The Quad has more policy space to undertake maritime security activities than its members’ policymakers have assumed. Our recent study, published on 13 October by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, shows that Quad partners could expand security activities if they were to concurrently deliver benefits to Southeast Asian states, experiment with creative configurations of participation, and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in regional political relations.

Regional views should be investigated, not assumed. For good reason the Quad – the informal grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – has consistently sworn that it doesn’t seek to supplant the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the region’s primary international organisation or otherwise rattle Southeast Asian countries that fear intensifying security rivalry between the US and China. But every Southeast Asian country views the Quad’s security activities through the prism of its own distinct national interests. Their perceptions are not automatically opposed to Quad military activities, nor are they uniform across countries.

After watching Russia bombard Ukrainian civilians and cities for 4.5 years with ballistic missiles and drones, and seeing Iran do the same to US bases and Gulf State populations in the Middle East, Australia’s military has started to take missile defence and countering long range drones seriously. 

That’s good, because we know – because people like Defence Minister Marles have told us – that China’s military has plenty of ballistic missiles and long range drones capable of reaching Australia whether launched from the Chinese homeland or from various PLA ships, submarines and planes.