Covert Action: Evaluating the Future Leadership of U.S. Strategic Covert Operations

Two recent essays published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) rekindle interest in a perennial debate about whether covert action, particularly paramilitary operations, and other capabilities related to irregular warfare should be the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Department of Defense (DoD). Both articles — A New Office of Strategic Services? by J.R. Seeger and Reimagining Irregular Warfare: The Case for a Modernized OSS by Douglas Livermore — offer compelling and contrasting visions for the future of strategic covert operations. One essay advocates preserving the current system, in which CIA retains the lead role in paramilitary covert action and intelligence primacy overseas. It contends that, while imperfect, the system has demonstrated its effectiveness over decades benefitting from a mature framework of interagency coordination. It warns that boldly reorganizing for the future could jeopardize hard-earned covert action capabilities and argues that CIA should remain in the lead, with DoD and other agencies providing support as appropriate.

One of the FPRI essay’s authors, a former CIA Chief of Station in a major war zone with additional experience in multiple conflict areas, highlighted how the Agency has successfully executed sensitive missions in tandem with US forces — yet outside the traditional military command and control framework. Advocates further argue that success in covert action is not measured by scale or budget but by agility, institutional expertise, and deniability — attributes that do not necessarily favor a large and rigid military organizational culture. It is also worth noting that most covert action programs do not involve paramilitary operations in conflict zones. Most covert action is conducted in non-conflict environments, where DoD lacks CIA’s depth of experience, institutional memory, and surgical approach.

The second essay presents a contrasting view, arguing that the current arrangement is inefficient, duplicative, and misaligned with today’s complex threat landscape. It proposes establishing a new organization within DoD — a modernized version of the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services (OSS) — to centralize, reduce redundancy, and streamline the planning and execution of both irregular warfare and covert action. Supporters of structural reform argue that the nature of modern conflict (both kinetic and non-kinetic) has evolved. They believe DoD, due to its size and increased funding under the current administration, offers a more scalable, integrated, and technologically advanced covert action capability than the smaller CIA. With its expansive infrastructure, forward-deployed forces, and superior logistical reach, DoD can provide resources that most civilian agencies cannot match. Reform advocates also point to DoD’s significant investments in cyber operations, psychological warfare, and information campaigns — arguing that these capabilities could be more effectively employed under a unified command. Livermore’s article envisions a Department for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare (DSOIW), formed by elevating and redesignating the current Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). This proposed structure would reduce interagency friction, resolve persistent disputes over mission authorities, and enhance both accountability and congressional oversight — all while maintaining operational agility. Proponents also cite legal precedent. Executive Order 13470 authorizes the president to assign covert action responsibilities to agencies other than CIA when appropriate. They cite the fact that President John F. Kennedy relied on this authority when transferring certain covert operations in Southeast Asia from CIA to DoD. Reform advocates argue that this precedent, updated for the 21st century, could help reduce duplication, align resources more effectively, and better equip the United States to conduct influence operations in the digital age. Often proponents of consolidation in DoD suggest that migrating covert action from CIA to DoD would also free CIA up to focus on providing strategic intelligence to policy makers.

Still, critics of this proposal raise several valid concerns. Chief among them is the risk that consolidating covert action within DoD could erode Congressional oversight, blur the boundaries between diplomacy and warfare, and increase the likelihood of military entanglement in politically sensitive missions. Embedding covert action within a military structure may also obscure the vital legal and operational distinctions between Title 10 and Title 50 authorities, complicating oversight, accountability, and rules of engagement. Further complicating this discussion is the proposal to elevate the Defense Attaché Service (DAS) — a globally deployed, overt collection network managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) — as the core of future DoD-led intelligence support for covert action. While DAS officers provide valuable and unique baseline intelligence and perform critical defense diplomacy, they do not conduct clandestine operations, manage human sources, or engage in covert action. Suggesting that DAS could replicate or replace CIA’s global clandestine intelligence collection capabilities reflects a misunderstanding of the doctrinal and structural limitations of that organization.

Resource allocation is also a point of contention. Reform advocates cite CIA’s relatively small budget and possible reduction in force as indicators of a future diminished capacity for covert action. However, the proposed personnel reduction (as outlined by the CIA Director) is driven by attrition, not deliberate or targeted downsizing. As noted earlier, covert operations succeed not through mass or money but through discretion, precision, and expertise. Budget and personnel numbers have never been a determinant in the success or failure of covert action missions as DoD’s budget and size has always been greater than CIA’s. Moreover, large cadres of personnel are unnecessary for covert cooperation with foreign powers or indigenous non-state actors, as covert action programs from Tibet and Laos to Angola and Afghanistan have demonstrated. Actually, the larger the entity, the harder it can be to achieve the compartmentation and plausible deniability necessary for the covert nature of such operations.

Furthermore, there is an entire legal and regulatory structure that has been established and refined over the decades to ensure that covert action is conducted by CIA, supervised by the NSC, and overseen by the congressional intelligence committees. A significant shift (like the one proposed for a new OSS) would require congressional acquiescence and substantial changes to the oversight regime that currently covers Title 10 activities. It also would require DoD to develop a regulatory framework to ensure that the legal limitations that come along with covert action are respected. There are other legal and regulatory ramifications related to the new OSS proposal.

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 503(e) [50 USC §3093] defines covert action as, “activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” The National Security Act and other laws and executive orders are written with the understanding that CIA will be the agency responsible for covert action. This is reflected in EO 12333, Section 1.7(a)(4), under which CIA is instructed to “conduct covert action activities approved by the President. No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with War Powers Resolution) may conduct any covert action activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.” The authors are unaware of any occasion on which that determination has been made since EO 12333 was signed in 1981. Even the Osama Bin Laden raid was conducted under a specific Presidential Finding (the legal document authorizing a covert action program), and the military personnel and assets were detailed to CIA so the raid could be carried out under covert action authorities. Section 503(a)(3) of the National Security Act on which EO 12333 is based states that, “each finding shall specify each department, agency or entity authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action. Any employee, contractor, or entity of the United States Government other than the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate in any way in a covert action shall be subject either to the policies and regulations of the Central Intelligence Agency, or to the written policies or regulations adopted by such department, agency, or entity to govern each participation.” As of today, CIA remains the only government department or agency with covert action regulations.

The definition of covert action specifically excludes traditional military activities and routine support to such activities. Routine support to traditional military activities can be provided under either Title 10 or Title 50, but does not require a Presidential Finding. However, were DoD to attempt to conduct operations to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad where it is intended that the role of the US government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly under the guise of traditional military activities, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or other such semantic stratagems, this would violate the U.S Code in both letter and spirit. The law can be changed, but Congress has shown no inclination to do so and, per the experiences of one of the authors, has actually been quite forceful about keeping covert action programs under CIA control and the supervision of the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees.

Besides legal considerations, there are a number of organizational challenges for an OSS 2.0 construct within DoD. The proposed construct would include a wide range of activities — covert action, human intelligence activities, cyber operations, information operations, etc. — under a single Deputy Secretary. This would be achieved by, “redesignating and hyper empowering the DoD’s existing Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.” ASD/SOLIC exercises authority, direction, and control of all special operations issues relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces; sits in the chain of command above US Special Operations Command for special operations-peculiar administrative matters; provides civilian oversight; and advises on special operations and irregular warfare. If ASD/SOLIC was to be converted to DSOIW, a single section of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would then answer to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy for oversight of special operations policy, training, and equipment as well as a myriad of other programs regarding paramilitary covert action, human intelligence collection, cyber warfare, strategic communications, and military information support operations. This proposed mandate would cut across the jurisdiction of numerous Defense Agencies and Commands (National Security Agency, Cyber Command, DIA, etc.) and OSD entities (especially the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security). It would also increase organizational conflicts with CIA regarding the coordination of foreign intelligence collection, intersect with the oversight duties of the Director of National Intelligence, and require DSOIW be in constant coordination with the NSC and State Department, as well as to be responsive to congressional intelligence oversight committees. This does not seem like streamlining.

In evaluating which agency or department is best suited to be responsible for paramilitary covert action and other statecraft tools for use in irregular warfare and political warfare operations, it will be useful to carefully consider past history so as to not draw false analogies.

For example, the oft-cited historical example of the transfer of a program to infiltrate agents into North Vietnam from CIA to DoD should be analyzed in its full context. From 1961 to 1963, CIA’s Saigon Station ran a program to infiltrate agents into North Vietnam to collect intelligence and conduct covert action missions such as sabotage or guerrilla warfare. The program was patterned after OSS operations in France during World War II and some Saigon Station officers, including the Chief of Station, had OSS backgrounds. Unfortunately, North Vietnamese internal security was far more efficient than the Germans were in occupied France and the North Vietnamese were not receptive to a call for resistance, unlike the French in 1944. Saigon Station soon realized that the program was a failure and intended to end it. The teams it had parachuted into North Vietnam had mostly either been killed, captured, or placed under the control of North Vietnamese counterintelligence. Only a few teams were believed to be operational and there was debate if even they were under enemy control. The Station’s experience indicated that there was no chance of running an unconventional warfare program in North Vietnam.

However, Washington wished to intensify pressure on North Vietnam in response to its support to the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. There was a belief that DoD with its superior resources could succeed in the North where CIA could not. Saigon Chief of Station William Colby tried to persuade Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in November 1963 that the program should be shut down, not intensified, and that turning it over to DoD would not bring different results. DoD took over the program in 1964 believing that the few “operational” teams could serve as the nucleus for a major unconventional warfare campaign in North Vietnam. For another four years over 200 agents were delivered into the waiting hands of North Vietnam’s counterintelligence service.

The DoD program, known as OPLAN 34A, became larger but also less covert. One of its operations precipitated the Tonkin Gulf Incident when North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked US Navy destroyers offshore, which North Vietnam believed were part of an OPLAN 34A coastal raid. This is mentioned to reinforce the point made above that an important advantage of having covert action separate from DoD is that its separation from the traditional military chain of command provides a political and operational buffer that reduces the risk of escalation, overt military entanglement, and the loss of strategic flexibility. 

This example also highlights another aspect of covert action programs: They are highly dependent on intelligence and counterintelligence to achieve their goals and survive as deniable operations. Their administration, financing, and logistics must not only be covert (unattributable) but also clandestine (hidden) to preserve deniability. Keeping covert action in an intelligence culture that is naturally clandestine in terms of personnel, payments, logistics, communications, etc. increases the ability to maintain its essential covert nature.

Returning to the Vietnam War, we also see where various departments and agencies using their unique skills and different authorities in cooperation with each other were able to surmount the original threat that brought the United States into the war: the Viet Cong insurgency. DoD carried the brunt of this burden with combat operations including overcoming the Tet Offensive of 1968, which decimated the Viet Cong. CIA used its covert action authorities to work with South Vietnamese intelligence to destroy the Viet Cong’s leadership as part of the counterinsurgency effort. State Department and the Agency for International Development also played crucial roles in developing counterinsurgency programs to undermine the appeal of the Viet Cong. As most accounts of the war indicate, by 1971 the Viet Cong insurgency had been defeated and North Vietnam had to continue the war in the South with its regular army units, which eventually won the war after the United States withdrew. This experience as well as multiple experiences post-9/11 demonstrate, as Seeger wrote, that:

This was proven in Afghanistan, Iraq, and numerous other theaters during operations known as the Global War on Terror. Each organization brought specific skills and strengths to the fight, which complemented each other’s when working together. CIA paramilitary capabilities were enhanced by DoD support at times and enhanced DoD operations at other times. The same was true of DoD unconventional warfare operations such as the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police program. Neither capability was hamstrung by the other being on the same battlefield operating under different authorities to support the same overarching policy goal.  

Ultimately, the debate over covert action and irregular warfare responsibilities is more than a bureaucratic turf war between Langley and the Pentagon. It reflects a deeper question about how the United States should structure its instruments of national power to confront irregular threats, maintain strategic influence, and protect its interests in an increasingly contested global environment. While both camps agree that improvements in coordination, capability, and integration are necessary, the real question is whether those changes should be evolutionary (refining the current model) or revolutionary, involving fundamental institutional, leadership, and procedural reorganization.

In assessing the future leadership of US strategic covert operations, it is critical that decision makers and policymakers proceed with a clear understanding of comparative institutional strengths, operational mandates, and historical precedents. While DoD brings unmatched scale, resources, and operational reach to the irregular warfare domain, CIA possesses unique capabilities for covert action. Transferring leadership of covert action to a newly established DoD entity risks undermining legal clarity, weakening civilian oversight, and diluting the very attributes (discretion, agility, and plausible deniability) that make covert action effective in contested and ambiguous environments. As the United States faces increasingly complex national security challenges, including great-power competition with both irregular warfare and political warfare threats, it may create less risk by refining rather than radically restructuring the institutional architecture which governs its most sensitive and effective strategic tools. Preserving CIA’s lead in covert action, with enhanced interagency coordination with DoD, offers a prudent path forward, one that leverages the complementary strengths of both institutions without jeopardizing the integrity or effectiveness of US strategic clandestine operations in an era of accelerating uncertainty.

Philip Wasielewski is the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center for the Study of Intelligence and Nontraditional Warfare and a Senior Fellow in FPRI's Eurasia Program. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Doug Wise is a West Point graduate who had a 20 year army career including assignments in special operations. He then had a second career in the CIA's Directorate of Operations and was a member of the Senior Intelligence Service. He served four times as a Chief of Station including in a war zone and led a major covert action program. His final tour in government service was as the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).