The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump's Taiwan Stance

Would the United States come to the defense of Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invaded? Would the U.S. Navy break a PRC blockade of Taiwan? How would the U.S. military respond to a limited missile strike against military facilities in Taiwan? What would the United States do if the PRC seized one of Taiwan’s offshore islands? Would the U.S. president trade an American city for Taipei in a nuclear tit-for-tat to defend Taiwan?

Despite a growing consensus around Beijing’s desire to take Taiwan by force in the coming years, Washington has maintained its long-term policy of strategic ambiguity on all Taiwan contingencies. That policy is quite simple: the U.S. government will not commit to a specific action in response to a PRC action on Taiwan.

The language of the TRA provides the U.S. president with immense leeway in making a decision should the worst occur. The TRA states,

It is the policy of the United States … to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; … to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

The law does not provide a firm and solid security guarantee, but it reads rather like one. However, it is not a bilateral security treaty, but the wording of the law and what it commits Washington to do to help Taiwan have been debated since Carter signed it.

The answer to the question of the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan is simple: it is up to the occupant of the Oval Office. What does a second Trump administration mean for the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity? How does Trump—known for his off-the-cuff foreign policy pronouncements, alliance skepticism, and belief in the madman theory—differ from his predecessors?

Trump’s comments on Taiwan made headlines during the 2024 presidential campaign cycle and regularly come to the fore now that he is back in the Oval Office. His general comments on Taiwan have focused on the semiconductor industry and the amount of money Taiwan spends on its defense.

In the weeks before the election, on “The Joe Rogan Experience,” he accused Taipei of nefarious business activity: “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business … and they want protection.” Before winning his second election, Trump was generally critical of the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides new funding streams for semiconductor companies to boost research and manufacturing inside the United States. His belief that Taiwan stole semiconductor manufacturing jobs from the United States is one motivation for his proposed tariffs on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. After the tariff threats, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced a new investment in the United States.

On March 4, TSMC announced new plans to invest another $100 billion in addition to its $65 billion investment to build out a large semiconductor campus in Arizona: “The expansion includes plans for three new fabrication plants, two advanced packaging facilities and a major R&D team center, solidifying this project as the largest single foreign direct investment in U.S. history.” The original $65 billion investment occurred during the first Trump administration and came online during the Biden administration and “employs more than 3,000 people on 1,100 acres of land in Arizona.” Even though Trump made the announcement alongside TSMC chief executive officer C.C. Wei in the Oval Office, this development did not halt Trump from targeting Taiwan in his tariff plans.

The announcement was shocking in Taiwan, so much so that President Lai Ching-te hosted a joint press conference with Wei at the presidential office.

Taiwan’s prowess in semiconductor manufacturing is often connected to the need to defend Taiwan from a PRC blockade or military invasion since TSMC makes over 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. This line of thinking goes that if TSMC manufactures more semiconductors in the United States, there would be less incentive or need to get involved in a Taiwan contingency. Until the number of advanced chips made in Taiwan declines, it is in the U.S. interest to keep Taiwan out of the PRC orbit. Former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou even accused the Lai administration of “selling TSMC … as a protection fee.”

In addition to the semiconductor criticisms, Trump has been generally critical of the amount of money Taiwan spends on its defense as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Right now, Taiwan spends less than 3 percent of its GDP on defense. Trump has said that number should be 10 percent. During his confirmation hearing, Elbridge Colby, now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, reiterated that figure: “I agree with President Trump that they should be more like 10 percent, or at least something in that ballpark, really focused on their defense.”

This criticism follows Trump’s regular complaint that U.S. allies and partners are not spending enough or doing enough to support their own defense. Given Taiwan’s distance from the United States and the immense power asymmetry between Taiwan and the PRC, Trump has been clear about his unhappiness with the amount of money that Taiwan spends on its defense. While 10 percent is an exorbitant amount of money for any country to spend on defense, Taipei should heed Trump and his administration officials’ complaints about defense spending because the next four years will be critical in maintaining deterrence.

With the most pro-Taiwan elements of the Trump administration falling in line with the president’s 10 percent figure, leaders in Taipei should start to become worried about the role of the United States in a contingency scenario. This is especially true since Trump himself has floated the idea that Taiwan should directly pay the United States for defense: “Taiwan should pay us for defense… You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.”

While Trump may have a new perspective on the amount of money that Taiwan should spend on its defense, he has been relatively consistent in his statements about the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. When asked in February 2025 about any such commitment, he said, “I never comment on that. I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.” Not commenting on “that”—the U.S. commitment to or involvement in defending Taiwan from the PRC—is essentially the simplest way to explain the policy of strategic ambiguity.

Before his inauguration, in December 2024, Trump made a similar statement to NBC. When asked, “If China invades Taiwan on your watch, are you committed to defending Taiwan?” He said, “I never say… I never say, because I have to negotiate things, right?

While Trump has not publicly committed to or abandoned Taiwan, he has acknowledged the impact of additional TSMC investment in the United States and U.S. interests in defending Taiwan. He said, “I can’t say ‘minimize.’ That would be a catastrophic event, obviously… But … we would have a very big part of it in the U.S. So, it would have a big impact if something should happen with Taiwan.” That statement clearly demonstrates his mindset on TSMC’s global importance, and if TSMC makes more semiconductors in the United States, then there is less of a reason to defend Taiwan.

Nevertheless, while Trump seems to be leaning in one direction (away from the idea of defending Taiwan), he has been consistent in his lack of desire to publicly comment on the topic. This alignment with strategic ambiguity seemingly falls into his belief of the “madman theory,” especially regarding China. Trump has said that Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping “respects me, and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.” He elaborated, “I would say: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.”

Despite Trump’s unpredictability and bluster on many topics, he is not that different from every other president on Taiwan and strategic ambiguity. His words, as discussed above, are almost verbatim the definition of strategic ambiguity. They are not novel. They are not creating a new space in U.S.-Taiwan policy. He is just espousing the traditional American approach of non-commitment to Taiwan. He may not fully grasp the implications of his statements, but Trump has much in common with Democratic presidents like Barack Obama and Bill Clinton in this regard.

Interestingly, while Trump could be considered a strategic ambiguity traditionalist, two of his predecessors—Joe Biden and George W. Bush—are the ones who broke the strategic ambiguity mold.

In 2001, Bush told Good Morning America that under his leadership, the United States would do “‘whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself’ in the event of attack by China.” When pressed about the U.S. obligation to defend Taiwan, he doubled down, “Yes, we do … and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.” Bush would not get into specifics regarding what exactly he would do, but he was clear that his administration would defend Taiwan.

His statements inspired then-Senator Joe Biden to write an op-ed criticizing Bush’s far-reaching statements in the Washington Post. In the article, Biden argued that the United States does not have a commitment to defend Taiwan via the TRA. Biden wrote, “Where once the United States had a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’—under which we reserved the right to use force to defend Taiwan but kept mum about the circumstances in which we might, or might not, intervene in a war across the Taiwan Strait—we now appear to have a policy of ambiguous strategic ambiguity. It is not an improvement.” Throughout his time in the Senate, Biden was clear on his support for Taiwan and the policy of strategic ambiguity.

Fast forward to when Biden became president, and he quickly—and consistently—invoked Bush’s statements, arguing that the United States is committed to defending Taiwan. On multiple occasions, Biden clearly stated the very opposite of what he criticized Bush for. President Biden was not a proponent of strategic ambiguity the way Senator Biden was. In 2022, Biden said, “Yes … that’s the commitment we made.” He reiterated that commitment during a 60 Minutes interview: “Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack.” In 2021, he compared the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan to NATO Article 5: “We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if, in fact, anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with—Taiwan.”

The Bush and Biden administrations would attempt to clarify each president’s remarks and claim that U.S. policy had not changed. However, when a president clearly states his view, that amounts to a policy change. Given the number of times that Biden said the same exact thing about the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan, it is evident that the Biden administration did not have a policy of strategic ambiguity. Biden provided clarity: he believed that the United States had a particular commitment but would not expressly state what he would order beyond sending U.S. troops to Taiwan. So, there was still ambiguity on the level of response, but clarity on a response.

Where Biden embraced a policy of “strategic clarity,” Trump embraces the long-term policy of strategic ambiguity. Each vision has its pros and cons, both of which have long been debated.

Trump has surrounded himself with many officials who have track records of supporting Taiwan and who have pushed for a harder stance on the PRC. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while he was in the Senate, met former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. However, given the lack of a security treaty with Taiwan, it does not matter how pro-Taiwan his staff is.

With Trump back in office, the U.S. policy on Taiwan has moved back into the strategic ambiguity camp. What that means for Taiwan in the coming years is—by definition—anybody’s guess.

Thomas J. Shattuck is a Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Senior Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. He is a 2024-25 non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a 2024-25 non-resident Research Fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).