The Defense Department's Reorganization Problem Comes to Fightertown

After Hurricane Katrina exposed serious weaknesses in the federal emergency response, government leaders questioned the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s role within the Department of Homeland Security. Congress responded with the Post-Katrina Act, strengthening FEMA’s role and giving the agency greater independence. The changes improved FEMA’s position, while the wider response showed how much work remained to align authority, plans, and operations.

Government agencies and businesses often create branches, divisions, subsidiaries, and task forces to address emerging problems. A Justice Department civil division, a North Carolina task force on artificial intelligence, and a New York City interagency task force show how federal, state, and local organizations use organizational growth to solve problems. Each example changes the way people and resources have to work together. Leaders should compare those changes with options such as improving existing processes, clarifying decision rights, or adding staff to current offices.

Leaders often reorganize after periods of poor performance because they can quickly change reporting lines, responsibilities, and resource allocations. However, a new organizational chart does not guarantee better results. Sears and Yahoo show how redesigns can leave deeper business problems unresolved and create additional work for employees.

In 2008, Sears divided the company into more than 30 autonomous units, each with its own leaders, board, and profit-and-loss responsibility. The units competed for resources, and performance-based pay encouraged employees to prioritize their own divisions. Former executives described conflict, duplicated leadership roles, and lengthy negotiations between divisions. Sears filed for bankruptcy in 2018 after years of falling sales, rising debt, underinvestment, and stronger competition. Internal competition added pressure to a company that was already facing serious challenges.

Yahoo also reorganized several times as it tried to improve performance and compete more effectively. The company announced a three-group redesign in 2006, then reorganized again in 2008 to improve profits and decision-making. A 2009 redesign aimed to reduce internal silos and speed decisions. In 2012, Yahoo created Consumer, Technology, and Regions groups while cutting jobs. The repeated changes did not address the company’s deeper competitive and strategic problems.

Short command tours can create a related challenge for military leaders. Some improvements take several command cycles to complete. A commander might have an incentive to favor visible changes that show progress during their tour because process improvement, professional development, and cultural change require less visible, steady work across successive commands.

Federal commands face similar demands as their missions expand and their leaders decide how to organize people and resources. The following cases show why leaders need clear goals, authority, and measures as responsibilities grow.

Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa began in 2002 as an expeditionary counterterrorism headquarters and remains active today. By 2010, the command had grown to about 1,650 personnel and an $80 million budget. Eight years after the command began, AFRICOM had yet to decide whether to keep CJTF-HOA as a joint task force or change its mission, organization, or resources. Reports also found that the command lacked long-term assessments and clear, measurable goals. Those gaps made it difficult for AFRICOM to judge the command’s effectiveness.

The Department of Homeland Security faced a different challenge when it began operations in 2003 by combining 22 organizations. The agencies brought distinct missions, cultures, systems, and processes. Four years later, DHS lacked a comprehensive integration strategy and had not fully integrated its acquisition, financial, personnel, or information-management functions. The effort shows why leaders need to plan for integration alongside changes in reporting relationships and responsibilities.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence shows how a central office can improve coordination across agencies. Congress created the DNI in 2004 to strengthen information sharing across the Intelligence Community. In 2008, the DNI testified that his office managed strategy, policy, and budgets, while cabinet departments retained operational authority over their intelligence agencies. The arrangement gave the community a central coordinating office and preserved agency control over daily operations.

These cases point toward a foundation for organizational change: leaders need clear goals, assigned authority, and a plan to carry out the work. Agencies should set measurable outcomes, weigh expected costs and benefits, and plan workforce changes before they begin implementation. Major transformations can take five to seven years, requiring leaders to maintain focus after a new organization takes shape.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 shows how reorganization can address a defined failure. The law clarified the military's operational chain of command and gave combatant commanders greater authority over joint operations. The military services retained responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Joint education and promotion requirements aligned career incentives with the law’s goals.

DARPA’s design also fits its mission. Program managers lead fixed-term efforts and receive broad freedom from organizational leaders to pursue high-risk research using an eight-part test. Limited timelines encourage managers to test ideas and end weak programs quickly. DARPA’s research model supports speed, experimentation, and a focused purpose.

Joint Interagency Task Force-South relies on close cooperation among organizations with different authorities. The task force focuses on a defined mission and combines intelligence with ongoing operations. Empowered representatives commit their personnel and limited resources from their home agencies. Shared goals and trusted relationships help the partners work as one team.

Research on major organizational transformations identifies clear goals, executive accountability, employee involvement, communication, and sustained leadership as common conditions for success. Organizations need to align work processes, staffing, incentives, and performance measures with assigned responsibilities. Goldwater-Nichols, DARPA, and JIATF-South connect their designs to defined missions and clear roles.

Defense leaders face pressure to adapt as threats change and new funding arrives. Leaders managing large programs may feel pressure to create new headquarters, program offices, or task forces. The Air Force’s Fightertown Alaska plan offers a timely test of how leaders can manage growth. The roughly $7 billion effort at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson links construction with aircraft procurement, personnel moves, and logistics.

The program’s scale calls for clear governance across its organizations and projects. Air Force and Army Corps of Engineers leaders should identify who owns requirements, budget decisions, the integrated schedule, design changes, and dispute resolution. Program leaders should also set clear ways for operators, maintainers, installation staff, designers, and builders to raise conflicts and reach decisions.

Leaders should first assess whether existing offices have the authority, staff, and processes to manage the work. If gaps remain after that assessment, leaders can define the new office's specific function, its required authority, and the criteria they would use to measure success. Sequencing function, authorities, and success criteria ties organizational decisions to demonstrated needs.

Common measures can help leaders track progress across separate projects. Leaders can monitor schedule and cost performance, unresolved decisions, design changes, and the effect of construction and personnel moves on organizational readiness. Regular reviews can show whether current governance supports the mission and where leaders need to adjust responsibilities or processes.

Fightertown Alaska can become a model for a disciplined defense investment when leaders connect governance to mission outcomes. The cases at Sears and Yahoo show how redesigns can add conflict or distract from deeper business problems. Goldwater-Nichols, DARPA, and JIATF-South show how clear missions and roles can support coordination. Defense leaders should define the problem, assign authority, and measure against defined success criteria before they accelerate organizational growth.

Matt Russell and Michael Carvelli are co-founders and managing partners of Attain Leadership Solutions, a consulting firm that helps organizations turn strategy into execution, strengthen leadership teams, and improve organizational performance. Their work draws on experience leading complex organizations and planning operations in demanding environments. Russell is a retired Army infantry officer and strategist. Carvelli is completing his Army career as an engineer officer and organizational leader.

The views expressed are their own and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.