Wake Island Lessons for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

Fighting an Enemy Surge

Eighty-five years ago an under-strength Marine Defense Battalion (MDB) and its supporting Marine F4F Wildcat fighter squadron stood their ground at Wake Island. The defenders momentarily stemmed the Japanese tide of victories in the Pacific that exploited Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.[1] The defense of Wake remains relevant for modern Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).

Today’s potential threat is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which has built a potent Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) arsenal.[2] The PRC seeks to dominate the first island chain, making American allies and partners more vulnerable to coercion.[3] Marine Corps transformation under the Force Design road map is part of America’s military response to China’s expanding People’s Liberation Army (PLA) power projection capabilities. By reviewing the EABO concept and the battle for Wake Island, lessons are evident for implementing key features of EABO.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy directed the Marine Corps to prepare for littoral operations against a PLA pacing threat.[4] Force Design 2030[5] embraced that mission, organizing Marines to defeat A2/AD capabilities. Each Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) organized under the transformation includes a Littoral Combat Team (LCT) equipped for anti-ship and air defense missions to maneuver in the littorals within range of enemy A2/AD weapons.[6]

The MLR organizes LCTs to command and control distributed task-organized Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EABs) in the contested area. The LCTs conduct sustained sea denial operations to enable Navy missions.[10] An infantry battalion is the core of the LCT.[11] LCTs conduct and sustain combat operations, including strike and anti-air/missile missions; maintain theater and tactical mobility; and remain undetected while operating within range of enemy weapons.[12]

Defending Wake Island

With tensions rising in Asia while war raged in Europe, America began to fortify its territories in the Pacific, including the small Wake Island atoll first occupied in 1898.[13] Wake featured a refueling stop for Pan Am Clipper flying boats linking Hawaii to Guam.[14] Wake, under Navy control since 1934, was “one of the most strategically utilized islands of the Pacific.” Anticipated capabilities included airplanes, submarines, and small surface craft.[15]

A 1938 report recommended a 3-4 year plan to create an air base for long-range aircraft. In early 1941, development began. The intent was to make bases “relatively secure against air raids, hit-and-run surface attacks, or even minor landings.” MDBs were equipped for coastal and air defense. To defeat minor landings, infantry units could be formed from the MDB because “every Marine first and last, is an infantryman.”[16] Yet in April the Pacific Fleet commander was alarmed at Wake’s “defenseless condition.”[17] Unless that was rectified, the Navy would be unable to ambush a Japanese fleet focused on overcoming Wake’s defenders. The austere base meant defense preparations suffered because Marines were diverted to perform logistics tasks during the pre-war period.[18] The Navy also recognized that exploiting that bait required an intact Pacific Fleet and tracking the Japanese fleet.[19]

After Japan struck Pearl Harbor and put much of the Pacific Fleet’s battleship force out of action, the Navy considered options to reinforce, evacuate, or abandon Wake. The Navy chose to reinforce the garrison, evacuate some of the civilian construction workers, and hope the garrison and remaining workers could prepare sufficiently before Japan attacked.[20] Japan struck Wake shortly after raiding Pearl Harbor. Land-based bombers from Kwajalein evaded four patrolling Wildcat fighters and inadequate air detection means. Cloud cover aided the Japanese who knocked out eight Wildcats on the ground, which lacked protective revetments. A Clipper survived and subsequently evacuated some of the civilians. More raids over the next two days eliminated large amounts of ammunition and decoy gun positions. The surviving Wildcats shot down two of the attackers.[21]

The Japanese invasion force of older light cruisers and destroyers escorting a small ground force arrived December 11th. The defenders at the pointy end of the stick remained confident notwithstanding the devastating picture emerging across the theater.[22] The Japanese were confident, too, and did not expect resistance.[23] The Marine gun batteries held their fire until the Japanese warships came in close, hitting the Japanese ships hard and preventing any troop landing; and Wildcats bombed and strafed them during their retreat.[24] Of the 13 ships in the invasion force, the Wake garrison damaged nine and sank two.[25] More Japanese air raids followed, and the island’s anti-aircraft weapons and remaining fighter planes inflicted more damage[26] The Wake defenders had less than two weeks to cheer their success and prepare for the next assault. While looking out to sea for rescue.

The Wake relief operation was a complex plan using all three American aircraft carriers available in the Pacific. The Navy selected the carrier Saratoga to lead a force of cruisers and destroyers, a seaplane tender, and an oiler to sustain the task force.[27] The tender would evacuate the rest of the civilians after unloading its cargo at Wake.[28] Saratoga carried Marine aircraft for the garrison.[29] The Lexington carrier task force would attack Japanese Marshall Island bases as a feint. The Enterprise carrier task force sailing near Midway Island would protect Hawaii and serve as a reserve to support the other carriers. American intelligence expected no more than two Japanese carriers would support a second invasion attempt.[30]

Before the slowly organizing relief operation could kick off, a second reinforced Japanese invasion fleet attacked Wake. Carrier aircraft strikes from Hiryu and Soryu detached from the returning Pearl Harbor strike force to complete the conquest destroyed the remaining Wake Wildcats.[31] This time, Japanese warships kept their distance and skipped the preparatory bombardment, rapidly landing a much larger ground force before dawn. And at locations where the scattered Marine gun batteries’ fire was masked. Nonetheless, the Marines inflicted heavy losses on the larger enemy. Yet Japanese troops remained ashore with unknown reserves afloat facing a Marine garrison whose infantry component was simply gun crews organized as infantry. Without communications to the surviving Marine positions—above-ground telephone wires did not survive combat—to judge their status and with no relief force in sight, the garrison surrendered.[32]

Knowing two carriers were attacking Wake, the Navy worried their relief force could be ambushed.[33] The relief operation was called off on December 22nd.[34]

EABO and Wake Lessons

Features of EABO include:[35]

1.     Establishing EABs within the enemy’s tactical weapons engagement zone (WEZ) before conflict.

2.     Contributing to the kill web’s anti-ship, anti-submarine, land strike, and air/missile defense missions.

3.     Maintaining organic mobility for theater and tactical movement to maintain persistent capabilities within the broad area.

4.     Conducting sustainment missions enabled by a light posture and austere settings, with host nation support when possible.

5.     Protecting EABs from detection and targeting.

6.     Reliably communicating to maintain integration with the joint force.

7.     Establishing aircraft forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).

8.     Controlling or denying to the enemy key maritime terrain.

9.     Conducting surveillance, reconnaissance, and screen/guard/cover missions to generate, preserve, deny, and project information.[36]

Wake’s MBD deployed its 5” and 3” guns in separate strongpoints. That reflects in more concentrated form the intent for LCTs to command widely separated EABs. The defense of Wake Island provides lessons for many features of EABO waged from scattered littoral bases.

1. Establishing EABs.

Time is a precious commodity. Capabilities are always insufficient. Preparing Wake for war demonstrated the difficulties of deploying enough force; and the limitations of an austere EAB taking its place in a kill web. Establishing EABs prior to hostility will tempt planners to add more capabilities. But the price will add to existing sustainment and mobility problems. Yet the EAB will still be insufficient to defend itself if unsupported by outside forces. Determining key terrain for EABs may be judged by very different standards once war starts. Then an EAB will be in place with the “leave no man behind” standard conflicting with preserving Navy ships for another fight.

·       A full-strength MDB would have 982 personnel, with anti-ship, anti-air, and fire control and detection capabilities. The battalion on Wake had only 373 personnel unable to man all its crew-served weapons, and lacked sufficient fire control equipment. Only the 5” gun batteries were fully manned.[37]

·       Time to train and entrench was lost by diverting troops to labor-intensive aircraft refueling; and for unloading offshore supply ships.[38]

·       On the eve of war, 12 insufficiently supported fighters were added to the garrison.[39]

·       A British woman touring the island with her husband while flying through Wake commented when told of the urgent defense preparations, “Yes, it would be nice to have six months more, wouldn’t it?”[40]

·       The Navy judged it could defend Wake against up to a single Japanese carrier. Yet others believed Wake was not worth defending.[41] After the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Kimmel said fortifying Wake had been a moral duty to give the defenders hope of surviving.[42]

2. Contributing to Kinetic Missions.

Ships are mobile. Land garrisons are less so. That friction in a joint kill web increases with enemy pressure. The Wake garrison shows the opportunities and difficulties of a LCT operating in a joint kill web with constrained capabilities.

·       The MDB damaged or sank nearly the entire first Japanese squadron and inflicted significant air losses.

·       Marine Wildcats could provide air defense and reconnaissance.[43]

·       Marines MacGyvered[44] the Wildcats to drop small 100-pound bombs used against Japanese ships.[45] And at a range far exceeding 5” guns.[46]

·       Wake had the potential to be bait to spring a Navy ambush on the Japanese squadron. That in turn would deny the Japanese the ability to overwhelm the MDB. When the Navy was withheld from the battle, joint fight synergy broke down.

·       Two American submarines were ordered to patrol near the island.[47] They were not integrated into the defense and played no role.

·       Japanese carriers sowed doubt about the appropriate American course of action. Aggressive Navy action was ultimately judged—rightly or wrongly—too risky despite leaving the garrison and remaining civilians to be captured.[48]

3. Maintaining Organic Mobility.

EABs cannot match Navy mobility for surviving and maneuvering to attack. Moving with their own assets is possible with host nation support for overland movement in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Significant sea or air transport capabilities will be needed elsewhere. Can the Navy Landing Ship Medium support EABs under fire? Can EABs exploit fleeting opportunities to redeploy? And given that the Navy needs the support of EABs to cope with the PLA, allocating Navy warships to protect EABs moving within China’s A2/AD WEZ is disturbingly ironic.

·       The MDB was relatively immobile once emplaced.[49]

·       The austere Wake Island had no protected facilities for sea planes, land-based aircraft, or surface vessels.

·       The Wake garrison’s first victory bought time to evacuate the Marines and civilians.

·       Japanese air raids continued between invasion efforts.

·       The second Japanese attack closed the window for rescue.

·       Rescuing Wake was abandoned because of the risk to America’s suddenly vital carriers.[50]

4. Sustaining EABs.

There is never enough capability. Will MLRs overload their EABs to the point they can’t be sustained? Further, austere EABs will make receiving and protecting supplies difficult. Logistics will be strained sustaining both the Navy and the EABs.

·       The Japanese destroyed badly needed ammunition early in the battle.

·       The Marines lost two-thirds of their Wildcats in the first attack, eventually losing all of them. No replacements arrived.

·       The Wake garrison accomplishment of driving off the initial attacking fleet and inflicting substantial losses left the Marines with insufficient “critical equipment, ammunition, and manpower.” The garrison needed to be reinforced or evacuated.[51]

·       Inadequate underway refueling skill slowed Saratoga enough to miss the relief window of opportunity. The possibility of losing even one oiler promoted caution.[52]

5. Concealing EABs.

Flexibility in operations is necessary despite peacetime plans. EABO intends to use main force sea and air assets as bait to enable hidden EABs to strike the PLA maneuvering to attack the main assets.[53] This inverts the Wake bait mission. Achieving this assumes EABs remain concealed to ambush the PLA. If the PLA locates and attacks those EABs, the Navy and the joint force may face the Wake rescue dilemma. EABO concealment measures may duplicate the effects of Japanese ignorance about Wake’s defenders, compensating for inferior capabilities. But surviving may depend more on PLA mistakes than American preparations.

·       The Japanese did not have a clear picture of the Wake defenders and wrongly assumed ineffective resistance.

·       Marine gunners exploited Japan’s intelligence failure by holding their fire to increase their chances for successful strikes rather than exploit the maximum range of their 5” guns.

·       Not all the guns were entrenched or even camouflaged.[54]

·       A Navy Catalina seaplane arrived at Wake to notify the garrison to be prepared to receive reinforcements and evacuate civilians. The plane’s crew dutifully radioed valuable hourly weather reports. Unfortunately, the Japanese intercepted the transmissions, concluded the Americans would send help, and accelerated their second attack.[55]

·       Had the Japanese switched their Guam and Wake attack forces from the start, both islands could have quickly fallen.[56]

6. Communicating Reliably.

Marine LCTs will need to communicate with dispersed EABs and with higher headquarters to remain part of a joint kill web rather than being merely isolated, vulnerable outposts.

·       Dispersed Wake strongpoints were organized around coastal defense and air defense weapons.

·       Communications to the Marine strongpoints relied on vulnerable above-ground telephone lines.[57] No alternate means were available.

·       Navy efforts to contact two submarines in the area to attack the second invasion fleet failed.[58]

·       The Wake garrison commander could not contact the Navy to find out if continued resistance justified further loss of life.

7. Establishing FARPs.

Aircraft add capabilities to the kill web. Can an austere EAB struggling with its own combat and logistics capabilities host and protect aircraft?

·       Wildcats were the garrison’s only long-range anti-ship weapon. Even that limited capability contributed in the first attack.

·       The Marines struggled to maintain, refuel, and rearm their Wildcats. The airfield was fragile; support infrastructure and supplies—including the complete lack of airplane manuals—were inadequate; and planes on the ground had no passive protection.[59]

8. Fighting for Key Maritime Terrain.

EABs are an ambush force with limited self-defense depth. Force Design reduced the amount of infantry and other ground combat capabilities the Marines had in favor of supporting the Navy to defeat the PLA at sea. How will LCTs fight for land terrain with the MLR’s limited infantry and heavier weapons? Should MLRs evolve to correct that potential deficiency?

·       The Wake defenders inflicted heavy losses on the first attacking fleet. It was the only time in World WAR II that shore batteries prevented an enemy from landing an amphibious force.[60] Yet the heroic defense without external support could not stem the tide for long.

·       The MDB was not built for sustained ground combat. Once Japanese troops held their toehold, the Marine garrison felt it had no choice but to surrender.

·       MDBs were not universally welcomed by the Marine Corps because they reduced the offensive capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force. The Marines considered an Army offer to take over island garrison duties to protect Army Air Corps bases. The Marines ultimately rejected the offer to avoid losing scarce equipment.[61]

9. Dominating the Contest for Information.

“Uncertainty pervades warfare. It manifests itself in the form of ‘unknowns about the enemy, about the environment, and even about the friendly position.’ This is especially true while operating with few assets scattered across great distances.” [62] Appropriate information must support each echelon’s ability to fight. Without SIF success in the information battle across the screening zone, American forces will face more unknowns and may take counsel of their fears.

·       In the wake of Pearl Harbor, much of the Pacific Fleet’s staff reeled as the “Japanese went from being viewed as inferior to invincible overnight.” Japan’s actual and rumored victories inflated fears of what the Japanese were capable of, “provoking panicked reactions, enormous confusion, and occasional friendly fire deaths.”[63]

·       The Wake garrison remained confident in their “view through a straw” perspective on an isolated outpost. They fought bravely and effectively.

·       The initial Japanese air strike evaded detection because of cloud cover that degraded visual detection by the airborne Wildcats, lack of Marine radar, and the constant pounding of the surf that drowned out the sound of approaching planes.[64]

·       The Wake garrison lacked air, surface vessel, or submarine reconnaissance to support a Navy ambush.

Persistence of Missions with New Means

Littoral Combat Teams are not World War II MDBs with modern capabilities. The LCT is part of a joint kill web while the MDB was a point defense formation with the potential for conducting reconnaissance and strike missions to aid the Navy. Yet their missions and challenges are very similar. The elegant plans for EABO in a SIF-enabled kill web won’t survive getting punched first.[65] Challenges faced by the MDB at Wake Island can inform the design and employment of LCTs should small bands of Marines again be ordered to stand their ground on remote islands in the western Pacific.

Brian J. Dunn holds an AB in political science and history from the University of Michigan and a MA in history from Eastern Michigan University. He retired from his job as a nonpartisan research analyst for the Michigan State Legislature, and served in the Michigan Army National Guard for six years. He has written articles for publications such as Proceedings, Army, Military Review, and Joint Force Quarterly; and writes about defense and national security issues on Substack in The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

Notes:

[1] Paul Kennedy, Pacific Onslaught (Ballantine Books, 1972), 17.

[2] Achieved with weapons that increase the cost to the Navy to enter waters approaching China; and deny the Navy the ability to operate in waters close to China.

[3] United States Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-in Forces (December 2021) <https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Users/183/35/4535/211201_A%20Concept%20for%20Stand-In%20Forces.pdf>, 3.

[4] United States Marine Corps, Force Design 2030 (March 2020) <https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf>, 2.

[5] The concept itself is now called “Force Design”.

[6] Force Design 2030, 3, 5.

[7] A Concept for Stand-in Forces, 1, 4-5.

[8] Kerg, Fowler, and Johnson, “The MLR ≠ The Stand-in Force,” Proceedings Volume 145/2/1,392 (July 2025). <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/july/mlr-stand-force>

[9] Major Pat Hassett, USMC, “Bringing Clarity to the Stand-in Forces,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies Volume 15, No. 2 <https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-15-no-2/Bringing-Clarity-to-Stand-in-Forces/>

[10] Tentative Manual For Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 2^nd Edition (Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, May 2023) <https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/230509-Tentative-Manual-For-Expeditionary-Advanced-Base-Operations-2nd-Edition.pdf?ver=05KvG8wWlhI7uE0amD5uYg%3d%3d>, A-2.

[11] Ibid., A-4.

[12] Ibid., 1-3, 1-4.

[13] Concise Dictionary of American History, ed. Thomas C. Cochran and Wayne Andrews (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962), 480.

[14] Samuel J. Cox, Director NHHC, H-Gram 002: Wake Island (National Museum of the U.S. Navy, Navy History and Heritage Command, 29 December 2016), <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/about-us/leadership/hgram_pdfs/H-Gram_002.pdf>, 6.

[15] Homer C. Votaw, “Wake Island,” Proceedings Vol. 67/1/455 (January 1941) <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1941/january/wake-island>

[16] Lt. Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, The Defense of Wake Island (Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters, U. S. marine Corps, 1947) <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Heinl_The%20Defense%20of%20Wake.pdf?ver=2019-02-12-085233-467>, 2-3.

[17] Heinl, 1.

[18] John Wukovits, Pacific Alamo: the battle for Wake Island (NAL Caliber, 2003), 29.

[19] Marilyn R. Pierce, Major, USA, Tactical Defeat or Strategic Victory: The Battle For Wake Island, 8-23 December 1941 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998) <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA350061.pdf>, 56.

[20] Ibid., 57.

[21] Cox, 6-7.

[22] Wukovits, 48.

[23] Pierce, 64.

[24] Cox, 7.

[25] Toll, 147.

[26] Cox, 7.

[27] “Attack on Wake Island” (National Museum of the U.S. Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d.) <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/wwii/wwii-pacific/us-entry-into-wwii-japanese-offensive/1941-december-11-attack-wake-island.html>

[28] Pierce, 60.

[29] “Saratoga V (CV-3): 1927-1946” (National Museum of the U.S. Navy, Navy History and Heritage Command, 27 March 2026) <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/saratoga-v.html>

[30] Cox, 7.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Pierce, 72, 75.

[34] Saratoga V (CV 3): 1927-1946.

[35] Tentative Manual For Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 1-3, 1-4, 2-2,  A-1.

[36] See Tentative Manual For Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, E-2, E-3, E-6, for definitions of the distinctions for the cover, guard, and screen missions.

[37] Heinl, 3, 10

[38] Wukovits, 29.

[39] Heinl, 8.

[40] Wukovits, 48.

[41] Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: the U.S. strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1991), 288-89, 291.

[42] Ibid., 292.

[43] Wukovits, 41.

[44] A term referring to the television character able to create weapons from chewing gum and duct tape. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/macgyver>

[45] Toll, 146.

[46] Wukovits, 42.

[47] Miller, 292.

[48] Toll, 155-56.

[49] Glen Williford, Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific Outposts, 1941-1942 (Naval Institute Press, 2010), 131.

[50] The Japanese crippled America’s battleship force at Pearl Harbor, keeping the presumed key naval weapon out of the subsequent broad Japanese offensive.

[51] Toll, 146.

[52] Cox, 9.

[53] Tentative Manual For Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 1-4.

[54] Wukovits, 42-43.

[55] Pierce, 73-4.

[56] Williford, 208.

[57] Heinl, 10.

[58]Pierce, 77.

[59] Wukovits, 42.

[60] Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2012), 147.

[61] Williford, 141-142.

[62] Second Lieutenant Sean Kelsay, USMC, Proceedings Vol. 147/6/1,42o (June 2021) <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/june/maneuvering-through-uncertainty-pacific>

[63] Cox, 11.

[64] Ibid., 6.

[65] As boxer Mike Tyson observed. See “Quote Origin: Everybody Has Plans Until They Get Hit for the First Time,” Quote Investigator (August 25, 2021) < https://quoteinvestigator.com/2021/08/25/plans-hit>