Cold Snap Ahead for the U.S.-Australian Alliance

U.S. President Donald Trump’s memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions is a roadmap for protecting and promoting U.S. polar interests. This directive will place further pressure on the fragile Antarctic governance system, and the usual suspects, Beijing and Moscow, may now be off the hook for sinking the ATS. 

The problem is the directive indicates Washington’s inability to discern between the differences of the Arctic and the Antarctic. Treating the two polar regions as one operational theater will result in strategic competition for the U.S. and the usual suspects, but it will also inject tension into the U.S.-Australia alliance.

Ironically, despite the existence of U.S. bases, including year-round McMurdo, Trump is seeking ‘persistent presence’ in the Antarctic. The directive calls for ‘at least two’ new international basing locations for U.S. icebreakers. Assuming one at each pole, it appears Washington is pushing for a maritime base in Antarctica. Further, Trump calls for new U.S. bases to be considered as ‘burden-sharing opportunities’ for allies. It is hard to envision a setting in which Antarctic stakeholders (all 54 of them), including U.S. allies with frozen territorial claims such as Norway, New Zealand, Australia, France, or the United Kingdom, would welcome this initiative.

Of course, claiming that any development of U.S. Antarctic capabilities will be within 'accordance' with the ATS signals that Trump does not understand the Treaty. All activities on the continent must be scientific. Yet, the directive explicitly leaves off the National Science Foundation and its Office of Polar Programs (the agencies responsible for U.S. Antarctic research programs) from the distribution list. The directive frames icebreaking capability in terms of supporting 'national and economic security missions’ in Antarctica. There is no basis provided in terms of the general scientific purpose served by bolstering U.S. presence in the Antarctic.

Potential challenges to the Treaty are also found in Trump’s shopping list of operational capabilities for the new fleet.  The most obvious – his call for an assessment of the fleet’s defensive armament components. The Treaty bans the militarization of the Antarctic or the use of military hardware (if not in support of scientific activities).  As one of the principal architects of the ATS and the self-appointed guarantor of the rules-based global order, it is troubling to see the foundations of a new U.S. Antarctic strategy emerge in Trump’s directive. This effort to safeguard U.S. national interests in the Antarctic will no doubt erode the Treaty and kick-start a race to conquer the last unclaimed continent. By pushing back against any assertive development of the U.S.’s Antarctic footprint, traditional ally Canberra adds itself to Washington’s list of competitors in the polar regions.

Elizabeth Buchanan is Lecturer of Strategic Studies with Deakin University for the Defence and Strategic Studies Course (DSSC) at the Australian War College and a Fellow of the Modern War Institute at West Point. Dr. Buchanan holds a Ph.D. in Russian Arctic strategy from the Australian National University and was recently the Visiting Maritime Fellow at the NATO Defense College.

This article reflect the views of the author and not The Australian War College or the Modern War Institute at West point.