The Myth of Chinese Containment

The great debate on the meaning of China’s rise is coming to a close. Where academics once argued over whether the Asian power would be a status quo or systemic challenger, there is growing consensus that China intends to reshape the global system in its image.

We now know the answers to two of the great questions of the twenty-first century: will China become a democracy? And what will it do once it has risen?

China’s most successful strategy, perhaps, has been to attack any response to its actions with the “containment” concept. The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia”; trade deals such as the TTP and TTIP; U.S.–Republic of Korea exercises; the Japan–India nuclear agreement; the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”; various U.S. presidential visits to the region; U.S. reactions to Chinese moves in the South China Sea; the U.S.–Japan–India–Australia Quadrilateral; and even Western values and the Nobel Prize have been seen as “containment” by China’s diplomats and media.

As a concept, containment dates back to the beginning of the Cold War and U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s infamous Long Telegram which first articulated the outlines of a policy that could be used to peacefully contain Soviet efforts to globalise their ideology and influence. American policymakers have continually disavowed such a strategy against China, as have Australian counterparts, saying it would be impossible and undesirable due to China’s integration with the global economy. This, however, has had little effect on the use of the term by Chinese policymakers and diplomats. It’s not difficult to tell why.

In terms of strategic messaging, “containment” has sown confusion among Western trading and security policy elites about how to react to the less positive aspects of China’s rise. The concept has been used to shift responsibility and agency from China itself to the West: “China isn’t behaving assertively, it’s reacting to an unfair containment policy”. The decision by Australia to abandon the U.S.–Japan–Australia–India Quadrilateral under Chinese pressure in 2008 was a reaction to Chinese pressure, and its resurrection nearly nine years later saw Chinese diplomats attempt to reframe it as “containment” or “NATO-in-Asia”.

The primary outcome of the myth of Chinese containment has been to divide American, Australian, and Indian policymakers at the domestic level, and to keep regional states forever on the back foot, forever apologising for making China “feel” surrounded. Most importantly, it has prevented them from pursuing their legitimate national interests.

It is an easy message to absorb: at some level, any policymaker can see the conceptual logic of security dilemmas, where one state attempts to balance insecurity by adding to its hard-power capabilities. This cycle of distrust is an easy concept to recognise and has become a prominent part of how Western states have sought to allay Chinese concerns. The U.S., Australia, Japan, and others, for example, have done this by seeking closer military-to-military links with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); the U.S. helped China’s entry into the WTO; and nearly all have overlooked egregious trade practices and IP-harvesting, and sought to give China representation in all the major international forums.

Yet the neither the Quadrilateral nor the term “Indo-Pacific” are about ganging up on China. These states feel insecure because China has taken over a major global trade route upon which they depend, militarised it, and then brushed off their concerns.

Western states have reacted by seeking collective security, and approached the region within an inclusive framework – one that seeks to balance China’s unequal weight. Naturally, Beijing dislikes these groupings for challenging its expansion, and therefore accuses them of containment.

All states have interests, and if there is no diplomatic compromise, countries naturally begin to band together against another that is behaving in a way perceived as threatening. Reacting to this, and attempting to ameliorate insecurity might be defensive, but it is certainly not containment.

John Hemmings is Director of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society and an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  Prior to his doctoral studies, he was a visiting fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS and a research analyst at the Royal United Services Institute in Whitehall, working on Northeast Asia defense and security policies.

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.