Do Nuclear Numbers Matter

Last year, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded that both Russia and China are increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons to achieve their national interests. Combined, they are projected to exceed the U.S. strategic nuclear force in numbers, creating a multiple challenger problem for the U.S. and raising the possibility of a dangerous collaboration between adversaries.  

The DIA also predicts that China will deploy 60 fractional-orbit bombardment systems (FOBS) by 2035, a force that grants China a new, more dangerous, and heightened capability. The FOBS are likely to attack the U.S. early warning, C3, and leadership nodes, whose survivability is required to execute any U.S. retaliatory response.  Also, of great concern are the additional 4,000 Chinese hypersonic speed weapons, which can largely evade current defenses and attack from any direction or altitude. It is possible that some of these could be tipped with a nuclear warhead. Especially given that China has the materials and manufacturing processes to produce large numbers of M10-20 hypersonic vehicles and does so at far lower cost than the U.S.. 

North Korea, with some 50 DIA-predicted ICBMs, exacerbates the multiple challenger problem and increases the possible collaboration between Russia, China, and North Korea during a crisis or conflict.

Now let’s look at the USA. The strategic modernization program of record consists of 400 ICBM Sentinel missiles to be deployed in silos through an estimated time frame out to or through 2045, with 400 but possibly 800-1200 warheads. Add to that 12 Columbia-class submarines, each with 16 missiles, and each missile with a maximum of 8 warheads or 1,536 warheads. That gives the U.S. a grand total of 2,736 total fast-flying warheads if all systems are loaded at their maximum. America’s strategic nuclear bomber force of 60 B-52 and B-21 bombers, each with between 8-12 cruise missiles or gravity bombs are in the mix and together could add upwards of 720 warheads for a hypothetical total of 3,456 strategic long-range warheads—although this may exceed the number of warheads available in our entire available stockpile and the USAF planned cruise missile acquisition. 

Deploying such an expanded or uploaded warhead force would require at least an additional four years, according to nuclear Triad experts. When compared to a potential and projected Russian and Chinese deployed force of over 11,000 long-range strategic warheads, the USA could be left with at least a 3-to-1 numerical disadvantage. Of critical importance is to note that the USA's total deployed force described here is the maximum number the USA can build, as the Sentinel and D-5 missiles would be “maxed out” under the assumed numbers used in this hypothetical force. 

While the USA could add additional strategic bombers to our planned nuclear force, those bombers would probably be necessary for other conventional purposes, as the USA is the only country in the free world with such capability, and current planning is for 100 new B-21 strategic bombers although there is growing support for upwards of 150-200 such aircraft. If additional ICBMs, submarines, or bombers are to be produced, current USA acquisition schedules would probably add such platforms, but at the end of the current build schedule or generally after 2040. The USA does have 50 additional ICBM silos (now empty) that could bolster its arsenal. Even so, this projected new window of vulnerability may not close for decades.  

One could argue that relative levels of nuclear warheads don’t have a strategic impact. Such an assumption may apply to possible USA strategic assumptions, but not necessarily for our adversaries. Arms control deals from SALT in 1972 to New Start in 2010 began with the proposition that parties to these treaties would be operating under the same rules and warhead limits. That is the underlying basis for sound inspections and verifications, and for President Reagan laying down the key requirement— “Trust but verify.” If warhead levels don’t matter, why require verifiable limits in arms control deals? Why worry if no arms deals are in place?

History tells us that nuclear superiority may have significant value. President Kennedy believed superiority enabled the USA to stare down the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis, declaring the newly deployed Minuteman ICBM force was “my ace in the hole.” Not dissimilar to his previous belief that the newly deployed Polaris submarine force enabled the USA not to yield to Soviet blackmail over Berlin in 1961. 

Having such superior military capability doesn’t eliminate the need for sound diplomacy and strategy in the nuclear age. The USA must be mindful of Dr. Kissinger’s explanation that while military force without a sound diplomatic framework is but bluster, diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect. 

If the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission is correct that Russia and China are in the nuclear blackmail and coercion business, then the USA cannot assume Russia and China have the same strategic assumptions or altruistic goals regarding nuclear weapons numbers and arms control as the United States. 

While the USA and Russia curbed nuclear warheads by some cuts of 4,500 each under the Moscow and New START agreements (down from 10,000 actual allowed warheads under START I), the decline under both deals was down to the neighborhood of as low as 1,700-1,800 deployed strategic warheads. This may indicate Russia wanted to limit USA-deployed nuclear forces to fewer than 2,000 warheads for about 24 years (2002-2026), while Russian nuclear modernization was eventually completed, and the post-Cold War economic decline in Russia could be overcome. 

Superior nuclear weapons numbers for China and Russia could translate into tangible strategic leverage and altered international behavior. Meanwhile, recent proposals from nuclear abolition advocates urge the United States to unilaterally abandon its long-standing deterrence strategy, including extended deterrence and leave the U.S. with markedly lower strategic nuclear forces than our adversaries. Such a move could signal a weakened U.S. commitment to its NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, undermining confidence in existing deterrence arrangements and potentially compelling allies to seriously consider developing their own nuclear capabilities.

This is highly ironic, as this very outcome was what many critics of the Trump administration assumed would happen when the administration pushed for more defense spending for non-U.S. NATO nations. A stronger NATO, including the U.S. as a NATO anchor, is better for everyone’s security, especially a conventional buildup that encompasses all NATO members rather than most defense spending being primarily centered in the USA. 

There is an adage that says the enemy always gets a vote. While the USA may wish for our adversaries to see nuclear forces as a deterrent against the use of force, the reality is starkly different. The enemy has voted. Escalate to win it is. For our enemies, nuclear force is an adjunct of military blackmail and aggression as well as serving as a handmaiden to the unrestricted warfare the U.S. now faces. 

Because nuclear weapons underpin America’s overall deterrent strength and provide the umbrella under which U.S. military and diplomatic power operates, it is urgent that the United States complete its planned nuclear deterrent modernization programs which now goes beyond the previous program of record and adds important theater/tactical nuclear capability. These forces now and will serve as a critical firewall against the use of force directed at this nation. There is no substitute for this capability, regardless of how strongly abolition advocates may wish otherwise.

Peter R. Huessy is President of Geo-Strategic Analysis and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Deterrent Studies.