The Road to Securing European Cooperation on China Runs through Ukraine

The Trump administration’s drive to minimize its security commitments in Europe and enact a “reverse Nixon” strategy to drive a wedge between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is unlikely to succeed.  But even if it were successful, the pursuit of that strategy damages the transatlantic alliance at precisely the time that an emerging transatlantic consensus on the challenge the PRC represents could work in the U.S. interest. The administration may believe that a deal with Russia over Ukraine that ignores European concerns is worth the political cost because it frees up resources that could be better devoted to the main strategic competition with the PRC. But it alienates precisely the partners that the U.S. needs to contain Chinese influence on a more than Indo-Pacific regional level. The PRC’s strategic alignment with Russia since its invasion of Ukraine is the single largest factor driving the PRC to be described as a rival or threat, rather than a partner, across Europe. A strategic marginalization of Europe by the United States will necessitate that European states to focus on the proximate threat of Russia rather than cooperate with the U.S. on a broader agenda to contain the PRC’s influence. It could even push some European states to seek accommodation with the PRC in their own interest if they are convinced there is nothing to be gained from broader security cooperation with the United States. 

There was a striking degree of commonality among those interviewed on the challenges the PRC presents to European security. The PRC is increasingly seen as a threat to European interests and since 2022 attitudes regarding the PRC have dramatically changed to align much more closely to that of recent U.S. administrations. As one European External Action Service (EEAS) policy staff member put it, “we were naïve…a lot of governments got burned by being optimistic” about what the PRC’s increased power and influence meant for European security. While there is variation between institutions and among national delegations, even those states that prefer less confrontational language toward the PRC generally do not act to block the broader consensus in the EU institutions. “They are in the room,” notes an EEAS official, “but they don’t veto” stronger statements or measures on the PRC.

An EEAS official noted that the European Commission is consistently asking EEAS for more stringent policy options in dealing with the PRC and countering its influence in Europe. The same official also noted that even if this was originally driven by Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, the sense that the PRC is generally a malign actor in international affairs and a threat to European interests is now broadly entrenched among the EEAS staff. “Some trailblazed and some held back,” states an EEAS staff member, “but the important bureaucratic actors are all on board.”  The trend intensified in 2024 with Kaja Kallas becoming the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Kallas has consistently used the term “systemic rival” to describe the PRC, and this has shifted the discourse to something much closer to the U.S. discussion of the PRC. As an EEAS staff member summed up, the EU, “was not talking at the same level {as the U.S.} but it is now.”

But the critical factor that supercharges this shift in policy is the PRC’s support of, and strategic alignment with, Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As an EEAS official stated, it is “the most important thing in China’s foreign policy and is a hugely contributing factor” to the degree of unity seen across the member states of the EU (with a few notable exceptions such as Hungary, and to a lesser degree Greece and Cyprus).  In the words of one EEAS official with extensive experience dealing with the PRC, there was a time when many of the EEAS staff and those they work for were, “a bit skeptical of the U.S. obsession with China. Initially, we saw it as a U.S.-China problem and that we could avoid getting stuck in the middle. But we can’t stay in the middle.” 

The PRC’s support of Russia as described by a senior staff member at the European Parliament is, “not just a war on Ukraine, but it is a war against democracy and the European Union.”  It is an assault on the ideas that underpin the entire concept of a unified Europe in which violent conflict is obviated by economic and political integration. This is what has transformed a general unease with China’s authoritarianism into a direct security concern in Europe. The way in which the U.S. handles the discussion of a settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war, therefore, is critical to securing broad cooperation across Europe to rein in China’s influence and ability to rearrange the global order to its advantage. So far, however, the U.S. approach has alienated European states to the degree that many question the viability of the alliance and are moving rapidly to increase European defense investment in the face of what they see as American disinterest with European security.

Many in the Trump administration would likely respond to these points with, “so what?”  The U.S. has asked, cajoled, and threatened its European allies to shoulder more of the defense burden for decades. Now European states are doing precisely that because they take President Trump’s threats seriously. But this misses the point that they are doing so because they fear abandonment by the U.S. rather than a desire to deepen an existing alliance. It is not about burden sharing in NATO, which is in the American interest, but rather strategic separation, which is not.

It is not too late to take a different approach that would bend the curve. First, the U.S. can make a clear statement about its commitment to the defense of Europe by adding to its military presence in the Baltic states and Poland. This would help calm the fear of abandonment in Europe by emphasizing the tangible U.S. role in the region. It does not detract from President Trump’s focus on the free-riding problem in the alliance to reassure those front line states that have boosted their defense spending to levels that rival that of the U.S. in terms of percentage of GDP spent on defense.   Second, the U.S. can sweeten the pot for Ukraine by announcing that a successful settlement of the war will be backed by continued and upgraded arms sales to Ukraine to deter another Russian invasion. Third, it could offer to back a proposed UK-France led reassurance force in Ukraine with American logistical and intelligence support once there is a negotiated cease fire in place.

None of those actionable items would go against the Trump administration’s current statements or previous actions. In his first term, President Trump increased the U.S. presence in the Baltic states and this could be announced as building on that show of strength to encourage a durable peace.  Future arms sales to Ukraine to boost its ability to deter future Russian aggression align with  Trump’s first term policy and could potentially be paid for from the proposed minerals deal rather than draining the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) budget.  Support for a European reassurance force could be framed as a temporary measure enabling Europe to shoulder its responsibilities until such time as it has the capacity to do so without U.S. assistance. The cost of doing all this is relatively minimal compared to the long-term strategic cooperation it could build on the main U.S. security challenge of containing the PRC’s influence. For a president who sees himself primarily as a businessman in search of the best deal, this should be a bargain too good to ignore.

Zachary Selden is the former Deputy Secretary General for Policy at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and is currently an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. He was the NATO-Fulbright Security Studies fellow in Brussels in 2024.