limited societal reform, and co-option for some societal elites (Hazelton, 2017).

Once the die was cast, and the Rhodesian state implemented coercive COIN strategies, it became increasingly difficult to adopt a political path. Increased international pressure on Rhodesia added little incentive for the regime to limit the brutality of its COIN strategy. Unlike the British colonies in Kenya, or the French in Algeria, Rhodesia had no far-flung constituency calling for a kinder, gentler, approach to counterinsurgency.      

This paper suggests that international sanctions may have shaped the decision path of the Rhodesian government and led Rhodesia towards an authoritarian COIN model. I contend that international sanctions may have produced a path dependent process towards coercive COIN practices. Although international sanctions were designed to force the Rhodesians to adopt majoritarian rule, sanctions created second order effects, which made divergence from an authoritarian path difficult. 

First, sanctions led Rhodesia to become more insular and paranoid. Always an anocratic regime, Rhodesia became increasingly authoritarian. Counterinsurgency tactics that would be unpalatable to democratic governments proved more acceptable to the authoritarian Rhodesian regime. Second, international sanctions led to mass white migration. Subsequently, Rhodesia faced economic decline and significant limitations on Security Force manpower. As a result, Rhodesia had neither the blood nor treasure to fight "conventional" hearts and minds COIN warfare. Lastly, international sanctions provided space for increased external support for the insurgencies. As the insurgent threat increased, the Rhodesian COIN strategy became increasingly coercive. As a result, international sanctions limited the type of counterinsurgency Rhodesia could wage^[ii]. 

^[i] I recognize that single-case study research, “with ambiguous case selection and tentative findings will irk the more orthodox political scientists” (Ucko, 2016, p. 36). However, selecting only one case can be justified when doing so “provides better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation” and may lead to “zeroing in on the theoretically crucial cases, which can provide decisive tests of theories" (2004, p. 87). As such, this paper seeks to build upon the authoritarian COIN theory and subsequently address "the declining focus in political science on creating and refining theories" (Hazelton, 2017, p. 95).

^[ii] Admittedly, this causal process – like much of this paper – is currently underdeveloped and will be fleshed out in future iterations.