
Tough Budget Environment Raises Stakes for Army's Decision on Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft
Last updated 02:33 AM EST • Read time: 5m
Sometimes the absence of a commitment is the clearest signal. Discussing budget challenges at a recent CNAS event, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth gave an uncoded answer on the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program – known to be targeted for potential cuts. “I think we are some distance away from being able to go fully unmanned,” Wormuth said. “Perhaps that is something further out in the future we can look at.”
While the Army has not officially thrown in the towel, the lack of a firm commitment signals FARA isn’t likely to happen in a budget environment where everyone is looking to the service as the bill payer. But if FARA does get canceled, the stakes get that much higher for the Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) competition. As the only major rotary wing acquisition remaining, the FLRAA will now have generational impacts on warfighter capability – and the defense industrial base (DIB). It is now all the more imperative that Army gets the requirements right.
In choosing an FLRAA, the assault mission must come first.
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Ben Hodges has pointed out “the ability to mass combat power, infantry and equipment, directly onto the objective, many times in very tight places… is the key tenet of an air assault operation,” while remarking that “one of the challenges I had in Afghanistan was getting soldiers and equipment across mountain ranges or into landing zones at high altitude and hot temperatures.”
This tracks with my 10 years of experience as a combat helicopter pilot in Afghanistan and as a developmental test pilot. Range and speed, though important, are not the most important criteria. What counts much more is the ability to land on the objective and mass combat power incredibly quickly – including supporting equipment, fires, and vehicles – and survive while you do it. Landing troops in waves because your assets can’t mass them safely in the landing zone is a recipe for mission failure.
Similarly, the effective in route time of an assault mission isn't when the aircraft touches down – it’s when the soldier reaches the objective. For soldiers carrying weapons and gear, landing on the objective enhances surprise, success and survivability.
One of the aircraft under consideration for FLRAA, Defiant-X, completed the confined area landings mission profile – including a 247-knot level ingress, rapid, level deceleration, and a vertical landing in an H-60-sized landing zone.
The right FLRAA decision will also de-risk the DIB.
A healthy industrial base requires a constant cycle of design, production, and deployment. If the FVL program is truncated via the cancellation of FARA, incentives for industry to invest in military rotorcraft programs will evaporate. So will with the facilities and institutional knowledge required to produce those machines.
The FVL program is the only major defense rotorcraft program scheduled to start fielding aircraft as late as 2030. Bell’s AH-1Z Viper operational deliveries began in 2012.
Sikorsky will start operational deliveries of the CH-53K in 2025; Boeing’s CH-47F Block II will also start in 2025. If the FARA configuration is deferred or canceled, the FLRAA program will be the only major rotorcraft defense program in production well into the middle of this century.
Once lost, industrial capabilities are very hard, if not impossible, to recover. All these capabilities take decades to develop from manufacturing facilities, custom-built forges, tools, jigs, artisans, technicians, tradesmen, engineers, production processes down to the small businesses supporting sustainment. With a fickle Pentagon customer, industry is far less likely to make the required investments to support defense programs.
Since the inception of the future vertical lift program, industry has taken its cues from the Pentagon. Bell has invested in a state of the art manufacturing technology center, and Sikorsky has developed a digital factory tying together design, production, and sustainment in a digital thread.
On the choice of FLRAA itself, the manufacturer must have a portfolio of military projects to sustain operations without depending on the FARA program. It should also have a mature digital design, production, and sustainment capability with reach back across all Services. Between the two FLRAA competitors, only Sikorsky builds aircraft supporting all Services and has a mature digital thread integrated into the design, production, and sustainment processes.
Finally, Army should go with whichever option grants the edge on lifecycle costs, training, and infrastructure requirements.
While actions “on the X” are paramount, the aircraft can't perform the mission without a proven, efficient production line and a robust supply chain. Production and delivery matter. Given this and Army’s aforementioned budget challenges, the service should avoid any FLRAA candidate that requires new hangers, ramp space, or a new production line. An FLRAA incompatible with the Army’s existing facilities means new military construction. Multiplying these costs across the anticipated 500 plus FLRAAs planned for purchase, the price tag quickly goes out of reach for a service already facing significant cuts.
With FARA’s future in serious question, the Army must choose wisely on FLRAA. Senior decision-makers can do so by weighing the frame that delivers on the mission, the industrial base, and lifecycle costs.
Scott Trail is a retired Marine CH-46E helicopter pilot, V-22 developmental test pilot, and a member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots.

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