China's Jurisdictional Traps: The Risks of Silent Transits in the Taiwan Strait

The Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts routine operations in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers fulfill critical roles to forward-deployed naval forces, carrier strike groups, and regional partners and allies in supporting the security and the right of all nations to trade, to communicate, and to choose their destiny in a free and open Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Molly M. Crawford/Released)

China quietly escorts these foreign ships in the strait and probably does so to present an appearance of the waters being uncontested. This contrasts with its behaviour in clashes with the Philippines over maritime territory. In those cases, China is militarily aggressive and diplomatically loud to force a jurisdictional outcome in its favour.

China also tries to present an appearance of sovereignty when it deploys warships in waters all around Taiwan, not just the strait. It has stepped up this activity since the then-speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, visited the island in August 2022.

In the strait, there have been at least 18 transits of non-Chinese naval vessels since August 2022, some unpublicised.

Although one might expect fierce Chinese harassment of foreign warships in the strait, reminiscent of manoeuvres in the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, significant confrontations have seldom occurred.

Moreover, China has not responded even by sending out more vessels when foreign warships appear, even though it usually holds press briefings to oppose the passages. Instead, its standard response is just to send ships that are already in or close to the strait to track the foreigners. It acts similarly on the far side of Taiwan, too.

Taiwan’s own allies and partners unintentionally help to create the appearance of Chinese sovereignty. When they send ships silently through the strait, they give more evidence of China’s claim being uncontested, whereas by declaring a freedom of navigation exercise they make the distinct point that it is not.

If China can exploit an image of foreign acquiescence in its authority over the strait, it can progressively promote its sovereignty as an accomplished fact. This will also involve eroding Taiwan’s claim to the eastern side of the median line.

At the Second Thomas Shoal, the Philippines actively contests China’s claims by maintaining an outpost on the grounded landing ship BRP Sierra Madre. China is attempting to prevent the Philippines from delivering construction materials to the ship. China’s aim is apparently to let it deteriorate and ultimately collapse due to lack of maintenance.

The Taiwan Strait lacks artificial features occupied by countries other than China.

China’s claim to the strait appears to be based on its claim to own the land on the other side, Taiwan. Since other countries do not overtly dispute that Taiwan is part of China, preferring to leave the issue vague, Beijing is evidently hoping that its control of the waters can be normalised.

Opposition to Chinese assertions of control over the strait are based on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, which limits territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (22km) from land. The width of the strait is 130km at its minimum.

Occasional incidents in the strait accord with China’s presentation of it as uncontested. In February, a Chinese fishing vessel capsized near Kinmen. In July, a Taiwanese fishing boat was detained by the China Coast Guard. In both cases, the coast guard vessels were merely ‘present’ and conducting ‘their own missions’ without engaging in fierce clashes with Taiwanese coast guard. Nor has China obstructed sea or air transportation between Taiwan and Kinmen to date.

The image that Beijing wants the world to see is that the strait is under China’s serene jurisdiction. Other countries should use their navies to loudly say that it is not.

Chart: daily numbers of Chinese naval ships in the Taiwan Strait, with annotations showing dates of non-Chinese ships’ passages through the strait.

Cheng-kun Ma is a professor at National Defense University, Republic of China, and the director of the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). K Tristan Tang is a research associate at the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). The views expressed here are personal and do not represent the positions of the National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense or the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).