A New CNO, Some Current Recommendations

• Expeditionary Navy. In the past, I have provided background[i], rational, strategy[ii], and force structure for building a navy that can carry the fight to any opponent, overseas.[iii]  The right number of manned ships is 351.[iv]  Those recommendations stand.
• FFG-62. “Bear whatever cost, piss off whoever you need to, hire the lawyers necessary, propose whatever legislation, etc., etc., etc., but get out of this train wreck and cancel this program now.”[v]
• Frigate (FF). We need to build a class of small, affordable escort warships with primary warfare areas of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW). I propose building a new version of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class FFG-7 with VLS replacing the Mk13 launcher, CAPTAS-4 replacing AN/SQR-19, removing the over-the-side (OTS) torpedo system, and updating the sensors and combat system. With two hangars and the current ability to carry two MH-60R helicopters, a new version of FFG-7 would be ideally suited for the employment of future unmanned aerial systems (UAVs).
• Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). I am too far removed from current efforts to right this ship (pun intended) and make any specific recommendations, but I like the idea of putting a percentage of these ships into a revitalized Naval Reserve Force (NRF). Reconstituting the NRF in this way would provide some short- and long-term cost savings while also providing the Surface Reserve component with some desperately needed platforms on which to train. In addition, these units would be available in the event of a national crisis and can support peacetime counter-drug patrols.
• DDG-1000. This class should have always been designated a land-attack cruiser; it is in no way a destroyer as destroyers have been historically defined/understood. Again, I am too far removed to provide specific recommendations, but I would focus these ships on being the operational centerpiece of land-attack surface action groups (SAGs).
• Unmanned surface vessels (USVs). I support research and development of USVs, but the four-time failure of the Navy to successfully develop minimally manned surface vessels should provide a cautionary note. I will feel much more comfortable about our prospects when I hear more discussion of USV basing and support, which I believe has been lacking to date. The Base is the most important of the four Fleet functions, as it enables the other three.[vi]
• Operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The number one thing the Navy can do to improve force material readiness, morale, and retention is return to predictable six-month long deployments. I urge the CNO to bang on the table, advocate for changes to Joint force employment, hold his breath until he turns blue, advocate for the necessary legislation, etc., etc., etc., in an effort to get OPTEMPO reduced.

I wish the CNO all the best!