Undersea Cable Control: The Information Dimension

Sabotage operations conducted against cables and pipelines in European waters, which are generally attributed to Russia, have made marine infrastructure attacks a hot topic over the past couple of years. At the same time, we have seen a growth of attacks on cables connecting Taiwan and its outlying islands, blame for which is commonly attributed to the People’s Republic of China.

Yet examples from the First and Second World Wars suggests other impacts can be arguably even more significant in shaping the information environment.

In both conflicts, Anglo-American dominance at sea enabled the Allies to protect their own submarine communications infrastructure and destroy that of their adversaries. This ability in turn forced global communications onto Allied-controlled infrastructure. The control of this global infrastructure gave the Allies a critical advantage.

In the weeks leading up to the outbreak of war, roughly a third of all stories in American newspapers about the crisis originated from Germany. Following the cutting of German cables, this supply of information dried up. In the year from August 1914, 70 per cent of the war-related stories on the front pages of US newspapers came from Allied sources. The proportion received directly from Germany never exceeded four per cent. The vast majority of news about Germany reached neutral audiences on British-controlled cables, having passed through British censors. American and other neutral audiences remained sceptical and were conscious of Allied censorship. However, controlling global communications infrastructure was a major advantage in winning the battle for neutral hearts and minds.

During the First and Second World Wars, Anglo-American dominance at sea enabled the ‎Allies to protect their own submarine communications infrastructure and destroy that of their ‎adversaries (Australian War Memorial/Flickr)‎

Controlling the information space was not only relevant in terms of propaganda, it was also vital in facilitating economic warfare. British control of the information infrastructure allowed it to build an unprecedented “database” of global trading information. Knowledge extracted from being able to read and censor communications on the cable network enabled Britain to seize suspect cargoes, blacklist firms that traded with the enemy, and do so in a manner that did not upset neutrals (too much). Without control of the information space, control of the seas would have counted for little.

It is for this reason that British plans for war against Imperial Japan, drawn up in the 1920s and 1930s, contained an appendix devoted to cable cutting. Once again, the global naval hegemon was preparing to use its control of the global commons to secure the global cable networks and isolate its adversary.

Japanese military successes in 1941–42 limited the scope for such an approach, but Operation Sabre towards the end of the war again demonstrates the value of targeting cables to shape the information environment. In this operation, Japanese cables connecting the Home Islands with Southeast Asia were severed in order to force the Japanese to use wireless communications, which could be intercepted, and potentially decoded.

These historical examples give us pause to think carefully about why the ability to destroy (or protect) submarine cables matters. Technology has changed dramatically since the era of the world wars, and radio and satellites have added alternative communication systems. However, submarine cables remain the bedrock of the global communications network. These cables transmit more than 98 per cent of international data traffic, control of which is both a significant Western vulnerability, but also a huge asset.

In wartime, arguably more than at any other time, information is power. It is through this lens that we must view the global submarine cable network. Cutting and tapping cables is important, but these tend to be the acts of a disruptor. Western nations need to think once again about how they would exploit their control of the global commons in time of war to control the global communications infrastructure, and the knowledge that flows across it.

This article was produced as part of a multi-year project being undertaken on submarine cable security by the University of Melbourne’s Australia India Institute, with the support of the Australian Department of Defence. All views expressed in this article are those of the author only.

Richard Dunley is a Senior Lecturer in History and Maritime Strategy at UNSW Canberra.

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.