Preparing Taiwan for a War With China

As the Ukraine-Russia war passes the two months mark, the tide on the battlefield has fundamentally changed. Rather than staying on the defensive, Ukrainian forces have shifted their strategy, with NATO’s assistance, to expel Russia from its current occupation. While the final outcome of this war seems elusive, most observers believe that the successes of Ukrainian forces lie partially in employing an asymmetrical strategy. The employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Stinger missiles, Bayraktar TB2, switchblades, NLAWs, and new technology such as SpaceX’s Starlink has disproportionately damaged Russian forces, paving the foundation of Ukraine’s current military posture against Russian invasion.

We argue that Taiwan should keep constructing its defense capability by balancing a variety of approaches and should not treat these strategies mutually exclusive. Putting most emphasis on purchasing light weapons and small arms could be helpful for Taiwan’s defense, but it might also incur other weaknesses. Cross-Strait war games have demonstrated that China has considered various ways to coerce Taiwan, such as a naval blockade, an amphibious attack, a surprise attack, a decapitation strike, or a combination of the above. Therefore, reorienting the island to rely on light arms or asymmetrical strategy could significantly weaken the traditional deterrence that Taiwan’s forces could provide against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It might also create unintended consequences that give China an upper hand in identifying a previous nonexistent weakness. Recent delays for U.S. manufacturers to acquire chips to make stinger missiles also suggest that shifting arms purchases to just a few categories could be risky. Thus, striking a balance between traditional and asymmetrical military capabilities is critical for Taiwan to maintain its deterrence posture against China.   

For the near future, Taiwan’s administration needs to double down on its investment in Taiwan’s defense industry to cultivate a military supply chain. Taiwan is capable of producing some weapons on its own, including the Hsiung Sheng surface-to-surface missiles, Wan Chien air-to-ground missiles, and its indigenous diesel submarine. Taiwan should also initiate a discussion with the United States to carve out divisions of labor to not overlap efforts in producing arms. More importantly, Taiwan needs to maintain deterrence with its navy and air force. Cumulatively, of course, the disparity between Taiwan and China reveals that Taiwan’s air force and naval powers could not effectively expel or stall its enemy. However, losing air and naval superiority quickly to China at the beginning of warfare will allow China to easily suppress resistance from Taiwan’s troops. In other words, Taiwan still very much needs traditional weapons such as fighter jets and missiles to deter a Chinese invasion.

In brief, pursuing both goals would result in fewer trade-offs than many would think. Recently, more and more citizens in Taiwan now support the government to increase its defense budget and even revert back to the conscription system. For instance, Taiwan will be able to procure more arms with a 3% GDP. Taiwan’s weapon procurements should be multi-dimensional, and public support now is the highest in recent years.

Yao-Yuan Yeh, Chair and Associate Professor in the Department of International Studies & Modern Languages at the University of St Thomas, Houston @yeh2sctw

Charles K. S. Wu, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Alabama Twitter: @kuanshengtwn

Fang-Yu Chen, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Soochow University, Taiwan @FangYu_80168

Austin Horng-En Wang, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. @wearytolove