How an Iran Hawk Lets IS Off the Hook

This week, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Darling argued over at Cicero Magazine that Washington’s decision-making on intervention in Iraq should be shaped by the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf triggered by a nuclear Iran, rather than the threat of the Islamic State (IS).

Darling is not alone in the camp that views the “Iranian threat” through the lens of IS. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Washington that the greatest priority in the Middle East remains the possibility of a nuclear Iran. The United States, he argued, should not cooperate with Tehran to defeat IS. This despite the fact the barbaric actions of IS are taking lives every day, while the prospect of a nuclear Iran remains a distant future postulation.

IS and Iran: Comparable Actors?

Iran, on the other hand, may not have been the United States’ best friend in the past three and a half decades, but it remains a legitimate nation-state. It has a political system with a series of checks and balances and some level of accountability and debate. Importantly, Iran can be deterred. Ideology is certainly a driver behind Tehran’s decision-making, but its national interests dictate much of its actions. These interests in turn do not always converge with those of the United States, nor do they always conflict. In fact, Iran and the United States have many common interests in the Middle East and South Asia. The two countries, in fact, have many commonalities.

Iran hawks, like Netanyahu, would advise the United States to sacrifice those interests to oppose and weaken Tehran at any cost. But such inflexibility would undermine U.S. interests without undermining Iran. There is no evidence that U.S. failure to effectively collaborate with Iran on regional security issues has come at a cost for Tehran, which has promoted its interests through different channels. But with cooperation between these two key players in the region, things could look very different for those countries and the United States.

Darling argues that, “While American policy makers make decisions with the next congressional election dominating their thinking, Saudi and Iranian decision makers think of the long term spiritual future of Islam.” This is a very naïve view of Middle Eastern politics. Neither Tehran nor Riyadh thinks about the “long term spiritual future of Islam.” What they do think about is their interests, much like decision-makers in Washington.

A close examination of the Islamic Republic’s thirty five-year history proves this point, as does its decisions to ally itself with and support certain Shiite factions and not others across the Muslim world. For example, as noted by Iranian-Israeli scholar, David Menashri, during the 1991 Shiite uprising of southern Iraq, “Iran preferred to view the events there as an exclusively internal Iraqi issue. Stressing the policy of expediency, [Supreme Leader Ayatollah] Khamene’i, [...] maintained that Iranian intervention was ‘not recommended.’”

Rather than offering a constructive solution, Darling chooses to play the blame game, arguing that both Riyadh and Tehran are responsible for the creation of IS. From this, he concludes that the United States does not “owe” either country anything.

Darling argues that Washington appeared to “favor” the Islamic Republic by choosing non-intervention during the 2009 post-electoral protests. Whether or not one believes that the Obama administration made the right ethical and political decision not to become involved, one key issue cannot be overlooked: had the President made the decision to respond favorably to the crowds in Tehran chanting, “Obama, Obama, you are with us or you’re with them,” the nuclear issue would look very different today.

Indeed, choosing to stay out of Iran’s “business” in 2009 has allowed the United States to engage Tehran on its nuclear program in the context of the ongoing negotiations with the rest of the P5+1. The Supreme Leader, who has backed the talks, albeit with some reservations, would probably not have endorsed them had the United States chosen to intervene then. What is more, the outcome of the 2013 presidential elections leading to the election of President Hassan Rouhani would have looked very different as well.

This brings me to Darling’s core argument – one echoed by Netanyahu and other Iran hawks – that the gravity of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran is much greater than the immediate threat of IS.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

First, it is striking that in a piece discussing the concerns over Iranian proliferation, the author fails to mention the administration and the rest of the P5+1’s diplomatic efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear dossier. In fact, Darling correlates the end of the “momentum for sanctions” with the U.S. “decision that disarmament in Syria was more important than nuclear non-proliferation in Iran.”

But he fails to mention that almost one year of negotiations have resulted in the Joint Plan of Action in November 2013, which the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported is being implemented by Iran. He also fails to take the Rouhani team’s obvious willingness and efforts to normalize relations with the West and to solve the Iranian nuclear issue. He ignores the most relevant and important pieces of the puzzle, choosing instead to focus on Syria, which is not directly relevant to the nuclear issue.

Second, Darling argues that, “Iran’s nuclear program is not a response to an immediate sense of being threatened.” This statement is wrong. Diminishing Iran’s security concerns is not conducive to solving the nuclear issue. And acknowledging and understanding these concerns does not mean that one has to support the prospect of a nuclear Iran. Rather, it would help the United States reach a solution on this matter.

Darling may have missed the developments in Iran’s neighborhood in the past four decades, not to mention centuries. Iran was attacked by Iraq in the 1980s, a war that involved the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein, taking the lives of hundreds of thousands combatants and non-combatants. The United States has invaded the country’s two immediate neighbors. The region is home to a number of fragile states and terrorist safe havens, including nuclear-armed Pakistan. Its territorial integrity is threatened by non-state and other state actors in the region. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are being armed to the teeth by the United States. And Israel and the United States have threatened to attack the country a number of times.

A wider view of history provides no greater solace. The Soviet Union and Britain invaded Iran during World War II. And over the course of centuries prior, then-Persia was invaded by the Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Mongols, and Russians. This is what Ron Paul meant when he stated, “if I were an Iranian, I’d want a nuclear weapon.” Promoting a more unstable region, as Darling does, would only push Tehran toward nuclear weapons, not the opposite.  

Third, Darling claims that Iran’s quest for the bomb “serves a cornerstone of Iran’s argument they alone have the strength to fight the enemies of Islam in the name of the Umma.” Darling ignores that the foundation of Iran’s nuclear narrative is that nuclear weapons are strictly prohibited under Shiite jurisprudence. Whatever one may think of Iran’s Islamic nuclear narrative, the declaratory policy and what Darling calls “a cornerstone of Iran’s argument” are in stark contradiction. Indeed, Tehran has stated time and time again that it would never use nuclear weapons, which it views as prohibited under Islamic law. How can a country claim not to be willing to use nuclear weapons and argue that nuclear weapons would allow it to fight the enemies of Islam?

Fourth, Darling presents the old argument of the domino effect of Iran’s nuclear program: should Iran go nuclear, so would the rest of the region, starting with Saudi Arabia. This argument, which cannot be taken for granted, has been long debated in the non-proliferation community in the United States and beyond. The author presents it as a fact, which it is not.

The domino effect theory has led the United States to a number of poor foreign policy decisions over the past few decades, including wars which could and should have been avoided. Yet, this uncertain variable has been presented as a viable reason justifying certain foreign policy decisions. It cannot be stated with certainty that Saudi Arabia would risk its ties with the United States, from which it procures many of its weapons. Indeed, even though U.S.-Saudi relations have been shaky, the kingdom still needs the United States.

Lastly, Darling believes that the United States would be doing Iran a favor in intervening in Iraq against IS, which, he argues, should be done if Tehran gives up its nuclear ambitions. This suggests that the only actor with an interest in Iraq is Iran and that IS only constitutes a threat to Tehran. In fact, has not directly attacked Iran so far. Given its strategic depth and military and paramilitary forces’ capabilities, Iran is one of the only countries in the region IS cannot effectively threaten immediately. But IS is a threat to regional stability and security in the Middle East. It intends to annihilate a number of Iraqi ethnic and religious minorities. It represents a threat to U.S. national interests, U.S. nationals, and U.S. allies.

In the current climate, amidst all the insecurity and conflict in a volatile yet strategically crucial region, it is important to understand each actor, refrain from generalizations that will trigger miscalculations in the Middle East. Only by doing so can we find viable and constructive solutions to the current crises.

This article is a response to a piece in Cicero Magazine entitled “Let Iran and ISIS Fight It Out.”

Ariane M. Tabatabai is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Follow her on Twitter @ArianeTabatabai.