Russia Increases Ties with Iran's Axis of Resistance

On November 19, Israel announced it found a large cache of Russian arms at the hand of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Reports show that many of the weapons were initially owned by the Syrian military, to which Russia has supplied weapons for years (Times of Israel, November 19). This indicates growing cooperation between Russia and the militias across the Middle East (see EDM, September 18). While Russia has been opportunistic in the Middle East, it does not have a blueprint for an overarching peace in the region, nor does it genuinely strive to achieve it by portraying itself as a substitute for the United States (see EDM, October 7). Russia seeks a measured increase in its geopolitical influence via bilateral deals with key Middle East actors. These are enhanced through close military, security, and economic ties and are especially valuable in the age of Russia-West rivalry following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia turned to the Middle East and wider Asia to withstand the pressure of sanctions by seeking alternative trade routes and sources of foreign investments.

In Gaza, where Israel has waged a massive military campaign, Russia has considered Hamas as a legitimate ruler (see EDM, October 16, November 1, 2023). This February, Moscow hosted an intra-Palestinian conference where officials from Hamas, along with those from Fatah and Islamic Jihad, participated (Al Jazeera, August 13). Russia also abstained from criticizing Hamas for the attack on Israel and was somewhat critical of the latter throughout the past year (see EDM, October 23, 2023).

Moscow knows the limits of its power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially in internal Palestinian affairs. Its response, however, is about how it will be perceived internationally, presenting itself as a reliable and, most of all, largely pro-Arab power in the Middle East (see EDM, February 22, October 15). This fits into Moscow’s overall strategy of pivoting to Asia and the Middle East, especially closer ties with the Arab states. This posture concerns messaging that the United States has failed as a responsible actor in the Middle East (see EDM, October 21).

Hezbollah is another critical player within Iran’s Axis of Resistance with which Russia has maintained close contact. Russia has been critical of Israel’s campaign of targeting high-ranking Hezbollah leaders. When Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukr was killed in late July, the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued concern that Israel’s attacks would complicate the regional situation (Atalayar, September 15). Moscow has also been vocal about how resilient Hezbollah has been in the face of the Israeli onslaught (MEMO, October 9).

There is also a security and military aspect to the Russia-Hezbollah engagement. Both Hezbollah and Russian forces cooperated during the civil war in Syria. The two were instrumental in helping Bashar al-Assad to retain power from 2015 onwards. In addition to Israel’s claim about finding extensive caches of Russian arms supplied to Hezbollah on November 19, some media outlets have previously suggested, however unlikely, that Hezbollah sent fighters to Ukraine to aid Russia’s war effort (Israel Hayom, March 27, 2022).

Moscow sees these contacts as a powerful leverage not only against the United States but also the regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. In the case of the Houthis, close cooperation allows Moscow to acquire a powerful leveraging tool against Riyadh if the latter chooses a more pro-US position. This is especially pertinent as President-elect Donald Trump’s second term is eagerly anticipated among the Arab states, which expect more transactional relations with the United States (Anadolu Ajansı, November 6; Middle East Eye, November 7). The Houthis also allow Moscow to put pressure on the collective West and distract it from the war in Ukraine.

Similarly, close ties with Hamas and Hezbollah enable Russia to signal to Israel that should it shift its approach over Ukraine or attack Iran’s nuclear program, Moscow is ready to increase cooperation with the two militias (see EDM, February 22). This approach is a result of cooling in Moscow-Tel Aviv relations since the war in Ukraine began and especially so after the hostilities in Gaza. Russia is an opportunistic power in the Middle East. It benefits from the United States’ failure to bring an end to the war in Gaza and conclude the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Moscow equally recognizes the limits to what it can do in the region, but over the past couple of years, Russia’s posture in the Middle East has increased, and a big part of it is due to the close ties with Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University. His research focuses on great powers’ interests in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Avdaliani is also the author of New World Order and Small Regions.