In the Shadow of Douhet

In the current Iran War, the U.S. and Iran's (so far) exclusive dependence on airpower and naval blockade has allowed both to achieve tactical advantages, but, like almost every conflict of the last 80 years in which airpower took precedence, the reliance on airpower and naval blockade as sole tools to execute the war still offer limited means for either side to win outright. 

Douhet’s proposition was broadly put to the test during the Blitz, the Allied bombing campaign over Germany, and the strategic bombing of North Vietnam.

However, the Luftwaffe’s turn to civilian targets did not break Britain (although the initial offensive against RAF airfields nearly destroyed Britain’s air defences) and, while the Allied bombing campaign arguably attrited Germany’s industrial and resupply systems, it took the liberation of Western Europe and the sacrifice of countless Soviet lives in the race to Berlin to defeat Nazism. 

Both sides of the Iran war have taken to heart Douhet’s dream of strategic bombing as a war-winning weapon, to staggering effect, but as with the Blitz, the strategic bombing of Germany or North Vietnam, both sides are encountering the limits of aerial bombing as a singular war-winning weapon.

The U.S. has secured some measure of air superiority over Iran, allowing it to destroy perhaps a third of Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, and seemingly allowing it adequate leeway for its H-60s to conduct mid-air refuelling at relatively low altitudes over Iranian territory, at least in some areas. But Iran’s missile and drone attacks continue and neither regime collapse nor a popular uprising have materialised. 

While the limits of the U.S.’s air campaign are becoming well-rehearsed, Iran’s air campaign and its strangulation of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, too, are limited in their capacity as means to secure Iran’s stated war aims, notable among them the demands for economic reparations, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the shuttering of U.S. bases in the Gulf.  

Iran’s attacks have caused the shuttering of oil fields, the suspension of some oil and LNG contracts and the strangulation of the world’s oil supply while severely denting the Gulf states’ tourism industries. however, its air attacks and de facto naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz are not enough by themselves to achieve their seeming hegemonic ambitions in the region.

While U.S. could still attempt to redress its so-far only-tactical successes through the use of ground forces - should hostilities resume –  the costs of ground intervention remain prohibitive: The support requirements of even a comparatively selective incursion onto Kharg Island or other islands, such as operations on the mainland to protect the assault forces, risk drastically widening the scope of an American ground commitment. 

While Iran can still raise the costs of the war by attempting to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, its strongest cards, the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and its missile and drone attacks against the Gulf and Israel, have already been played. In spite of the announcement of a ceasefire - by Iran’s account based on the terms of its ten-point plan calling for maximalist concessions including economic reparations and the closure and withdrawal of all U.S. bases and troops – The damage inflicted by Iran’s missile and drone campaign and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz still appear insufficient to extract its maximalist demands. 

The Gulf states’ calculation remains that the damage so far inflicted by Iran is not an existential threat to its economic model; while painful, the expectation remains that oil and gas production can be restarted should hostilities cease and that their economic model remains fundamentally sound. Iran’s war gains are inadequate to assert the hegemonic position its demands require, with the prospect of accepting a long-term shift in the regional order in favour of Iranian hegemony remaining far more damaging to the Gulf states’ interests than the damage incurred in the war so far.

Given the damage sustained to U.S. bases in the region and the failure of the bases’ presence to deter Iran, some sources suggest the Gulf states may reconsider their policy of hosting U.S. bases if they deem the policy no longer in their interest, but this would merely be a result of a cost-benefit calculation of the bases’ value to the Gulf states themselves. While the situation is clearly fraught with difficult dilemmas, it would not necessarily indicate the Gulf states’ willingness to subordinate themselves to Iranian regional hegemony.

The thus far short-term duration of Iran’s air campaign and maritime blockade are therefore inadequate to radically alter its strategic position relative to its neighbours in the short-term.

Thus, both sides have encountered the limits of airpower as a war winning weapon by itself. While both have achieved some measure of their tactical objectives, neither has achieved its strategic aims and both face severe limits in their ability to do so through airpower alone.

At the same time, while the U.S. and Israel may disengage from the hostilities, on the level of self-preservation, the Iranian regime seems unlikely to accept a return to the status quo based solely on intangible U.S. assurances that hostilities will not resume. Should Iran agree to return to the status quo, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and cease its air campaign, it risks the degradation of its leverage by countermeasures the U.S., Israel and the Gulf states are likely to take to mitigate the risk of a repeat of the current situation.

It has likely not escaped the Islamic Republic’s attention that its well-known capacity to close the strait of Hormuz had little deterrent influence on the decision to commence the war. From this they may conclude that the leverage represented by their missile and drone arsenal and the potential to close the Strait of Hormuz may be degraded should they return to the status quo.

Should hostilities end with the announced ceasefire, and should the status quo reassert itself, it seems probable that the Gulf states may well seek to negate Iran’s ability to exert the same leverage in future, potentially eroding Iran’s leverage. It has been publicly reported that much attention has already turned to building new pipelines to negate the threat of future closures of the Strait of Hormuz, though this would take several years and cost tens of billions of dollars.

The threat either of future direct U.S. intervention or of attempts at regime change built on a longer-term subversion campaign, such as through arming Kurdish groups to penetrate Iran, remains.

Precisely because its politico-military options are likely insufficient to achieve regional hegemony through a short campaign, the Islamic Republic may conclude that it must continue imposing these strategies for fear that a return to the status quo will lead to a degradation of its leverage. Iran’s passage of legislation to impose long-term physical and financial control over the strait provide strong evidence of Iran’s long-term intentions regardless of a diplomatic outcome.

It is precisely the weakness of Iran’s military options to revise the regional balance of power coupled with the risk of its leverage evaporating if it accepts a return to the status quo that appears to make it likely that the regime will continue on a conflict course even if the U.S. withdraws from hostilities.

Iran may gain in the short-term by exerting its military leverage in the face of risking weakening its position if it relents. But, paradoxically, should the costs become sufficiently prohibitive for the international community, Iran’s pressing-home of its leverage may precipitate even greater isolation and conflict with a wider array of nations.

With no guarantee from Iran’s perspective that hostilities won’t resume, and with the spectre looming over the international community of a protracted Iranian strangulation of the world’s shipping lifeline through the Strait of Hormuz, even with news of a ceasefire, the diplomatic landscape is marked by impossible demands on one hand, and a broken diplomatic process on the other.

Frank Fitzgerald is a Research Ireland Postgraduate Scholar and a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at the University of Limerick in the Republic of Ireland. His work has appeared in the Irish Times and RTÉ Brainstorm and he has appeared on Newstalk Radio.