Kremlin Shifts Focus to Information Warfare

Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no sign of giving up on his war against Ukraine despite limited battlefield gains. As Russia begins to experience a shortage of certain types of military equipment, its propaganda machine continues unabated and may have even expanded. Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrii Sybiha, stated that Russia’s draft budget for 2026 would reduce military spending by approximately $2.4 billion compared to 2025, while increasing funding for state-run media by 54 percent, an additional $458 million. In Sybiha’s opinion, this draft budget realignment shows that the Kremlin is prioritizing informational warfare going forward (The New Voice of Ukraine, September 30; Telegram/@Ukraine_MFA, October 19). The target audience—including the population of the Russian Federation, citizens of Ukraine, and residents of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and allies—dictates Moscow’s strategy.

Kremlin-funded media aimed at Western audiences attempt to convince their targets that Russia is still a superpower on the world stage. Moscow demands that the West lift sanctions as part of this effort, claiming that they have no effect on the Russian economy and instead backfire on Western countries. When Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s special envoy for investment and economic cooperation, visited the United States, he attempted to portray the Russian economy as more stable than that of Europe. He claimed that new gas sanctions have “absolutely no effect on Russia’s economy. They will simply lead to higher prices at gas stations in the United States” (Kommersant; CBS News, October 26). Dmitriev’s trip took place immediately after the October 22 announcement of U.S. sanctions against the Russian oil industry, underscoring the Kremlin’s sensitivity to energy sanctions. When asked about Dmitriev’s comments, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the Russian envoy as “propagandist” and explained that “it’s oil that funds the Russian war machine, and I think we can make a substantial dent in [Putin’s] profits” (CBS News, October 26).

Russian state media seeks to demonstrate Russia’s military power to the West alongside threats of nuclear weapons. Every time the battlefield or global political situation does not favor Moscow, Russian officials begin to declare an alleged “escalation” and threaten devastating consequences (see EDM, October 27, November 3 [1], [2]). The Kremlin demonstrated this pattern on the eve of the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, during which the leaders were expected to discuss the transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Kyiv. Shortly before the meeting, a telephone conversation took place between Trump and Putin, after which the United States postponed its final decision.

The much-publicized “launches” of new Russian weapons in October—the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile (SSC-X-9 Skyfall) and the Poseidon nuclear-capable torpedo—sought to project Russian military power domestically and to the West (Radio Svoboda, October 26; Telegram/@news_kremlin, October 29; see EDM, November 3). Norway’s military intelligence reported that Russia launched Burevestnik from the Arctic archipelago Novaya Zemlya in the Barents Sea on October 21 (Meduza, October 27; The Insider, October 29). News of the tests was accompanied by aggressive posturing from Russian state television hosts, bloggers, and experts. Among the narratives is that Moscow has an advantage in the global technology race and has significant scientific and industrial potential (RIA Novosti, October 26). There are also statements that Russia could pose a significant threat to Europe and the United States (Rossia 1, October 27; YouTube/@russianmediamonitor, October 30). Despite a series of loud statements from state-affiliated Russian media, however, there is no credible data about the success of the Burevestnik test.

The Kremlin’s Burevestnik and Poseidon tests did not make as large an impact as Putin intended. On October 28, during a press conference at the Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that he had not received any feedback on the tests through diplomatic channels (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 28). Alexei Fenenko, professor at the Faculty of World Politics at Moscow State University, said that “judging by Washington’s reaction, the tests unfortunately did not make the desired impression” (Russia 1, October 27). Only Western politicians with pro-Kremlin views, such as Gunnar Lindemann, a member of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, responded to as Moscow intended, citing “the West’s anxiety and Russia’s high combat readiness” (Izvestia, October 27).

Kremlin-funded media seeks to convince the West to cancel or reduce military aid to Ukraine. The Kremlin attempts to create a negative image of Ukraine and Ukrainians and stir up conflicts between states through fakes, manipulations, or false-flag operations (Telegram/@CenterCounteringDisinformation, October 22, 23; NV, October 29).

Moscow is trying to convince citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union that they need to spend public funds on domestic problems instead of supplying weapons to Ukraine. The Kremlin pursues this through support for radical political parties in the European Union and by increasing provocations toward the West, including allowing Russian drones over critical and military infrastructure in Europe, sabotage, and cyberattacks (Vox Ukraine, March 28; Slawa.TV, July 9; see EDM, September 15, 16, 25, October 9). According to Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, Russia’s goal is to stir up opposition to aid for Ukraine in European countries (see EDM, May 29, June 9, July 22, August 1; Il Foglio, October 25).

The Kremlin continues its campaign to discredit Ukraine’s top military and political leadership. In 2022 and 2024, Moscow primarily targeted this campaign at Zelenskyy and the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Now, a narrative is being promoted in Russian sources about an alleged conflict between Zelenskyy and General Oleksandr Syrskyi, as well as between Syrskyi and General Mykhailo Drapatyi, Commander of the Joint Forces of AFU (Telegram/@khersonnewsru, October 31).

On October 30, Putin invited international journalists to visit Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and Kupiansk to “prove” the Kremlin’s claims that Ukrainian forces are encircled there, promising to halt hostilities for five to six hours for the event. Heorhii Tykhyi, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, warned against participating in this event, which Ukraine views as a propaganda tool and potential threat to journalists’ safety (Liga.net, October 30; X/@JulianRoepcke, October 31). The Kremlin may also use the ceasefire to transfer reserves, as during the Easter truce (see EDM, May 5; Telegram/@spravdi, October 31). Ukrainian monitoring organizations have found that Russia has committed more than 836 crimes against journalists in Ukraine and killed more than 135 Ukrainian media representatives since February 2022 (Institute of Massive Information, May 23; President of Ukraine, October 23).

Russian propaganda seeks to undermine Ukrainians’ support for the war, with a particular focus on mobilization (Telegram/@landforcesofukraine, August 31). Among those who have already joined the army, Kremlin propagandists are spreading calls to surrender or flee. They often use fake videos allegedly filmed by real Ukrainian soldiers, mostly generated using neural networks or artificial intelligence (AI) (Telegram/@frontline_pvt, October 12). The Kremlin is increasingly utilizing AI to produce media for influence operations, as it reduces the time and resources required, enabling content to be generated on an industrial scale.

The Kremlin also creates graphics and videos mimicking pro-Ukrainian sources in large numbers, primarily on TikTok, to attract Ukrainian subscribers. After building their base, these accounts begin to spread information about allegedly catastrophic losses in the AFU (Telegram/@spravdi, October 23, 25).

To influence AFU soldiers and generate positive news for the Russian target audience, the Russian army uses a “flagpole tactic.” Russian soldiers enter Ukrainian territories, sometimes changing into civilian clothes, to raise the Russian flag and take a photo as proof of “complete control.” In most cases, such groups of “flag bearers” are immediately destroyed by Ukrainian fire (Freedom, October 29). A recent example is in Pokrovsk, where such a flag lasted less than an hour (X/@Maks_NAFO_FELLA, October 29; Zerkalo Nedeli, October 30).

Even more telling is the case of the Russians’ announced mass landing of troops in the Ostrov district of the city of Kherson, particularly on Karantinnyi Island, on October 15 (Suspilne.Kherson, October 15). The news about the landing was disseminated by Russian media, including at the federal level. The fake was quickly refuted—the Ukrainian military filmed a video in the area in question, showing the absence of the enemy. Due to the publicity surrounding the refutation of the fake, Russian media simply “canceled” the news (TASS, October 22).

The resumption of a series of Russian airstrikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has once again, as expected, raised the issue of the influence on the civilian population (see EDM, August 1, 2024). As in previous years, the Kremlin is actively promoting the idea of an impending collapse of the energy sector and total blackouts, the inability of the authorities and the military to protect the population, and the need for immediate evacuation. According to Pavlo Lakiychuk, Head of the Security Programs of Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI,”  the goal of the strikes is not only to paralyze the country’s logistics routes and energy system, but also to force the population to surrender (TSN, October 30). 

The use of informational warfare to enhance the effect of kinetic strikes is becoming standard operating procedure in modern combat. The Russian propaganda and disinformation system is likely to increase its intensity to compensate for economic difficulties, the lack of significant results in the war against Ukraine, and problems on the global stage. 

Yuri Lapaiev is currently the editor-in-chief of Tyzhden (The Ukrainian Week) magazine. He graduated from the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University in Kharkiv, with an MA in computer network engineering. Between 2006 and 2011, he served in Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, including as an analyst.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.