America's Counterattack on China's Growing Influence in the Pacific Islands

The Trump administration should maintain its regional momentum following recent diplomatic success with the Cook Islands

China’s cooperation with the Cook Islands on seabed mining remains limited to exploration, but it builds Beijing’s reputation as an industry leader. In February, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries committed to the formation of a “Joint Committee of Marine Cooperation in Seabed Minerals Affairs” to manage the promised collaboration on research and technology sharing. The MOU was signed in conjunction with a larger comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) with Beijing, which covered topics ranging from infrastructure to the environment to educational scholarships.

President Trump’s April 2025 executive order on seabed mining declared that partnering with “countries developing seabed mineral resources in areas within their national jurisdictions, including their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ),” is the policy of the United States. According to estimates posted by the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority, the waters surrounding the country contain “the second largest deposit of metal-rich nodules” in the world. Guaranteed American access to these resources constitutes a victory. Though “U.S.-linked firms” currently lead the charge in studying this EEZ’s resources, Chinese entities could bring competition and pull another source of critical minerals into supply chains dominated by Beijing. The Trump administration is right to counter China’s February MOU with America’s own bilateral discussions on seabed development. August’s joint statement could be a gateway to a broadened relationship that will keep China’s presence in check.

The United States recognized the Cook Islands as an independent nation in 2023, but China has enjoyed formal relations since 1997. America’s narrow statement on seabed research may seem inconsequential when compared to the wide vision of China’s comprehensive strategic partnership. However, the Cook Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs reported in May 2025 that the projects included in the February accords had not yet materialized. He further affirmed that established development partners, China-wary New Zealand and U.S.-aligned Australia, remain the first choices for investment and aid. The expanding relationship with China draws mixed responses from the Cook Islands population, and opposition legislators pursued a vote of no confidence against the current prime minister soon after he entered his nation into the China deals. The Pacific nation is by no means lost to China, and America’s diplomatic overtures today could pay big dividends in the future.

The Cook Islands exist in free association with New Zealand, but the China agreements created a divide. While Cook Islanders operate with autonomy over their international relations, they are also New Zealand citizens and passport holders who normally consult with Wellington on important matters of foreign policy and security. New Zealand’s government contends that the China deals were not sufficiently discussed before going into force and responded by freezing over $10 million in funding. One representative stated that funding will not resume “until the Cook Islands government takes concrete steps to repair the relationship and restore trust.”

Tension between the Cook Islands and its traditional ally works in Beijing’s favor. The United States should not ignore China’s encroachment in a region that hosts core national interests.

The United States has a territorial link to the Pacific Islands through Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Hawaii. In exchange for economic aid and other benefits, Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) afford America exclusive defense authority in the nations of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. But a strong and long-established position has not fully deterred China.

Two of America’s three closest allies in the Pacific, Palau and the Marshall Islands, recognize Taiwan as an independent nation. Chinese pressure has been especially prominent for the COFA state of Palau, which for years has faced maritime incursions into its EEZ and assaults on the tourism industry. Palau hosts US military assets and lies along the Second Island Chain, an invisible line east of the Philippines and spanning from Japan to Indonesia that plays a significant role in US security strategy for the region. A Chinese aircraft carrier made precedent by reportedly crossing the Second Island Chain in June 2025.

Chinese inroads impact additional Pacific Islands states. Since 2019, three countries—Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Nauru—have ceased diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for official ties with China. The Solomon Islands’ comprehensive strategic partnership with China includes security and law enforcement, areas of cooperation beyond that of the Cook Islands’ CSP. A third China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2025 boosted Beijing’s symbolic and practical relationships with eleven governments.

The Cook Islands are a new front line in the competition for influence in the Pacific Islands. Diplomacy with the small country should be treated as a first step toward securing a positive American presence in the entire region.

The August joint statement must evolve into long-term action, both to ensure ties to plentiful resource reserves and to present America as a committed partner in the Pacific. The U.S. could also consider expanding collaboration with the Cook Islands. State Department Chargé d'Affaires David Gehrenbeck, who was involved in the recent deep-sea mining talks, mentioned business and combatting transnational crime as options for mutually-beneficial cooperation. The United States Coast Guard should continue to work with the Cook Islands on maritime law enforcement, especially considering that the Cook Islands EEZ “borders the EEZ of American Samoa.” While free association with New Zealand limits the possible extent of China’s influence in the Cook Islands, robust American involvement provides further defense against Beijing’s machinations.

In counterattacking China’s growing impact on the Cook Islands, the U.S. must not neglect the bigger picture. Seabed mining may become a prominent industry in the Pacific Islands region. To prepare for this possibility and counter China’s demonstrated interest, Washington should follow the lead of Trump’s executive order by building partnerships with other interested Pacific Islands countries. Kiribati, Tonga, and Nauru all have potential. America should also be proactive about addressing the concerns of Pacific states like Palau that oppose deep-sea mining. The August joint statement made a good start by including “environmental stewardship” as a core principle.

Finally, America should hold the line both with its COFA partners and on the home front. Chinese activities that undermine Palau’s sovereignty are also jabs at the US capability to defend treaty allies. While all three Compacts of Free Association were recently renewed, the United States must consistently rebuff the day-to-day threats of a China on the rise in the Indo-Pacific. To support interests abroad, be they mineral or security or economic, the United States must also be strengthened through domestic policy. Tapping American sources of minerals and revitalizing US shipbuilding will decrease vulnerability to adversaries and improve the nation’s hand in the Pacific Islands.

America’s joint statement with the Cook Islands was released around the Cook Islands’ 60th anniversary of self-governance. By contrast, the February 2025 accords only commemorated 28 years of relations with China. The United States should embrace its example of freedom and guide the Pacific Islands toward an independent and prosperous future.

Wyatt J. Greco is a Master of Public Policy Student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy. He specializes in International Relations and National Security, with regional interests in the Pacific Islands and Europe.