Political Purification and Strategic Realignment in the PLA

Executive Summary:

The purge of general officers responsible for planning and operations related to the unification of Taiwan has prompted a possible temporary strategic realignment. Given that the highest ranks of the PLA experienced an overhaul of officers in the PLA Navy and Eastern Theater Command, the probability of success for a protracted blockade or joint amphibious landing campaign has decreased. The remaining PLA leadership has incentives to pursue other strategies for unification, such as a joint firepower strike campaign or decapitation strikes. The purges therefore may influence a shift in PLA strategic decision-making, at least in the short-term.

Vague Statements Call For Party Discipline

Following the announcement, the PLA Daily published several articles and commentaries on the state of political discipline in the PLA. The first, published on October 18, called for rooting out corruption in the military “until the end” (到底). It stated that everyone is equal before the Party and state law (在党纪国法面前一律平等) and that no official would be exempt from punishment, irrespective of their achievements or position. To make this point, it used the phrases “iron certificates” (丹书铁券) and “iron-cap princes” (铁帽子王). These refer to ways in which Chinese emperors rewarded their most prized officials, protecting them from criminal prosecution (PLA Daily, October 18). The article specifically called out He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun, who enjoyed connections to Xi Jinping from his time as a Fujian provincial official, and may have seen themselves as unimpeachable.

A second PLA Daily article stated that the post-purge PLA should refocus its thinking and see itself as the army of the people and the Party. It said that PLA actions should be based on the decisions of the Central Committee, Central Military Commission (CMC), and Xi Jinping, with a call to “use the Party’s flag as our own, the Party’s direction as our direction, and the Party’s intentions as our intentions” (党的旗帜为旗帜、以党的方向为方向、以党的意志为意志). It directly referred to purged military leaders’ self-interest in an effort to discourage other officials from cultivating their own personal interests, and noted the importance of “setting the tone on the need to ensure that the gun is always directed by the Party” (枪杆子永远听党指挥) (PLA Daily, October 24).

More recently, the October 27 issue of PLA Daily ran a special feature across pages 5–8 on “Promoting Fine Traditions and Deepening Political Rectification” (弘扬优良传统 深化政治整训) in the military. The first article, which similarly called on the whole PLA to revisit its roots as a revolutionary army, made clear that it must reflect on its original mission (以初心为镜) and prepare for the discomfort of rooting out corruption. The article encouraged soldiers to “frequently reflect on our thoughts, frequently remove the poison in our hearts, frequently remember the responsibility of our mission, and frequently repair our virtue according to the Party” (常拂思想之尘、常刮心底之毒、常思使命之责、常修党性之德) (PLA Daily, October 27).

Finally, an October 30tharticle in PLA Daily drove home the warning against special interest groups. It stressed objectivity and impartiality in relationships, advocating for the frequent use of “comrade” (同志) as a title in order to “oppose thinking based on relationships, break the use of unspoken rules, abandon the prioritization of officials, and oppose privileged thinking and behavior” (反对庸俗 “关系学”，破除各种 “潜规则”，摒弃“官本位”思想，反对特权思想和特权行为). The article also emphasized the importance of regulating interpersonal behavior, saying that PLA service members should seek to achieve unity rather than forming interest groups (做到团结而不“结团”). It ends with an exhortation to “properly handle the relationship between public and private interests, righteousness and profit, and personal sentiments and the law when interacting with comrades” (正确处理同志交往中公与私、义与利、情与法的关系，做到交心而不交利) (PLA Daily, October 30).

In the aftermath of the expulsion of the nine generals, the column inches devoted to military corruption signals a fundamental problem within the PLA leadership. The particularly harsh punishment meted out to the generals may also suggest a symbolic nature to the takedown; a warning to others of the perils of violating Party discipline.

Corruption purges in the military have persisted for two years but have not outwardly affected Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA and PRC. Xi has cycled through and expelled a number of officers. This has cast doubt on his judgment but does not seem to have resulted in serious threats to his power. If any further political maneuvering is taking place, it is not visible to those outside of CCP politics.

The expulsion of general officers with ties to He Weidong and Miao Hua—something that may continue past the fourth plenum—lends credence to the idea that factionalism within the PLA is at least a partial impetus for the corruption purges (The Diplomat, October 21). This factionalism is not necessarily in favor of or against Xi but may reflect a recurring trend in CCP and PLA politics in which cliques (小圈子) and personal relations(关系) drive bureaucratic politics. Extensive patronage networks extending from current CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and former Vice Chairman He Weidong are the roots of these factions, and the repeated and systematic purging of individuals related to one network or the other suggests a power struggle (China Brief, October 17). Zhang Youxia is a putative member of the “Shaanxi gang,” which refers to officials who either grew up or spent portions of their career in Shaanxi Province. Beyond Zhang, it also includes Xi Jinping himself, as well as CMC member Zhang Shengmin (张升民), and Liu Zhenli (刘振立) (China Brief, March 15).

Recent developments suggest that the Shaanxi gang has the upper hand in any factional struggle currently being waged, though it has not yet fully won out. Zhang Shengmin has been promoted to CMC Vice Chairman and is concurrently acting as Secretary of the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Unlike He Weidong, however, Zhang has not been appointed simultaneously to the Politburo. A second data point is the purging of Rocket Force general Zhang Fengzhong (张凤中), also ostensibly a Shaanxi gang member (South China Morning Post, October 23). Still, the exclusive presence of Shaanxi Gang members on the CMC, and the widespread purges of He Weidong and Miao Hua’s clique would suggest that the Shaanxi Gang at least has the upper hand in the PLA. Minister of National Defense Dong Jun (董军), who is not part of the Shaanxi Gang and is known instead to have ties to Miao Hua, remains without a seat on the CMC or a State Councilor rank (CMSI, January 24).

High turnover of PLA flag officers has consequences for force readiness. To get a sense of what those consequences might be, it is worth considering how the PLA intends to achieve major CCP objectives, including unification with Taiwan. The October 27 PLA Daily article noted that uncomfortable changes are needed to maintain the PLA’s mission capabilities. This can be extended to strategic decision making.

The PLA has demonstrated growing proficiency and is developing capabilities to take Taiwan in any contingency. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has largely shielded tactical and operational level formations from corruption and anti-graft purges. Policies and procedures adopted by its units ensure that commanders are chosen on merit and have little room for corruption. As a result, the PLAN has been able to rapidly develop combat power (CMSI, August 13). Military exercises in suboptimal environmental conditions like the “Joint Sword” (联合利剑) series attest to Beijing’s determination to unify with Taiwan regardless of the circumstances and are proof of tactical- and operational-level proficiency (Taipei Times, December 18, 2024; CMSI, January 24). The PLA’s continued improvement in these domains indicates a level of insulation from endemic graft. This has not extended to strategic-level PLA leaders, however, who have been purged extensively.

A lack of command continuity and a shortage of staff indicates that the PLA will suffer from a short-term deficit in strategic planning and coordination, making any protracted conflict a risky endeavor. The kinds of campaigns the PRC would be willing to wage against Taiwan, should it decide to pursue unification in the near future, warrants further exploration. But the lack of experienced officers holding strategic level postings in the PLA, in conjunction with members of the Shaanxi Gang in the CMC, may indicate a decreased risk of blockades and joint amphibious landing campaigns in the near-term. Instead, the PLA could turn to joint firepower strike campaigns, decapitation strikes, or subversion campaigns. Some analysts have suggested that, as a direct result of the purges, the readiness time window to take Taiwan by a joint amphibious landing campaign has now shifted from 2027 to a 2029–2031 timeframe (Vermillion China, December 20, 2024).

Joint firepower strike campaigns are one of the PRC’s most viable options for attempting unification. These are offensive operations between multiple armed services coordinating long-range precision strikes to intimidate an adversary’s leadership and population, break their morale, and force them to alter their strategic intentions (National Defense University, 2022). The PRC can scale these campaigns according to strategic objectives. It can use them as a diplomatic tool, with limited strikes demonstrating Beijing’s displeasure with Taipei and its partners. As a military tool, they can cripple Taiwan’s infrastructure. They can also be employed in isolation or along with other campaigns as an antecedent to more complex operations.

Advances in modern technology and conflicts in 2025 have illustrated the viability of joint firepower strike campaigns for pursuing geopolitical interests. They have also shown the need to expand such campaigns to incorporate weapon systems beyond long-range fires. In addition to PLA artillery, rockets, and aircraft, Taiwan must also contend with potential attacks from cyber and electromagnetic pulse weapons, fifth column sabotage and subversion, and planned political assassinations of Taiwanese leaders (Atlantic Council, July 2024; Taipei Times, January 14; The Diplomat, May 7). In the aftermath of such an attack, the Taiwanese people and the world might doubt Taiwan’s ability to resist the PRC, creating a possible window for unification.

Profiles of officers comprising the Shaanxi Gang, particularly those on the CMC, suggest they may be willing to consider joint firepower strike campaigns or similar decapitation strikes against Taiwan. Both Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin have ties to PLA services involved in procuring advanced technologies that would enable a decapitation strike, such as those in the aerospace and cyberspace domains (The Diplomat, January 3, 2024; China Brief, March 15). He Weidong’s recently ousted network, by contrast, was comprised of officers who made their careers in the Nanjing Military Region and Eastern Theater Command. It included a high concentration of PLA Navy officers—individuals who spent decades preparing for a joint amphibious landing or a blockade campaign against Taiwan (China Brief, March 15).

On November 11, Zhang Youxia authored an article in People’s Daily. He emphasized the need to accelerate military modernization and overcome “bottlenecks and blockages” (破瓶颈堵点) in developing strategic capabilities. In order to gain the advantage in critical military functions, he said, the PLA needs to solve essential “technological chokepoints” (技术 “卡脖子”). Zhang’s interest in technologies that would enable a decapitation strike is best evidenced by his assertion that the PLA must accelerate the development of advanced weapons, equipment, and research and build more “assassin’s mace”-type weapons and equipment” (“杀手锏”武器装备) (People’s Daily, November 11). The phrase “assassin’s mace” is widely applied to describe advanced PLA weapon systems that are believed to confer a marked asymmetric advantage over the PLA’s adversaries (U.S. Army War College, September 1, 2004). [3] 

A shift may already be taking place. Coinciding with the purge of He Weidong’s clique, analysts have observed a decrease in military gray-zone activities against Taiwan (China Brief, October 31). Personal experiences may also contribute to a preference for joint firepower strike campaigns. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the only two CMC members with combat experience, both fought at the Two Mountain Border War of Laoshan in 1984 against Vietnam. As company commanders in the PLA Army, both witnessed firsthand the poor performance of the PLA against an outnumbered Vietnamese enemy (South China Morning Post, October 13, 2022, [a], [b]). During the war, they would have been privy to a sort of proto-joint firepower strike campaign known as “artillery diplomacy” (O’Dowd, 2007). [4]  This “artillery diplomacy” was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving the PRC’s objectives. But areas within range of the PLA’s artillery were mountainous and heavily forested provinces with relatively small populations and little economic value (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, December 15, 1978). This is not the case with Taiwan. Due to advances in weapon systems and Taiwan’s geographic constraints, Taiwan is far more vulnerable to the impact of a joint firepower strike than Vietnam was. The lived experiences of these men may influence their decisions when planning for future contingencies. Coupled with the recent purging of PLA personnel with expertise in conducting an invasion or blockade of Taiwan, this suggests that decapitation strikes are now the operations that the PLA has the greatest capability to perform.

The latest purges and the language with which they were announced suggest that, at a minimum, factionalism cannot be ruled out as a contributing factor to the downfall of the nine PLA generals. Looking ahead, an organizational reshuffling on this scale has the potential to influence PLA strategy. This could lead to a shift in the preferred military approach to Taiwan away from a naval blockade or amphibious assault and toward a decapitation strike. The precise positions and motivations of individuals within the system in relation to the purges cannot be fully ascertained—including that of Xi Jinping. But continuing to monitor personnel shifts and observable changes to military posture may provide a better understanding of ongoing changes in the PLA and reveal new patterns in PRC politics.

Gerui Zhang is an international affairs and Chinese double major at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has interned with the Center for Naval Analyses.

Brandon Tran is an international affairs and Chinese double major at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has interned with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Army War College, and been published in The Diplomat, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, the Modern War Institute, and more.

The views expressed are solely personal and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

[1] These officers were He Weidong (何卫东), Miao Hua (苗华), He Hongjun (何宏军), Wang Xiubin (王秀斌), Lin Xiangyang (林向阳), Qin Shutong (秦树桐),...

[2] MND, October 17). These charges previously have not been used under Xi to describe crimes committed by members of the Central Military Commission (IISS, October 27).">The stated charges were “serious violations of party discipline” (严重违反党的纪律), “serious misuse of occupational power” (严重职务犯罪), “crimes of a serious nature”...

MND, October 17). These charges previously have not been used under Xi to describe crimes committed by members of the Central Military Commission (IISS, October 27).">[3] Weapon systems that have been considered “assassin’s mace” weapons include ballistic missiles, electromagnetic jamming, and others capable of achieving deterrence, decapitation,...

MND, October 17). These charges previously have not been used under Xi to describe crimes committed by members of the Central Military Commission (IISS, October 27).">[4] Edward C. O’Dowd. “Artillery Diplomacy: Waiting for the ‘Second Lesson.’” In Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last...