
Climate and a Looming World War
Published July 11, 2024 • Read time: 12m
With a Looming World War, It is Time to Link a Grand Climate Bargain to Democratization
Bargains work best when both parties desperately want something from the other. Much of the developing world, where 6.7 billion (or 83 percent) people live, live in climates and soils under the greatest climate stress, and are desperate for a solution to global warming. By 2100, the projected average increased global temperature range of 1 to 5.7 degree Celsius, will inflict an agriculture drought on thirty percent of the world’s soils. Coupled with desertification, it will result in food deficits in selective areas of up to sixty percent, contributing to resource conflicts and state collapse, triggering in turn a scale of maritime migration heretofore unseen. Already, Africa, with a population of 1.5 billion (a ten-fold increase since 1900, and a seven-fold increase since the end of the Second World War), imports 30 percent of its food supply. By 2100, Africa’s population will more than double to 4 billion (or almost 40 percent of the wold’s total population), magnifying its vulnerability to a disruption of imports caused by a world war. China and India, two candidates for future global hegemon, are also under severe climate stress. Having already passed the de-carbonization point of no return, by some estimates, the world is in the damage control phase of addressing the consequences of a return to Malthusian economics and demographics.
The world’s liberal democracies, because of their attractive economic, political and cultural systems, especially in the areas of personal liberties and individual conscience, pose an existential threat to the world’s authoritarian regimes. Given the ease of societal comparison through social media, even in North Korea, these militarily powerful states are suffering from the steady erosion of their legitimacy. Fearing a color revolution, they have started or are threatening wars against local democratic exemplars in their region. Russia has already invaded Ukraine, and China’s Communist leader Xi Jinping has alerted the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) to be prepared to invade Taiwan starting in 2027. North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Un, is fully aware that the wealth and success of South Korea poses an existential threat to the Pyongyang regime. The unprecedented and converging threats of color revolution in Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tehran, has brought these countries closer together, and led to threats of war from every single one of their leaders.
The modality of such an agreement should include an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, which is already the host to isolated negotiations on non-proliferation (1968/1995 NPT), The Paris Agreement addressing climate change, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a sound basis for mandating the requirements of liberal democracy. The fundamental global illegitimacy of authoritarian systems of government is obvious in the constancy with which these types of governments pretend to hold elections for legislatures, or refer to the term “true” democracy in their constitutions and laws. Making climate negotiations conditional on progress in state liberalization and preservation of non-proliferation objectives, compensates the developed economies from the tremendous costs of industrial restructuring, and protects them from being exploited by aggressor states who seek to take advantage of weakness during the transition period. Already we see critical disjunctures, where the Canadian government refused to take steps to provide gas to Europe during the opening stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, because it chose to prioritize climate goals over democratic unity.
The objections are predictable. The principal moral objection by activists in the West is that climate change is a externalization of settler-colonial industrialization, facilitated by European conquest of territories with the world’s best temperate soils (Rio de la Plata, North America, and Australia). Therefore, the argument goes, climate change should take precedence and not be conditioned on the proximity of developing world regimes to the ideal model of the “end of history.” The major mainstream complaint is that under current trajectories of industrialization, developing countries will be the largest contributors to carbon emissions, and therefore their leaders are either actually disinterested in the effects of climate change, or are relying on the climate crisis narrative to justify the extraction of foreign aid, reparations, and value adjusted trade as compensation.
Certainly the attitudes of leaders in the developing world are mixed with regards to climate change. Russia and Iran, which both rely on fossil fuel exports, have a vested interest in the current architecture of energy capitalism. The leaders of Brazil, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan, for example, oscillate between sustainable development and exploiting low cost fossil fuels for industrialization. China does take climate change very seriously and has demonstrated this at tremendous cost in investment. It is ironically benefitting from having forward looking technocrats supported by a Communist Party conditioned to be aware of the political impact of ecological catastrophes in Chinese history. However, an aspect of China’s food security-climate change strategy may include a conquest of Russian Yakutia, and rebuilding of the Arctic ports of Ambarchik, Rytcuchi and Pevek, a conflict anticipated and described in detail by strategic analyst Trevor Dupuy. The U.S., Canada and Europe will be net losers in terms of food production, because while agriculture may shift North towards the pole, most of the advance will be into the poor soils of the geology of the Canadian Shield. Russia is a net winner, if it can resist invasion by its neighbors, although not all of the de-thawed Siberia, Russian Far East, or the Kolyma Lowland will be arable.
Nuclear weapons are inexpensive, powerful, and cannot cost-effectively be defended against. While militaries have adopted measures of dispersal and technologies to resist electro-magnetic pulses and mitigate shockwaves and radiation, the electricity driven civilian economy is exceptionally vulnerable and it will not take much to shatter that aspect of affluent daily life. China, Russia, North Korea and Iran are either rapidly increasing their arsenals, or are moving inexorably towards possession of one. None of these powers are moving yet towards a USSR scale break-out or Cold War arms race, in which a total of 55,000 Soviet and 72,000 U.S. warheads were ultimately assembled. The presence of nuclear arsenals make escalation to a strategic level nuclear exchange possible. Obviously surrendering possession of nuclear weapons, or even reducing the pace of an arms race, exposes democracy to conquest by aggressor states, as Ukraine is discovering today. Nuclear deterrence, in conjunction with social change in the Soviet Union, as predicted by George F. Kennan’s Containment Theory, won the Cold War. Peace and security, therefore, must come instead from changing the threat perceptions within a country, which is only possible through liberal democratization.
Democratic peace theory, which observes that liberal democracies do not engage in war against each other, is a powerful insight and the cornerstone of Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush’s, and virtually every other U.S. chief executive’s, foreign policy. The pacific transformations are often immediate: Argentina and Brazil were involved in a peculiar status-driven missile and nuclear arms race in the 1970s and 1980s, which evaporated when their military regimes were displaced by democratic elections. The exceptions to the theory are ambiguous examples of illiberal democracies, such as the combatants in the Spanish-American War of 1898, or accusations that the theory only applies to European cultures. However, in countries in which there is no exclusion of women from the franchise, the contemporary genderization of politics has led to a marked reduction in war enthusiasm, exemplified at its worst by young men celebrating the outbreak of the First World War in virtually every European capital.
What this means is that it is insufficient to push for electoral or legislative democracy, but that states must embrace laws that respect aspects of liberalism, including protections for journalists and press freedoms, jury-driven legal systems, de-criminalizing homosexuality, and conformity with the standards of treatment of the indigenous set by the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples. The model state is Taiwan, which is domestically progressive with regard to its indigenous population, and enforcement of the rule of law (it has imprisoned its head of state for corruption, a step not yet taken in most occidental democracies). A state on the wrong path is Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda, whose legislating the death penalty for homosexuality is popular, but ultimately erodes freedoms.
There are four obvious and therefore addressable pitfalls. The first is that many states will be incentivized to sign-up and even ratify a treaty for the promised benefits, while delaying the implementation of its measures due to a low level of domestic effort, or by design. Alternately, states may comply with the treaty, but then the moral hazard of the settlement is that states will opt out of agreeing to enforce it, creating a situation worse than no treaty at all. The despondency of the democracies in the 1930s that led to the rise of fascism, was largely facilitated by a misplaced faith in the punishment mechanisms of the League of Nations’ collective security architecture. If a large state, like India or the U.S. refuses to submit to the treaty, it will fail. However, small states will not likely escape punitive measures once the major powers come to an agreement.
The second issue is that it is too easy for developed states to passively sabotage the negotiations by not making the diplomatic effort to resolve differences. Tying together three complex issues into an interdependent knot makes them nearly impossible to solve. However, the threat of a nuclear proliferation breakout should be enough to shake any domestic political debate into confronting the deadlock, given that no state can now escape a nuclear attack. More importantly, the developing world has been lagging behind on liberal democratization, an achievement of which would accelerate the resolution of climate change and nuclear proliferation.
Third, the arrangement must not be subverted by advocates of world government and legal idealists, typical of nuclear abolitionists and single-issue human rights activists, whose anti-militarism creates the dangerous conditions of undermining deterrence, which is the main means by which democracies ensure a secure peace. Concerned primarily with stopping war profiteering, these advocates were largely responsible for allowing the rise of Nazi Germany by militating against early intervention, and were also responsible for the abandonment of Eastern European populations to Soviet occupation.
The fourth challenge is that the distribution of nuclear weapons capability will be seen as unfair. While the UK and France have become Lilliputian states since 1945 (arguably since 1918), the five permanent veto members of the United Nations Security Council are still, in 2024, the only states possessing the ability to mass manufacture thermonuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, have very low rates of production. The obvious issue here is that there is a strong incentive for developing countries to divert the enormous expense of acquiring this capability to equalize their negotiating positions, but this is a fallacy: the democracies are powerful not because of their weaponized nuclear science, but because of their powerful legally-protected capitalist-market economies. Nuclear weapons have not alleviated Pakistan’s periodic request for IMF assistance, nor will nuclear weapons save Iran’s rent-seeking infested oil extraction industry.
Nevertheless, making distinctions between the haves and have-nots will make any agreement in which the U.S. keeps its supremacy unpopular in the local presses. India and Pakistan have refused to sign the discriminatory 1995 Non-Proliferation treaty precisely because of its requirement that the five legally-recognized nuclear weapon states engage in disarmament measures, has only been half-heartedly pursued. The U.S. has argued, with some validity, that to disarm would weaken its extended deterrence to its allies, abandoning states like Germany, Japan, Australia, Italy, Turkey, and South Korea, to develop their own regionally destabilizing nuclear arsenals. The reality is that Western democracies, with their industrial potential, leading edge technological innovation, and sufficient reserves of uranium, are both more militarily powerful relative to the rest of the world than at any previous period in history, including during nineteenth century colonialism, and at the same time exposed to nuclear attack themselves. To compete against NATO’s nuclear arsenals, and those major states that depend on extended nuclear deterrence, is to risk exclusion from world markets and investment.
Arms control arrangements require fine-grained measures of verification, climate agreements depend on scientific epistemic communities, and constitutional adjustments need the advice of historians and legal experts. Coordinating an agreement with verifiable metrics is complex, but initiating a dialogue will have the benefit of publicly linking Western industrial waste concessions to constitutional reforms aimed at creating pacific foreign policy in the developing world. As the democracies of the world tumble towards a confrontation with the nuclear-armed revisionist states of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, this cross-linking of issues will remind both the domestic constituents in those authoritarian countries, who are not completely isolated from concerns of the outside world, of our collective fate on a very small planet. It will also alert free-riding neutrals that hedging with regressive authoritarianism will carry with it a steep opportunity cost.
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University, and author of "Militarization and War (2007) and of Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014)." He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control, and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt, and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer, 3 Field Engineer Regiment, from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11.

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