
A Recommendation for the Incoming Administration
Published Nov. 9, 2024 • Read time: 7m
In 1948, the Cold War in Europe was heating up with the Soviets as their communist henchmen took control in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets imposed a land blockade of Berlin. In the Far East, Mao Zedong’s Communists were advancing in China’s civil war, while Ho Chi Minh’s communists challenged French rule in Indochina. It was also the year of the first Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East. And 1948 saw the first publication of Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, which eventually became the bible for foreign policy realists. It is a book worth consulting as we deal with shooting wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and a Cold War that could turn hot in the western Pacific.
In the Foreword to the first edition, Morgenthau, who emigrated to the United States from Germany in 1937 and later taught international politics at the University of Chicago, wrote that the book developed from his college lectures in which he sought to present a theory of international politics. He called that theory “realism,” and began the book by identifying six principles of political realism. First, “politics . . . is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature,” which he wrote, had not changed since ancient times. Second, “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power,” and foreign policy realists are less concerned with intentions, motives, and what is desirable than with what is possible “under the concrete circumstances of time and place.” Third, the “interests” of a nation should determine its foreign policy, and those interests can change over time. Fourth, “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but [instead] must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.” Prudence, not morality or ethics, is “the supreme virtue in politics.” Fifth, moral aspirations often distort judgment and can lead to “the blindness of crusading frenzy [that] destroys nations and civilizations.” Sixth, political realism eschews the “legalistic-moralistic approach,” in favor of an approach that asks how policies “affect the power of the nation.”
Although realism is a theory of international politics, it is based first and foremost on a study of history, which teaches that “the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible,” according to Morgenthau. While it is important to study the past, the statesman “cannot read the future from his knowledge of the past [or] from the signs of the present.” But some concepts in international politics are eternal, including the fact that “international politics . . . is a struggle for power.” Nations have broader goals, but their immediate aim is always power. And power is defined by Morgenthau as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.” Power in international politics is based primarily, but not exclusively, on armed power and the threat it poses to other nations. History teaches that “the struggle for power is universal in time and space and an undeniable fact of experience.” Throughout history, Morgenthau wrote, some countries use power to maintain the status quo, others seek power to change the status quo in their favor, while still others use power as a means of establishing or enhancing “prestige” or what we call today “credibility.”
Morgenthau also attempted to put meat on the bones of the abstract term “power” by setting forth, as Alfred Thayer Mahan did in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, the elements of national power. Morgenthau identified the first element as geography, which he described as “the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends.” The second element is natural resources, including food, raw materials, industrial capacity, technology, and population. The third element is national character and national morale. Fourth is the quality of a nation’s diplomacy, and fifth is the quality of government. Underlying all of these elements are the nation’s military and economic power.
Morgenthau emphasizes, however, that power in international politics is not absolute, but relative to the power of other nations. The key realist concept here is the balance of power, which has always shifted throughout history. Realists understand that there is no magic formula to assess the balance of power. It depends on numerous factors, including geography, relative population, relative economic and military power, alliances and counter-alliances, and the courage and character of opposing forces.
Politics Among Nations includes many historical examples that lend an empirical quality to realist theory. Those examples include the wars of Napoleon and the coalitions of nations that ultimately brought him down; the statecraft and diplomacy of Bismarck, which unified Germany and for many years thereafter successfully established and maintained a stable balance of power in Europe; the flexible policy of Great Britain that enabled it to be the “holder” of the balance of power by supporting alliances against nations that threatened to upset that balance; the neutralist policies of the United States under Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson that exploited geographical advantages to avoid foreign wars and expand across the North American continent; and the 20th century U.S. foreign policy that accepted overseas commitments to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a hostile power or coalition of powers.
Politics Among Nations went through seven editions. Morgenthau wrote other books, including Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946), In Defense of the National Interest (1951), and A New Foreign Policy for the United States (1969). He wrote articles and essays for Worldview Magazine, Commentary, The New Republic, Foreign Affairs, and other journals. Some of those essays and articles were collected in Truth and Power (1970), and others can be read on the web at https://russilwvong.com/future/morgenthau.html. Morgenthau opposed the Vietnam War--not on moral grounds, but on realist grounds. Our interests, he believed, were not proportionate to the investment we made in that war.
Morgenthau concluded Politics Among Nations with a warning to American statesmen to avoid the “crusading spirit”; conduct diplomacy and formulate policy based on concrete interests, not abstractions; be willing to compromise on issues and interests that are not vital to the nation; always consider the mind and motivations of other nations; never allow allies to determine your foreign policy; don’t let the nation’s armed forces dictate foreign policy; don’t surrender to “popular passions”; and base your foreign policy solely on the national interest. Prudence, stability, and a sense of limits are all aspects of Morgenthau’s realism.
Morgenthau, one senses, would have strenuously opposed the enlargement of NATO after the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. He would likely have balked at the notion that America should fight to make Afghanistan, Iraq, or any other country a democracy in our own image. He would probably have been astounded at our reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring,” and would surely not believe that an American president (Obama) would go on an apology tour at the outset of his administration. Morgenthau would likely recognize that what is needed today is a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War, a lessening of tensions between Israel and Iran in the Middle East, and a greater U.S. deterrent posture in the western Pacific.
The struggle for power that Morgenthau identified as the essence of international politics continues into the 21st century. "The incoming Trump administration would be well-advised to consult the timeless wisdom in Politics Among Nations."
Francis P. Sempa writes on foreign policy and geopolitics. His Best Defense columns appear at the beginning of each month.

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