Russia's Peace Conference on Afghanistan: What Does It Mean?

Last week (November 9), Russia finally convened its long-heralded peace conference on Afghanistan. Attending the conference were members of the Taliban as well as the governments of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and China. A representative of the Embassy of the United States in Moscow also attended as an observer, as did members of the Afghan government’s Peace Council, but no member of the formal government in Kabul (Al Jazeera, November 9; TASS, November 12). The so-called “Moscow format consultations” are intended “to coordinate the development of an inclusive intra-Afghan dialogue toward promoting the process of national reconciliation and the restoration of peace as soon as possible in the long-suffering Afghan state” (Mid.ru, November 9).

Russia, like other observers, apparently sees the US as bogged down in Afghanistan and therefore perceives an opportunity to achieve several Russian objectives simultaneously (Ifri.org, September 2018). It aims to regain enduring influence in Afghanistan; discredit US military and political performance; strengthen its alliance with China that is manifested in its warming relations with Pakistan—probably at China’s suggestion—whose interests will gain from the Taliban’s inclusion in the government; and also simultaneously retain its influence and strong ties with India, a long-standing partner. Indeed, the fact that neither Washington nor Kabul were officially represented at the Moscow talks suggests the fundamentally anti-US and de facto anti-Afghan motives underlying Russian policy. We should thus not expect much in the way of a viable or acceptable road to peace out of this conference. Instead, like a lot of Russian foreign policy, the Moscow meeting may ultimately be little more than a propaganda stunt.

Nevertheless, if this is the case, why are major governments like India participating? India, of course, has vital interests in the future of Afghanistan as well as long-standing concerns that Pakistan uses that war-torn country to both challenge those Indian interests and incite terrorist attacks there. New Delhi has long supported the idea, therefore, that an Afghan peace must be made and owned by the Afghans themselves, not third parties (Al Jazeera, November 9). However, under the circumstances where even the US, not to mention other parties, have already had discussions with the Taliban (in the US case, bilateral meetings in the Gulf), India is hard-pressed not to attend lest its interests become marginalized as a result of its absence.

In the final analysis, the November 9 conference represents another of Moscow’s many efforts to convince itself, the Russian people and international audiences that it truly is a global power able and willing to propose constructive solutions to current world crises. Put another way, Moscow is seeking recognition that it deserves a stature comparable to what it had in 1945.

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow and resident Russia expert at the American Foreign Policy Council. Previously, he worked as a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.