The U.S. Marine Corps, China, and Force Design

Force Design, originally known as Force Design 2030, is a restructuring initiative by the United States Marine Corps aimed at modernizing its combat capabilities to address future near-peer adversary conflicts. Introduced in March 2020 by General David H. Berger, the plan focuses on preparing the Marine Corps for potential naval warfare against near-peer adversaries, such as China. Key goals include enhancing collaboration with the U.S. Navy, transitioning to a more amphibious and agile strike force, and modernizing equipment.

The near-peer threat of China’s aspirations towards reunification with Taiwan has American and allied forces laser-focused on the regional and global implications and ramifications of such an event. The new strategy correctly models a complete mix of platforms and weapons systems. However, it falls short in the small-unit tactics necessary to achieving deterrence and enhancing warfighting capacity.

If the Marine Corps is to be operationally ready to conduct anti-access/area denial operations, it appears to have overlooked critical components of operational practice. The staff functions of intelligence, deployment, sustainment, command, and control are interrupted when hostilities begin. The platforms these littoral combat teams will operate are limited in size and means of ingress/egress. The conceptual and physical links between strategy and tactics are mainly absent. There is a tendency to apply the operational practice to large-scale operations and meet strength with strength through the conduct of offensive operations. If Marines are to focus on anti-access and area denial from island platforms, lighter combat teams will be needed. Those same teams will be required to conduct operations that do not appear sustainable. The combat load for a typical Marine in this environment can be appreciably more considerable than that of a more conventional mission, incorporating the additional weight of anti-ship weapons, navigation systems, communication systems, and potentially scuba equipment and small boats must be considered.

These small-unit tactics will combine reconnaissance and intelligence gathering with the ability to deploy immediate weapon capability and avenues of communication and retreat. This begs the question of what steps are being taken to assure Marines that their missions are not one-and-done events. The plan lacks practical considerations, including local conditions, terrain, freshwater, and, most importantly, the native peoples. The latter can be an asset or a liability.

The cornerstone of America’s continued military preeminence is our ability to project power rapidly and virtually unimpeded to widespread areas of the globe. If Berger’s littoral teams are to be mobile, agile, and quickly redeployed, how do we maintain and preserve that constant and persistent presence? Despite the apparent danger of precision weapons and naval bombardment, the Marine Corps is ignoring that China has already considered the question of area denial. Further, it should be suspected and preparations made for the idea that China is already infiltrating local populations and initiating insurgent plans for their version of asymmetrical warfare.

Judgment and criticism of Berger’s Force Design should be tempered against the overwhelming fact that new American militarism embodies a false sense of capability and superiority. Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look after we abandoned Afghanistan and the new near-peer threats of China and Russia.

After over forty years focused on Southwest Asia and a preceding 30 years focused on Southeast Asia, the American military is faced with fighting a war they have not considered or contemplated in their training and strategic focus since World War II.  The Marine Corps must focus on a highly maneuverable force that can serve as an early warning force through forward observation posts and with the capability to engage warships with shore-to-ship weapons. While no one questions the Marine Corps’ ability to engage with and destroy the enemy, we cannot lose sight of the Marine Corps’ dependence on logistical and operational support. The answer will not lie in the forward deployed units and over-the-horizon response but in area denial through a robust naval presence. Equal power struggles to co-exist in a limited space without confrontation, and conflict is not likely. Force Design 2030 needs to be retooled quickly to provide a cohesive Naval solution for our national security in the South China Sea.

James M. Deitch served as the Motor Transport Operations Chief for 6th Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Fleet Service Combat Support Group during Operation Desert Storm from 1990 to 1991. He served in the Marine Corps from 1984 to 1996.