The Primacy Trap

In the 2010s, the global landscape changed. The Arab Spring, the Russian occupation of Crimea, and China’s national security law in Hong Kong were indicative of a profound change in the global system. The era of the unipolar moment, when the United States was the world’s sole dominant power, has ended. This is not to say that America’s decline is inevitable, but rather that the balance of power in the world is changing gradually, and Washington is no longer dictating the full course of geopolitical events around the globe.

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration prioritized and directed its resources toward the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific by revitalizing the Quad, inking AUKUS, and stepping up its strategic alliances and partnerships with Australia, Japan, and South Korea—moves that reflect Biden’s “Asia-first” strategy. With Putin’s tanks rolling into Ukraine, the United States changed course, arming Ukraine, which is not a formal US ally, providing Kyiv with intelligence and economic assistance, and imposing draconian sanctions on Russia that crippled Moscow’s economy. After a hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, America’s success in Ukraine not only regained the lost confidence in its capabilities and competence but also ushered in a new conquest to save Washington’s self-defined rules-based liberal international order, or in other words, global primacy. US diplomats went on a mission to convince partners and allies in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America to align with the United States on its position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine became front and center to US diplomatic and political engagement with everyone, everywhere.

The Ukraine temptation manifested itself in the United States urging its allies and partners to align with Washington’s strategy for a broad alignment against Russia and China simultaneously. Washington now treats Europe and the Indo-Pacific as one linked strategic theater. The United States expects all of its allies and partners to maintain the same approach towards China and Russia, regardless of their strategic position or relationship to the Indo-Pacific and Europe. In his recent visits to Japan and Australia, President Joe Biden “huddles with allies on their continued response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as ways to confront China’s assertive economic and military moves in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Washington succeeded in its conquest, and currently, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and individual European countries are gradually aligning themselves with the US-led alliance to dually contain the Russia-China axis. The strategic manifestation of this approach is the geopolitical merging of the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The aim is to consolidate political, military, economic, and technological capabilities, deterring China and Russia from undermining the liberal international order and tipping the geopolitical balance of power against the West.

However, this inter-theater approach faces challenges from consequential states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, India, and other middle and regional powers. These nations prioritize strategic autonomy and resist external constraints in foreign policy decision-making. They would actively collaborate in formats such as the G20 to undermine the emerging collective Western posture of treating Europe and the Indo-Pacific as a single geopolitical theater. Furthermore, merging the European theater with the Indo-Pacific could be a strategic blunder. It would necessitate diverting resources from allies that could be better utilized in their respective theaters. European allies should focus on Ukraine and Eastern Europe, while Asian allies should concentrate on Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region.

Despite the optimistic aspirations in Washington that the collective West could carry the burden of dual containment against China and Russia, it will ultimately fall on Washington alone to pursue this resource-consuming strategy to maintain global primacy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine sent a clear message that the United States could no longer prevent revisionist powers from challenging the global order that Washington had established and committed to uphold after World War II. With America’s position as the center of the global order, it is currently navigating a significant transformation marked by a gradual shift of global power towards the East and Asia more broadly. In response to these evolving dynamics, the United States must exhibit adaptability and embrace the necessity of adjusting rather than stubbornly resisting these geopolitical changes. As a nation, it is crucial for the United States to acknowledge the inherent limitations, cost, and unsustainability of pursuing global primacy or an expansive definition of American interests and responsibilities. Washington can’t do everything everywhere, all at once.

Mohammed Soliman is the Director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Middle East Institute. You can find him on Twitter at @Thisissoliman.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).