Russia Prepares to Add Newest Nuclear-Powered Submarine to the Northern Fleet

In June, Russia is set to commission the Knyaz Pozharsky (Князь Пожарский), its newest nuclear-powered Borei-A class submarine, into the Northern Fleet. Construction of the Knyaz Pozharsky began at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk on December 23, 2016 (Sevmash, December 23, 2016). The submarine was launched on February 3, 2024, and is reportedly undergoing ballistic missile testing ahead of its scheduled commissioning in June (Izvestiya, December 4, 2024; Sevmash, February 3; FlotProm, February 5; Power Block, May 17). The upcoming deployment of the submarine aligns closely with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on strengthening naval capabilities in Russia’s northern territories to bolster its Arctic nuclear deterrence (1.ru, June 28, 2024; see EDM, March 21, 31, April 7). 

The Knyaz Pozharsky is the eighth submarine in the Borei-class program and the fifth classified as Borei-A (also known as Project 955) (Sevmash, February 3; TASS, February 3, October 18, 2024). The Borei-class submarine program, initiated in 1996, is Moscow’s strategy to replace the aging Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon-class submarines (Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 28, 2024). The submarines are constructed and tested by Sevmash, the only shipyard primarily tasked with nuclear-powered submarine construction and owned by the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, the largest Russian shipbuilding corporation (RIA Novosti, December 21, 2009; Sevmash, accessed May 29). Construction and commissioning of Borei-class submarines are regularly delayed due to changes in construction terms, supply-chain and financing problems, and, more recently, Western sanctions, including on Sevmash and United Shipbuilding Corporation (TopWar.ru, November 2, 2012; see EDM, June 16, 2020; U.S. Department of State, April 7, 2022, January 15; The Barents Observer, May 14). 

The commissioning of the Knyaz Pozharsky is part of a broader naval modernization campaign bolstered in 2024 with Putin’s appointment of Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev as chair of a new Maritime Collegium  (President of Russia, August 13, 2024, accessed May 29; see EDM, September 4, 2024). The Maritime Collegium reports directly to Putin and was established with three new sub-bodies: the Council for Strategic Development of the Navy, the Council for Defense of the National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, and the Council for Development and Securing of Maritime Activities (President of Russia, August 13, 2024). In line with this campaign, Moscow has now earmarked 8.4 trillion rubles (nearly $100 billion) over the next decade to construct new ships and naval vessels (President of Russia; TASS, April 11). Included in this is Putin’s commitment to “serial production” of both the Borei-A and Yasen-M class submarines in recent years (President of Russia, December 11, 2023). According to Putin, 49 naval vessels, including four Borei-A and four Yasen-M class submarines, have been commissioned over the past five years (President of Russia, April 11).  In March, the Perm, a Yasen-M class submarine and the first to be capable of carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, was launched and is expected to join the Pacific Fleet in 2026 (see EDM, March 31). The Zircon hypersonic missile has a reported range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers (311 to 621 miles) (President of Russia, March 27; Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 23).

Beyond conventional submarine operations, Russia may become the first in the world to utilize its submarine fleet to transport liquefied natural gas (LNG). In February, Putin claimed that Russia’s LNG corporations, Gazprom and NOVATEK, both “believe this is entirely possible and profitable” for nuclear-powered submarines to transport LNG (President of Russia, February 21). This has never been done before, and even Putin did not believe it was possible when, according to him, Mikhail Kovalchuk, president of the Kurchatov Institute, proposed the idea a few years ago as a means to avert sanctions and showcase Russian scientific achievements (PortNews, October 10; RIA Novosti, November 7, 2024; President of Russia, February 21). 

According to reports, the Malakhit Marine Design Bureau of the aforementioned Kurchatov Institute is developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarines to transport LNG through the Arctic year-round (Interfax, February 21). According to Kovalchuk, the submarines would provide year-round LNG transport without the need for support from icebreakers. Likewise, this new fleet would allegedly reduce the travel time along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from 20 to 12 days (PortNews, October 10, 2024). Aleksandr Nikitin, an exiled nuclear expert and advisor at the Bellona Environmental Foundation headquartered in Norway, argues that the project “lacks calculations on technology, economy and industrial implementation” (The Barents Observer, October 13, 2024; Bellona, accessed May 30).

Russia’s forthcoming “naval development strategy to 2050” is expected to prioritize Arctic operations. This would likely include the further development of Northern Fleet vessels, especially submarines. The official document is currently in the final stages of preparation, according to a statement by Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov in May (Interfax-AVN, May 5). During a meeting in April to discuss the Kremlin’s naval development strategy, Putin explained that improving the Russian navy was especially relevant for the country’s Arctic territories (President of Russia, April 11). The strategy is expected to align with the “2022 Maritime Doctrine.” The Doctrine outlines four main priority areas in the Arctic: 1) mineral and hydrocarbon resources; 2) the importance of the NSR; 3) ensuring national defense, vis-à-vis the Russian Navy; and 4) global economic and military competition in the Arctic region (President of Russia, July 31, 2022. Available in English at U.S. Naval War College).

The integration of advanced submarines, such as the Knyaz Pozharsky, marks a decisive step in reinforcing Russia’s strategic posture in the High North. Global interest and competition in the Arctic are steadily rising and coincide with Moscow’s goal to maintain “Russia’s leadership in the Arctic” (President of Russia, February 28). Efforts to enhance Russian submarine capabilities in the Arctic and strengthen the posture of the Northern Fleet are expected to only intensify. The imminent arrival of the Knyaz Pozharsky marks only the next of many steps Moscow is taking toward strategic deterrence, force projection, and sovereignty in the Arctic.

Dr. Anna J. Davis is Fellow of Eurasia Studies at the Jamestown Foundation and Editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor. She is an expert on nuclear energy policy and international relations, with a focus on the Eurasia region and the Arctic.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Note:

[1] The number of submarines in the Russian Navy is based on estimates, as the government does not officially publish the exact number.