
An Aging Amphibious Warfare Fleet Will Not Deter China
Last updated 08:17 AM EDT • Read time: 6m
Events of recent weeks have underscored the correctness of the Biden administration’s view that China is this country’s “pacing threat,” one that is racing to create a military that would challenge that of the United States. The U.S. military is seeking to alter both the design of its forces and how they operate in peacetime to provide a credible deterrent and, if necessary, a war-winning capability. To that end, the U.S. Navy is proposing both a quantitative and qualitative buildup. One part of the fleet that must be enhanced in both respects is the amphibious warfare force.
The Chinese military buildup has been progressing at an alarming speed. So too has the escalation of Beijing’s bellicose behavior. In response, the Navy has revised its Fleet design to primarily reflect the need to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. The 2022 Navigation Plan calls for some 355 manned ships and approximately 150 unmanned vessels. This larger Navy will also be more modern.
Yet, the Navy seems to be uncertain of how it wants to modernize and expand its amphibious warfare fleet. In the wake of the Marine Corps’ publication of its Force Design 2030, which proposed creating a Stand-in Force comprised of small, mobile land units backed up by a new class of small amphibious warfare vessels, more than a few Navy and Pentagon officials came to the erroneous conclusion that the nation no longer needed large amphibious warfare ships.
The sea services need both large and small amphibious warfare ships. The large amphibs play a unique role in integrated deterrence by providing a sophisticated air/sea/land capability consisting of Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) and the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) that sail aboard them. The ARG/MEU is the nation’s 911 force. It is in extremely high demand in peacetime. It also has a role to play in wartime, seizing critical chokepoints while the new smaller marine units and amphibs create a sea denial environment. As Marine Corps Commandant, General David Berger, explained:
“There is not a tradeoff... they are complementary capabilities. They are not a substitute for each other because a traditional amphibious ship has all the attributes that we know and love so much over the years that a Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Ready Group have been using.”
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gilday, also made a compelling case for the large amphib fleet: “We need a strong amphibious force to include nine big-deck (amphibious assault ships) and another nineteen or twenty (landing platform/docks) to support them. Perhaps thirty or more smaller amphibious ships to support Maritime Littoral Regiments.”
In fact, 28 or 29 large amphibs are not enough. Repeated studies have shown that the nation needs a fleet of more than 30 large amphibs; some have argued for as many as 38. This fleet would consist of a combination of Landing Helicopter Assault/Landing Helicopter Dock (LHA/LHD) “mini” aircraft carriers and Landing Ship Dock/Landing Platform Dock (LSDs/LPDs) that carry a mix of marines, equipment, and supplies.
The Navy’s new proposed fleet design calls for some 31 large amphibs to be maintained between now and 2045. While this number is higher than some sources had proposed, it is insufficient to allow the Navy to meet the long-standing peacetime requirement for three simultaneously deployed ARG/MEUs.
As the demands on the amphibious force continue to rise, and the range of scenarios to which the Navy and Marine Corps must respond expands, the amphibious warfare fleet must grow both quantitatively and qualitatively. Often, deployed ARG/MEUs are broken up in theaters, with individual ships performing specific missions away from the rest of the formation. This puts a premium on the capabilities of the individual platform.
Consequently, the Navy must not only maintain the required number of amphibs, but it must also modernize the force. This means building additional LHAs and replacing the aging LSDs which are reaching the end of their planned service life. They also lack the capacity and capabilities present in the newer LPD-17 class ships. In its FY2023 budget submission, the Navy proposed decommissioning four LSDs, a move rejected by Congress out of concern that this would reduce the overall amphibious warfare fleet to well below the needed numbers.
But the Navy must replace its aging LSDs. The only way to do this is to acquire more of the larger and more capable LPD-17 Flight II. The LPD-17s are designed to support the deployment of landing forces by helicopter, vertical lift aircraft, LCACs and conventional landing craft. The LPD-17 class has advanced electronics and sensor systems, signature reduction and modern command and control (C3) capabilities. Moreover, given the trend of dispersing the ARG to cover more assignments, the LPD-17 Flight II is being designed to conduct intensive air activities and to support distributed operations.
Yet in its FY2023 budget the Navy proposed truncating the LPD-17 Flight II procurement plan from thirteen ships to just three. With the existing LPD Flight I ships already in service, this would give the Navy eight LHAs/LHDs, 16 LPD-17s Flight I/II, and a handful of LSDs. As the LSDs age out of the force, the number of large amphibs would drop to 24 or 25, well below the minimum required.
In order to meet even the 31-ship target, much less the desirable goal of at least 38 amphibs, the Navy will actually have to increase its proposed procurements of these ships. The way to do this is by accelerating production of America-class LHAs, such as the USS Bougainville, and continue producing LPD-17 Flight II ships at a steady pace. LPD Flight II has a proven hull design that could decrease risk and increase delivery speed in replacing the LSD class.
Fortunately, the nation has the shipbuilding capacity to continue to produce both LHAs and LPD-17s. Congress has made clear that it desires to see a larger and more modern fleet of amphibs. Now what remains is for the Navy to get on board.
Dan Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Gouré has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.

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