South Korean Maritime Security

Splashed across the front page of many international headlines are topics relating to various countries claiming disputed territories in the Pacific as their own.  The struggle to expand maritime resources and stake territorial claims in East Asia intensifies with each passing week.  Furthermore, the race to improve maritime resources and interests is especially notable among East Asian states such as China, Japan, and South Korea.  Several factors, such as the assertion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China’s rise as a regional superpower, and the escalating importance of national image in East Asian domestic politics have exacerbated competition over maritime interests and resources in the region.  Given the current international circumstance, South Korea faces increasing maritime security issues through disputes with both China and Japan.

Background and Context

Growing Role of International Law

Maritime law is a relatively new development in international law.  In 1982, UNCLOS established Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and formally defined “continental shelf” in international law, adding them to the traditionally stark bifurcation of high seas and territorial seas.[2]  A continental shelf is defined by UNCLOS as “the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.[3]  Territorial seas are waters in which coastal states exercise sovereignty while high seas are waters wherein all states can travel freely.  Nonetheless, it does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.  The issue of maritime jurisdiction has gained more attention from states as maritime law has become more codified.  In 1994, when UNCLOS went into force, states were granted sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction in the management and development waters within 200 nautical miles (NM).  In accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS, states were given the ability to extend their continental shelf to 350 NM from their coastal baseline through application to UNCLOS.[4]  Generally, the maritime jurisdiction of coastal states has gradually expanded since the creation of UNCLOS.

Legal Foundation of Current Maritime Conflicts

The international maritime regime is typified by cooperation in certain matters â?? conservation efforts, ecosystem preservation, and scientific research â?? and competition in matters regarding marine resources.  As land resources become increasingly scarce, the development of marine resources has become more highly prioritized.  It is thus unsurprising that coastal states increasingly exercise their maritime sovereign rights through attempts to expand their respective continental shelves and EEZs.

China, Japan and South Korea submitted applications for expansion of their respective continental shelves’ limits.  Japan submitted its application in November 2008 while both China and South Korea submitted their preparatory applications a day before the May 13, 2009 deadline set by UNCLOS.[5]  The continental shelf claims of all three overlap, and UNCLOS stipulates that final delimitation be determined through negotiations between the three or international dispute resolution mechanisms.

The territorial rights and contiguous zones can be confusing.  According to UNCLOS, coastal states are entitled to 12 NM territorial seas, 24 NM contiguous zones, 200 NM EEZs, and continental shelves.  Other states are entitled to rights, such as the right of harmless passage in territorial waters and the right of free passage in EEZs and the upper part of continental shelves, in waters except for inland seas.  Contiguous zones are defined by UNCLOS as a zone contiguous to its territorial sea wherein the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea and (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.[6]  UNCLOS also prohibits the contiguous zone from extending beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.[7]  Still, others challenge established rules and laws. 

China’s Rise

The Pentagon’s 2015 report on China’s military noted that: “China has the fiscal strength and political will to support continued defense spending increases, which will support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization toward a more professional force.”[8]  According to the report, from 2005-2014, the Chinese government’s military budget increased by an average of 9.5 percent each year and “in 2015 the spending was estimated at $190 billion.”[9]  China’s military budget will only grow at 7-8 percent in 2016, but it will still rank number two in the world only behind the United States and by 2024, will spend more than all of Western Europe.[10]  Simply put, these efforts will allow the PLA Navy (PLAN) to transform into a navy with a more global reach.

Although Beijing’s overall strategy remains murky, it is evident that China has been building up naval resources.  It can be postulated that China appears to have a strategic goal of reinforcing its naval force projection capabilities.  China’s disadvantageous geographic position is a factor in China’s expanding interest in maritime jurisdiction in the East and South China Seas.  Geographically obstructed by Mongolia, Siberia, the Himalayas, and its borders with Myanmar, Vietnam, China’s utilization of its surrounding waters for increasing and asserting Chinese power is unsurprising.  Moreover, China’s apparent objective is to shift from a “brown water” to a “blue water” navy as it sees more advantage and opportunities for projection beyond its physical borders.  It increasingly sends its navy to distant borders as part of goodwill missions and efforts to scout new possible base/port locations to benefit its nation.  These missions are bringing China new opportunities for partnerships and lucrative deals, including what will be Beijing’s first foreign military outpost in Djibouti, along one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.[11]

Until the mid-1990s, the PLAN has fulfilled a secondary role to the PLA ground force; however, China has made significant marked progress in advancing its naval capabilities.  The general increase in defense fund allocation has been accompanied by an increase in naval capabilities.  Currently, PLAN is the second largest naval force in the world with a force of over 255,000 personnel.[12]  In 2012, the PLAN introduced the Liaoning, China’s first ever aircraft carrier.[13]  The Liaoning aircraft carrier is the former Russian Varyag aircraft carrier that was sold to and rebuilt by the Chinese.  PLAN currently has one aircraft carrier and two more in construction, three amphibious transports, 25 destroyers, 42 frigates, eight nuclear attack submarines and approximately 50 conventional attack submarines, with 133,000 personnel in the Chinese Marine Corps.[14]  Moreover, China’s first domestically-made aircraft carrier will be “conventionally powered” and despite its small size, it is “projected to carry more aircraft and have updated defensive capabilities.”[15]  Though deploying an operational squadron of J-20 stealth fighters is expected to take a few more years, it is another mark of progress in China’s attempt to improve its naval capabilities.[16]  The growth of PLAN capabilities and the ambiguity surrounding the true extent of Chinese maritime ambitions has led to warier regional neighbors.

From a strategic perspective, particularly regarding those matters concerning East Asian defense and security, the aforementioned figures are staggering.  It appears that the fundamental goal of China’s continued high level of military spending is to “rebalance” the region in China’s favor; and South Korea must not take this agenda lightly since it has a direct impact on security interests in Asia.  As China emerges as an influential regional superpower, China’s economic interests, foreign policy, and national security will increasingly play a substantial role in the reform of international institutions that is consistent with its global status.

Domestic Politics and National Image

As states become more open and democratic, the issue of national pride has gradually gained more importance regarding the resolution of maritime disputes.  China, Japan, and South Korea are all prime examples of growing relevance of nationalism to maritime issues.  Maritime (and airspace) disputes have emerged as matters of national pride that warrant active pursuit â?? or at least the appearance of active pursuit â?? by political elites.  Many contemplate that this pursuit of maritime claims employed by East Asian states is an attempt to appeal to and appease restless domestic populations that are discontent with any of a variety of issues; issues such as economic sluggishness.

The relevance of national image to maritime disputes in East Asia is an emerging trend that is especially troubling due to historical issues that remain unresolved in the region.  2012 was a significant year for China, Japan, and South Korea, which all saw shifts in their domestic politics.  China held the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party in November 2012, Japan held a general election, and South Korea gained a new president.  During these events and election campaigns, a general trend emerged wherein political parties adopted a strong stance on current maritime disputes to consolidate conservative support.

Moreover, the difficult relationship between Seoul and Tokyo – Washington’s two biggest allies in Asia – is precariously based on their background of longtime bitterness over issues of un-reconciled views of history.[17]  Reasons for their splintered relations are primarily found in historic anger over issues of comfort women and the continuing feud over Dokdo.[18]  These collective factors, including Japan’s semi-remilitarization in 2014, all foment the political imbalance that hinder cohesion between the two countries and preclude from smoothly operating as a unified body.[19] 

Contradictory Claims

Alternative Claims

Appeals to UNCLOS are far from the only method by which states seek maritime jurisdiction.  Some states, primarily China, rely on evidence of historical administrative control or de facto administrative control through occupation of islands and other land features.  This is in spite of China being a signatory of UNCLOS and all three countries ratified UNCLOS in 1996.  Another factor in the expanding maritime disputes in Asia involves the usage of alternative methods of establishing sovereignty over waters and islands.

China’s maritime claims in the East and South China Seas are not founded solely on the provisions of UNCLOS, or historical documents illustrating its centuries of administrative control over disputed areas: China also demands maritime rights through natural prolongation.  Natural prolongation involves claims to a continental shelf that is a natural extension of China’s mainland, beyond 200 NM to the middle of the Okinawa Trough. 

Ieodo/Socotra Rock/Suyan Rock

China and South Korea claim overlapping EEZs in parts of the East China Sea and Yellow Sea.  These overlapping zones have periodically been a source of contention due to a submerged rock named Ieodo that is administered by South Korea.  Ieodo is called Socotra Rock by the United States and known as Suyan Rock in China.  While Ieodo is submerged at least 4 meters below sea level and UNCLOS stipulates that a submerged rock outside of a state’s territorial sea cannot be claimed as territory by any state, Ieodo has served as an acrimonious flashpoint in China-South Korea relations.[20]  Both China and South Korea claim Ieodo as part of its EEZ.  South Korea finished constructed a research observation station on Ieodo, which has since been improved to include a helipad and other buildings.[21]

Ieodo is desirable and extraordinary for both countries due to the extension of special rights to use of exploration, its natural resources, and profuse fishery resources including croaker, herring, bass, mackerel, flounder and squid.[22]  To China and South Korea, this coveted rock symbolizes the path to a wealthy economy and firm maritime defense security.  From China’s viewpoint, “the Suyan Rock is a source of national pride and a part of its natural territory.”[23]  Notwithstanding, from South Korea’s perspective, considering China’s incessant growth in its naval capabilities, possession of Ieodo is a means to restrict some of China’s activities in the East China Sea.  Simply put, for Seoul, maintaining possession of Ieodo corresponds to safeguarding the free flow of its outgoing and incoming shipments.  Moreover, according to experts, Ieodo has been more than just a rock to South Koreans. It has been considered as a utopian island or a burial ground of fishermen who didn’t return from their fishing voyage.[24] It is described as an island “where Jeju fishermen who could not return would live forever.”[25]  Needless to say, both culturally and geographically, the ownership of this small islet means much more to Seoul than to Beijing.[26]

While China has objected to the South Korean administration of Ieodo and has flown surveillance missions over it, the dispute over Ieodo was a relatively minor issue in China-South Korea relations until the declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013.[27]  In response to China’s ADIZ, South Korea expanded its ADIZ.  Both the Chinese and South Korean ADIZs include Socotra Rock and while South Korean officials had asked China to remove Socotra from its ADIZ, Chinese officials have so far refused.[28]  Socotra Rock also falls into the Japanese ADIZ although Japan has not asserted any claims regarding it.  A more discordant facet of conflicting EEZs is a series of violent incidents between illegally operating fishermen of China and the South Korean Coast Guard in South Korea’s uncontested EEZ.  Such clashes have resulted in the death by stabbing of a South Korean Coast Guard official amongst other incidents during raids of the illegally operating fishing vessels.  Unsurprisingly, such incidents have resulted in significant nationalist backlash in both China and South Korea.[29]

Dokdo/Takeshima/Liancourt Rocks

Dokdo, or the Liancourt Rocks as they are referred to by the United States, are a set of small islets that lie in what is called the East Sea by South Korea and Takeshima in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) by Japan.  Tensions regarding these islets have been tenacious as South Korean opinion of Japan has long been rancorous.[30]  Issues surrounding the islets epitomize the hostile nature of South Korean-Japanese relations.  In August 2012, when then-South Korean President Lee, Myung-Bak visited Dokdo, then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda strengthened affirmations of the Japanese claim to Takeshima.  This concluded in an offer by the Japanese government to take the claims to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which the South Korean government rejected.  Lee became the first South Korean president to visit the disputed islands, demonstrating Seoul’s continued control over the islands, but it resulted in an overreaction to simmering strains.  In response, Japan’s Defense White Paper included its claim to the islands immediately after his visit.  This was nothing new, as Japan has made this prerogative numerous times, but it brought the territorial dispute back as the central bilateral issue.  Seoul escalated the situation by announcing it would stage regular military exercises near the islands.  At a critical juncture, instead of finding a way to de-escalate tensions, Lee had visited the islands.  The visit poured fuel on the already volatile situation, igniting a diplomatic firestorm.

Since then, political relations between the two states have only worsened as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Park, Geun-Hye proceeded through their terms.[31]  Indeed, it took until November 2015, more than three years for the two leaders to hold their first high-level meeting.[32]  Unfortunately, past transgressions sometimes blur the vision of a promising future for both nations, and holding onto the past prevents forward progress.[33]  Due to Prime Minister Abe’s known conservatism and President Park’s enthusiasm for disassociation from her father’s Japanese connections, it is unlikely that Japan and South Korea will be able to reach a mutually satisfying agreement regarding Dokdo barring outside deus ex machina in the near future.

Recommendations

Due to factors such as the ambiguity of international law, China’s emergence as a regional power, and the linkages between maritime disputes and island sovereignty disputes it seems likely that maritime disputes in East Asia will persist.  The overlapping claims represent the most recent facet of historical tensions that have existed for many years.  While UNCLOS and its dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the International Tribunal of the Sea, do present possible opportunities for resolving formal maritime claims, the historically resentful and sometimes unpredictable relationships between China, Japan, and South Korea does not bode well for any type of international resolution in the near future.

In this international context, it is evident that South Korea should adopt a more diplomatic approach toward Japan while expanding its naval resources to at least match the burgeoning naval capabilities of China to effectively move toward a more secure region.  While South Korean enmity may be traditionally directed at Japan, Tokyo’s fellow status as a democratic state and American ally ensures that serious military conflagrations between South Korea and Japan are unlikely to occur in the near future.  However, China’s belligerent maritime strategy is not a signal for South Korea to be distracted regarding Japanese intentions toward Dokdo.  Due to Tokyo’s status, maritime disputes with Japan should be addressed through formal international forums such as the ICJ or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or bilateral negotiations.  Japan and South Korea have already proved that both states can work together with minimal of diplomatic clashes regarding resources in its shared waters, as is evidenced in the 1999 fisheries agreement which addressed the issue of overlapping EEZs by setting up joint fishing zones in the overlapping zones.[34]  While South Korea cannot directly induce Japan toward any favourable action regarding Dokdo and other issues, South Korea and its political elites can only internationally benefit by projecting a measured and calm image in contrast to any Japanese belligerence.

From a diplomatic perspective, President Park’s behavior lacks logic and seems inefficient.  Her efforts not only escalate unnecessary tensions, but also worsen bilateral ties.  President Park should bear in mind that both she and Prime Minister Abe face serious shared national security threats in the region.  Seoul and Tokyo should make the management of Beijing’s military rise a fundamental component of the potential alliance.[35]  As an ally of the United States, South Korea is also responsible for helping ensure America’s rebalance to the region. But, Park’s behavior is widening the gap between Tokyo and Seoul amidst President Obama’s strategic “pivot to Asia.”[36]  Losing either one of these longstanding allies – South Korea and Japan – would be devastating to the United States. 

The modernization of China’s military is a concern for Japanese and Korean defense officials.  And both need to present a sense of cohesion and strength in the United States-led block challenging China’s belligerence in Asia.[37]  A positive step would be far Park to find ways to cooperate, perhaps a conciliatory approach in order to achieve rapprochement between her and Abe, and make moves to improve relations with Japan in order to neutralize China’s modernization of the military.[38]

Regarding China and its extensive naval build-up, South Korea must improve its maritime capabilities.  As sheer naval force build-up can only accomplish so much, South Korea should address its mediocre maritime resources through a variety of ways.  South Korea should seek to improve maritime technologies in collaboration with advantaged states like the United States while establishing strategies for joint development of resources, whether it be technological capabilities for the extraction of oil and natural gas or militarily useful technology.  To enhance maritime security, South Korea should make continuous attempts to partner with states such as Japan and the United States through increasing joint naval exercises and coordination.  In order to enhance national image abroad and strengthen overseas networks South Korea should also attempt to boost the participation of Korean nationals in international maritime organizations.  South Korea can achieve this policy goal by taking the initiative in locating such organizations within South Korea and by increasing the investment in education and training to foster experts in the maritime field.  Finally, President Park should expand on her reintroduction of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries to the South Korean government and allow it to form an integrated maritime policy to address the maritime disputes it faces today.[39]

Afterthought

Each source utilized in this analysis was based on journalists and pundits’ opinions who cover East Asia daily.  Though these experts’ critical intellect may be credible, this approach has its shortcomings as the future is mutable.  We can only assume the most likely situation or outcome based on factual historical evidence, personal accounts from experts or eyewitnesses, and traditional scholastic publications.  The ongoing East China Sea territorial standoff between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku in Japanese) might be the outlier that has an outside effect on the overall situation.  Neither side shows any sign of standing down; Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe constantly acquire new military equipment and order military deployments near the contested islands.  Due to the dispute, there is an increased risk of a small-scale war, with the potential to escalate to a potential high intensity conflict, which would clearly draw the close attention and potential involvement of South Korea and the United States if deemed necessary.  A clash between China and Japan, could skew all of the statistics and analysis put forth in this research paper.

With increasingly well-developed power derived from economic growth and political stability, China has emerged as a global power that progressively plays more of a substantial role in international society.  These days, it is difficult to find a major international issue in which China does not play a major role.  China has achieved unparalleled growth in its importance, influence, and power over the last 30 years.  Pundits extrapolate that its grand strategy is to become the pre-eminent power in the Pacific—and in the world—potentially replacing the United States as the world’s most powerful nation.  From an academic and martial standpoint, it is imperative to understand China’s foreign policies as they directly relate to East Asian affairs.  As illustrated in the case of China’s rise to the top and its economic success and military modernization, foreign policies are in many ways directly linked to its military expansion. China’s influence in Asia and around the world and Beijing’s political relationship with its neighboring countries will shape Seoul’s future and stability.  In summary, what we ascertain today about China’s aspirations for international political and military power and how South Korea responds to it will have direct and lasting ramifications tomorrow.

Endnotes

[1].  Daniel R. Deakin, “Let’s Sea The 10 Biggest Navies In The World,” The Richest, January 27, 2014, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/rich-countries/lets-sea-the-10-biggest-navies-in-the-world/.

[2].  United Nations, “Oceans and Law of the Sea,” August 22, 2013, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

[3].  United Nations, “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) The continental shelf,” 2012, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/continental_shelf_description.htm.

[4].  United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part V,” 2012, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm.

[5].  United Nations, “Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,” April 26, 2016, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.

[6].  United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part II,” 2012, accessed on May 20, 2016, 2012, accessed on May 20, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm.

^[7].  Ibid.

[8].  Andrew Poulin, “Going Blue: The Transformation of China’s Navy,” The Diplomat, April 15, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/going-blue-the-transformation-of-chinas-navy/.

[9].  Ibid.

[10].  Ibid.

[11].  Reuters, “China to start work soon on naval base in Djibouti, president says,” The East African, February 3, 2016, accessed on May 26, 2016, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/China-to-start-work-soon-on-naval-base-in-Djibouti/-/2558/3060328/-/814xx4z/-/index.html.

[12].  F. William Engdahl, “China, Russia challenge the ‘Navy Second to None’,” New Eastern Outlook, January 21, 2016, accessed on May 26, 2016, http://m.journal-neo.org/2016/01/21/china-russia-challenge-the-navy-second-to-none/.

^[13].  “Liaoning (Varyag) Aircraft Carrier, China,” Naval-technology.com, 2012, accessed on May 26, 2016, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/varyag-aircraft-carrier-china/.

[14].  Engdahl.

[15].  Alex Lockie, “Chinese’s second aircraft carrier will be based on dated Soviet designs,” Business Insider, January 12, 2016, accessed on May 27, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-second-aircraft-carrier-will-be-based-on-dated-soviet-designs-2016-1.

[16].  Next Big Future, “China should have an operation squadron of J-20 stealth fighters by 2017,” February 07, 2016, Accessed on May 27, 2016, http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/02/china-should-have-operation-squadron-of.html.

[17].  Christopher Lee, “Trilateral Security Cooperation Needed for North Korea,” Realcleardefense, April 19, 2016, accessed on May 28, 2016, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/04/19/trilateral_security_cooperation_needed_for_north_korea_109279.html.

[18].  Ibid.

[19].  Ibid.

[20].  Jeremy Page, “China, South Korea in Row Over Submerged Rock,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2012, accessed on May 29, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/03/14/china-south-korea-in-row-over-submerged-rock/.

[21].  http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/south-korea-counters-chinas-air-defense-zone-expanding-its-own-f2D11711755.

[22].  Young-Jin, Kim, “Why Ieodo Matters,” The Korea Times, September 18, 2012, accessed on May 28, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/117_120266.html

[23].  Ibid.

[24].  Ibid.

[25].  Yearn-Hong, Choi, “Ieodo,” The Korea Times, June 26, 2010, accessed on May 28, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/04/137_68269.html.

[26].  Liu Yuand-Yu, “International dispute in the Northeast Asia,” November 16, 2012, accessed on May 28, 2016, http://news.jejunu.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=8526.

^[27].  Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007.

^[28].  Jeyup Kwaak and Yumi Otagaki, “South Korea, Japan Send Planes into China’s New Defense Zone,” The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2013, accessed on May 29, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304017204579225371188431160.

[29].  Evan Ramstad, “Korean Officer Killed in Chinese Sea Clash,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2011, accessed on May 29, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204336104577093252281422984.

[30].  Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia,” Pacific Forum CSIS, September 2008, accessed on May 29, 2016, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n16.pdf.

[31].  Jeff Kingston, “Japan and Korea: Reconciliation and redress for wrongs remain elusive,” The Japan Times, September 28, 2013, accessed on May 29, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/09/28/commentary/japan-and-korea-reconciliation-and-redress-for-wrongs-remain-elusive/#.V2O4eih97NN.

[32].  Sang-Hun, Choe, “Leaders of South Korea and Japan Meet in Effort to Mend Ties,” November 1, 2015, accessed on May 30, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/world/asia/japan-south-korea-summit-park-geun-hye-shinzo-abe.html?_r=0.

[33].  Christopher Lee, “The Imperative Need for Reconciliation and Peace between Seoul and Tokyo,” Realcleardefense, April 5, 2016, accessed on May 30, 2016, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/04/05/the_imperative_need_for_reconciliation_and_peace_between_seoul_and_tokyo_109220.html.

[34].  Sun Pyo Kim.  Maritime delimitation and interim arrangements in North East Asia. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 2004.

[35].  Lee, “The Imperative Need for Reconciliation and Peace between Seoul and Tokyo.”

[36].  Ibid.

[37].  Ibid.

[38].  Ibid.

Christopher Lee is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from Columbia University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Cooperation from Yonsei University (South Korea). He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer, and is currently serving as a Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region. Chris can be reached via Twitter @chrislee733. The views expressed are his own and not those of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.