Task Force One Navy Final Report: "The Emperor's New Clothes" Redux

The Task Force One Navy Final Report was launched from the twin assumptions that the Navy suffers from systemic racism and that diversity benefits the Navy's military mission. Those assumptions are not supported by evidence. The use of data in support of the report's findings and recommendations is flawed by logical fallacies and by misapplied or misrepresented data to support its distorted narrative.  Themes that are central to Critical Race Theory and its allied movements find an active voice in the TF1N Charter and Final Report, confirming a philosophy and a political agenda on the part of those who wrote the Task Force One Navy Charter and steered the enterprise. The fundamental question posed by the issuance of this report is whether the Navy’s leadership is placing the Navy’s readiness to defend the Nation at risk (and unwittingly subverting the Nation’s Constitution and laws) by jettisoning its colorblind, meritocratic culture and entering a significant transformation without a rigorous, fact-based, logical justification.

Not surprisingly, considering the key entering assumptions, the Final Report identified systems, climate and culture problems and submitted almost 60 recommendations aligned with four lines of inquiry (LOE), Recruiting, Talent Management/Retention, Professional Development, and Innovation and STEM. A 5^th LOE, "Additional," was added for additional recommendations not fitting neatly into the original LOEs.

However, one should be skeptical about the entire exercise of TF1N and the recommendations that flow from it. It inaccurately depicts the proud institution of the United States Navy as systemically racist, a slander that has more potential to undermine morale, good order, discipline and military effectiveness than any recent national adversary’s actions. There are several reasons to consider it fundamentally flawed in its approach, inaccurate in its portrayal of the current status of the Navy, and blatantly misrepresentative of the achievement of equality of opportunity in the service through the efforts of generations of Naval personnel. Those reasons include:

In assessing the current state of the Navy, the TF1N Final Report states that the importance of diversity to the service rests in improved performance by diverse teams.[v]

“These statistics are important because diverse teams are 58 percent more likely than non-diverse teams to accurately assess a situation.[vi]  In addition, gender-diverse organizations are 15 percent more likely to outperform other organizations and diverse organizations are 35 percent more likely to outperform their non-diverse counterparts."[vii] 

These are impressive claims, but beyond these top-level summary statements, what do the cited source documents actually say in their details, and what are their implications for the U. S. Navy? These are important questions since these are the only performance-based evidence presented by the TF1N to support its entering assumption that “Mission readiness is stronger when diverse strengths are used and differing perspectives are applied.”

Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Science Article

The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) is a peer-reviewed multidisciplinary scientific journal. The article cited by TF1N is concerned with the effect of ethnic diversity on a misfit between market prices and the true value of assets (a bubble) in sets of ethnically diverse and ethnically homogenous traders. [viii] The authors conducted the study because previous research on the effects of ethnic diversity in economic growth, social capital, cities and neighborhoods, jury deliberations, organizations, and work teams was equivocal.  Some studies found benefits, while others did not, a critical point not presented nor considered in the TF1N Final Report.[ix]

The authors conducted stock trading simulations in two markets, Southeast Asia (Chinese, Indian, and Malay participants)and North America (White, Latino, and African-American participants), with individuals having the requisite financial skills. All trading information was true, public and anonymous, and all participants could see all completed transactions and bid/ask offers. The trading accuracy of each participant was evaluated beforehand and considered in evaluating results.[x]

The authors concluded that "Across markets and locations, market prices fit true values 58% better in diverse markets."[xi]  This summary is the only factoid from this entire study cited by TF1N. But the authors also analyzed the cause of the performance difference they observed and its implications.

“Ethnic diversity facilitates friction. This friction can increase conflict in some group settings, whether a work team, a community, or a region. Conversely, ethnic homogeneity may induce confidence, or instrumental trust, in others' decisions (confidence not necessarily in their benevolence or morality, but in the reasonableness of their decisions, as captured in such everyday statements as “I trust his judgment”). However, in modern markets, vigilant skepticism is beneficial; overreliance on others’ decisions is risky.”[xii] (Emphasis added)               

In this experiment, the gains come from increased friction and reduced mutual confidence, not from any cognitive diversity or assortment of perspectives and skills commonly posited to improve problem solving via enhanced diversity.  This insight begs several questions.

Considering the two key assumptions of TF1N identified previously, it seems reasonable to conclude that the T1FN authors cherry picked a number from the cited study to support one or both of those assumptions. They misrepresented the study’s applicability as much broader than it is. They ignored its conclusions about causality that are, at a minimum, adverse to unit cohesion, if not good order, discipline and military effectiveness. 

McKinsey & Company Report

McKinsey & Company is a worldwide management consulting firm that advises on strategic management to organizations across the private, public, and social sectors.  According to their website, their focus is on organizational transformation and is informed by a deep commitment to diversity and making a positive social impact through their work.[xiii] The “Diversity Matters” report cited in the TF1N Final Report looked at the level of diversity (defined as a greater share of women and a more mixed ethnic/racial composition in the leadership of large companies) and company financial performance (measured as average EBIT[xiv] 2010-2013).[xv]  The Executive summary of this report is the source of the TF1N Final Report assertion that "In addition, gender-diverse organizations are 15 percent more likely to outperform other organizations and diverse organizations are 35 percent more likely to outperform their non-diverse counterparts.”[xvi],[xvii]

The McKinsey report was prepared using a proprietary database of information on 366 commercial companies in 7 industry groups. Top management teams were taken as defined in company websites and comprised over 5000 individuals from the C-suite to senior vice presidents. Ethnic and racial categories were African Ancestry, European Ancestry, Near Eastern, East Asian, South Asian, Latino, Native American, and others.[xviii] It is important to understand that the McKinsey Report was prepared from proprietary sources that are not shared and cannot be checked, unlike a peer reviewed academic paper. In addition to these limitations, McKinsey & Company is explicitly committed to diversity and is engaged in selling its diversity-related expertise to other companies as transformative. These circumstances make this document more akin to a marketing brochure than serious scholarship. Nonetheless, the authors do point out some features that may affect the value of the report, while others are readily apparent. These include:

As with the PNAS paper discussed previously, using the McKinsey report by TF1N invites critical observations and objections.

Besides its own research, the McKinsey paper summarizes outside sources supporting its assertions that diversity results in improved decision making and innovation.  While that information is not cited directly in the TF1N Report, it is instructive to examine whether McKinsey uses the resources rigorously in its marketing environment.  Since the TF1N  Report focused on the decision making benefits of diversity as its primary rationale, the section of the McKinsey report entitled “Better Decision Making and Innovation” was examined. This section is meant to bolster support for McKinsey’s main assertion of gender and ethnic/racial diversity's value in making better business decisions. In that respect, it is similar to the TF1N’s use of citations of external resources to bolster its claims for the value of diversity.  

We see from the preceding sections that one of the key assumptions in the TF1N Final Report, of a performance advantage, accruing to organizations solely on the basis of demographic diversity, rests on a tenuous foundation. Where it is based in research, the research is extrapolated far outside of its basis (PNAS & McKinsey) or rests upon research that does not meet common standards for scholarly inquiry (McKinsey).  The TF1N Final Report completely ignores clear warnings in the sources it cites about equivocal findings of diversity in the literature, potential adverse effects due to demographic diversity (of a type that should be of concern for a military organization), and the logical fallacy of equating correlation with causation. The TF1N Final Report misrepresents and overextends its source materials to present a key assumption for its effort as fact. This, coupled with the Charter's other assumption that the US Navy is systemically racist, strongly indicates that the TF1N team started with an answer in search of justification rather than as an honest exercise in self-assessment.

Beyond the fundamental consideration this paper raises about whether focusing on increasing gender and racial/ethnic diversity is a net military benefit to the Navy, the TF1N Final Report provides no credible rationale for the selection of the demographic makeup of the country as a whole as the yardstick against which it selectively gauges measurement of diversity in the service.[xxiv] This is critically important because the chosen yardstick has the potential to radically shift the outcome of the assessment (if one assumes that the outcome is not dictated in advance). So let us examine why this particular basis of measurement is not the proper yardstick and how that choice affects the analysis if more appropriate bases are used.

The Navy has no control over the processes that bring individuals into the potential candidate pool for military service, nor may the Navy recruit from the entire population pool. Using US Census estimates,[xxv] we find that in 2018 (the year used by TF1N for its data) only 36% of the US population is of military service age, 18-44 years old. Further, with good reason, the Navy is enjoined from considering the entire pool of military age individuals for accession to the service. For instance, there are minimum standards of physical fitness and educational attainment. Also, prior activities reflecting moral turpitude or potential vulnerability to hostile powers (such as criminal convictions or financial difficulties) may be disqualifying. In short, the demographic from which the Navy can recruit is not the demographic of the country as a whole. If, without agreeing that it has benefit to do so, one is to judge the diversity of the Navy against any basis of measurement, then it can only be intellectually honest to judge its performance against the demographic diversity of the smaller pool of qualified candidates available to it by law and regulation, rather than to the population as a whole.

But do these requirements mean that the demographic diversity of the qualified candidate field could deviate substantially from that of the country as a whole? Fortunately, information is also available from US Census sources to estimate the demographic profile of the Navy's qualified candidate pool using the key requirement attributes of age and educational attainment.[xxvi] [xxvii]    

Examining TF1N’s assessment of the current state of the US Navy, we find the following data used to support the assessment of diversity problems in the officer corps in particular.[xxviii]

TF1N, pp. 12-17

While the 2018 Demographic percentage accurately represents the US Census Bureau estimates for the entire U.S. population, that is not the demographic distribution of the population from which the Navy can recruit. Let’s examine what happens when we adjust the basis of measurement to the population pool eligible for recruitment.

When one adjusts the demographic basis of measurement to consider age(18 - 44 years) and educational attainment (HS diploma for Enlisted, Bachelor degree for Officers) to evaluate the Navy’s demographic diversity against that of that portion of the population that is eligible to serve a radically different picture appears.

TF1N

Measured against the demographic diversity of the eligible pool of candidates, the Navy is succeeding, NOT failing. The officer corps is within + 3% of the eligible population in all categories(White, Black, Asian under, Hispanic, Female over), with no gender gap, while the enlisted community has notably overachieved in attracting Black and Hispanic sailors relative to their percentages in the eligible pool. The only enlisted demographics that have significant underrepresentation relative to the eligible pool of candidates are Whites and Women.[xxx]

This situation of actual relative success versus portrayed relative failure continues through the TF1N current assessment, particularly regarding LOE 1, Recruiting, and its discussion of underrepresented community accessions. As demonstrated in the tables below, when accession's demographics are properly measured against the demographics of the population pool eligible for accession, the fiction of underserved minority communities evaporates.

TF1N

TF1N

For the officer corps, virtually all commissioning sources comfortably exceeded the racial, ethnic, and gender distributions in the population that were eligible for accession. The sole near miss was a 2% shortfall in one year of NROTC racial minority accessions. For Enlisted sailors, racial and ethnic accession demographics again comfortably exceeded the relevant distributions in the population that is eligible to enlist. Only regarding the gender of Enlisted sailors is there any underrepresentation.

This is not the only place in which the TF1N Final Report suffers from inappropriate choices for its basis of measurement or from misrepresentation of the statistical significance of the result it presents. In its Navy Wide Advancement Exam data assessment, TF1N states that for E-4 to E-6, "minority advancement rates are lower compared to their white peers."[xxxi] This conclusion is inaccurate in its portrayal because it ignores demographic data for the "other/multiple races" category.  This category is typically about 8-10% of the pool considered for advancement.  One can compute the 'shortfall' of minority selectees by comparing the actual number selected to the number that would have been selected at the average selection rate. When one does this, invariably (including in E-7, E-8, & E-9 selections), the total 'shortfall' is of the same magnitude as the number in the "other/multiple races" category. More often, the minority selectee 'shortfall' is dwarfed by a pool of "other/multiple races" selectees that is 2-3 times greater than the assessed shortfall. When all demographics are considered, the narrative of lower minority advancement rates evaporates.

As in the discussion of accessions,[xxxii] TF1N notes, but does not identify as an issue nor flag for corrective action, actual inequities in minority enlisted advancements that do not fit its narrative of systemic racism.  For instance, neither the observation that “racial minorities accounted for higher percentages in the Meritorious Advancement Program (MAP),”[xxxiii] nor that "data for E-7 and E-9 during the most recent four-year period (FY17-FY20) shows that Black minorities and Hispanic ethnicity advanced higher than their white peers."[xxxiv] elicited any concern about those inequities or recommendations for addressing them.

The TF1N treatment of minority officer promotions is similarly disingenuous. It continues its pre-selected narrative of over representation of white officers in selection results.  In so doing, it ignores two factors previously discussed and one new consideration, all of which contradict its narrative. These are:

When one sees a study begun with explicit assumptions that make its outcome preordained and its use/manipulation of data an exercise in bias confirmation, one is forced to ask why the effort was undertaken at all. In the case of the TF1N Final Report, the frame of reference and the agenda are evident in the language and terminology used throughout. The clear purpose of the TF1N report is to justify and muster support for the Navy's diversity initiatives, with the words 'diverse' and 'diversity' frequently appearing, on average more than twice per page throughout the report. One might be excused for wondering why the leadership of an organization is as self-evidently diverse (e.g., by gender, race, age, geography, socio-economic status, religion, education, national/ethnic origin, etc.) as the United States Navy is focused so singularly on diversity. The immediate answer to this lies in its precursor, Executive Order 13583 of August 18, 2011,[xxxvii] that established a “Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce.” One of the key features of this executive order was its philosophical framework. The Executive Order directly discusses the importance of equal opportunity and merit in the implementation of the order and recommits to those principles stating the "order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law," explicitly citing 5 U.S.C. 2301. Indeed, within the framework established in Executive Order 13583, there are bona fide reasons bearing upon the Navy’s core military mission to assure that personnel policies attract, retain and promote adequate numbers of the best qualified personnel. Some of the TF1N recommendations appear to be aimed at such goals. But the language used in both the TF1N Charter and the TF1N Final Report is replete with politically charged language that is clearly unnecessary if the sole purpose of the effort is optimizing personnel policies associated with military readiness.

A useful reference in this regard is Richard Delgado’s seminal work, Critical Race Theory,[xxxviii] which contains both a Glossary of Terms[xxxix] and a discussion of the basic tenets and themes of Critical Race Theory (CRT).[xl] It is essential reading for any citizen interested in understanding the currents and counter currents of contemporary American civic discourse. Familiarity with this work shows that themes that are central to CRT and its allied movements[xli] find and active voice in the TF1N Charter and Final Report. Central to the TF1N narrative is demonstrating the existence in the Navy of one of the key themes of CRT, the under-representation of minorities in the distribution of social goods, benefits, privilege and status. The term 'under-represented' repeatedly occurs in the TF1N Final Report (mentioned more than 40 times). Indeed, the TF1N Final Report is extensively laded with the language and jargon of CRT, including “lived experience,” “intersectional experience,” “systemic inequities and racism,” “structural and interpersonal biases,” “equity,” “unconscious bias,” and “identity.” The incorporation of this language cannot be an accident: it does NOT appear in the source Executive Order. At a minimum, it confirms a philosophy and a political agenda for those who wrote the Task Force One Navy Charter and steered the enterprise. And it provides the answer as to why data was manipulated in support of the inequities narrative: without the mathematical sleight of hand to create the false impression of under-representation, the entire effort collapses. 

Critical questions remain. First, does the Navy leadership understand the philosophy underpinning TF1N and the political intent inherent in the effort? Do they share that political agenda, or are they simply uninformed, unconcerned “useful idiots?”

The reason the answer to this question is critical is that, as Richard Delgado points out, “critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.” [xlii] (Emphasis added) In short, CRT rejects the founding principles of the American nation reflected in the Declaration of Independence and defended by the Constitution that every Navy sailor and officer has sworn an oath to support and defend. CRT seeks to rewrite the history of the country,[xliii] to replace its principles of governance and reorder civic relations. CRT would replace colorblind equality of opportunity with equity, equal outcomes based on racial identity.[xliv] CRT would abandon the model of assimilation to American customs, measures and laws that were considered vital to the survival of the Republic by Washington, Madison and Hamilton, endorsing separatism and segregation.[xlv]  CRT rejects the Declaration’s assertion of rights[xlvi] and the Constitution’s ideal of equal protection under the law and endorses aggressive color-conscious governance and jurisprudence.[xlvii] CRT disputes the practices of merit and academic standards as inherently racist.[xlviii]  When the TF1N Charter and Final Report embrace the racialist philosophy of CRT, they depart from the guidance of Executive Order 13583. As recent statements by the Chief of Naval Personnel indicate,[xlix] they point at explicitly considering race in officer promotions contrary to the guidance of 5 U.S.C. 2301 that “selection and advancement should be determined solely (emphasis added) on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills after fair and open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity.”[l]

The fundamental question posed by this analysis is whether today’s Navy leadership is jettisoning the Navy’s previously colorblind, meritocratic culture (and unwittingly subverting the Nation’s Constitution and laws) without a fact-based, logical justification capable of withstanding rigorous scrutiny? In the process and actions they have launched with the TF1N Final Report, do they place the Navy's readiness to defend the nation at risk? 

Phillip Keuhlen is a retired naval officer and nuclear industry senior manager. He was educated at the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School and had the privilege to command USS Sam Houston (SSN-609), a nuclear submarine. He writes on topics related to governance and national security. 

[i] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2490996/task-force-one-navy-completes-report-to-enhance-navy-diversity/ (retrieved 8/22/20210

[ii] Task Force One Navy Final Report https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/26/2002570959/-1/-1/1/TASK%20FORCE%20ONE%20NAVY%20FINAL%20REPORT.PDF (retrieved 8/22/2021)(TF1N)

[iii] Ibid, Appendix B, Task Force One Navy Charter. See “Purpose” and “Method.”

[iv] Ibid, p.6

[v] Ibid

[vi] “Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles.” December 30, 2014, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America https://www.pnas.org/content/111/52/18524 (retrieved 8/23/2021) (PNAS)

[vii] “Diversity Matters,” McKinsey & Company, February 2, 2015 https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/organization/our%20insights/why%20diversity%20matters/why%20diversity%20matters.pdf (retrieved 8/23/2021) (McKinsey)

[viii] PNAS p.18524

[ix] Ibid, p.18525

[x] Ibid, pp 18525-18526

[xi] Ibid, p.18524

[xii] Ibid, p.18525

[xiii] https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/overview (retrieved 8/23/2012)

[xiv] EBIT: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, a common measure of profitability

[xv] McKinsey, p.1

[xvi] TF1N, p.6

[xvii] McKinsey, p.3

[xviii]Ibid, p.2

[xix] Ibid, p.1

[xx] Ibid, p.4

[xxi] Ibid, p. 12

[xxii] Ibid

[xxiii] Ibid

[xxiv] TF1N, p. 12 “Selectively” because if the goal were truly to mirror the demographic diversity of the nation as a whole, there would be critical TF1N discussion of the 17% ‘shortfall’ in white enlisted members, 39% shortfall in females, and 6% ‘excess’ in black enlisted members (that dwarf the number of service members represented by the well discussed putative 'shortfalls' of black and Hispanic officers) and there would be the identification of associated recommendations that are wholly absent. This is one of the clearest indicators of the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the TF1N Final Report.

[xxv] US Census, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Selected Age Groups by Sex for the United States: April 1, 2010, to July 1, 2019

[xxvi] US Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015

[xxvii] US Census Bureau Releases New Educational Attainment Data, March 30, 2020

[xxviii] TF1N, pp. 12-17

[xxix] See footnote 25

[xxx] See footnote 25

[xxxi] TF1N, p.103

[xxxii] See footnote 24

[xxxiii] TF1N, p.103

[xxxiv] Ibid, p.104

[xxxv] Ibid, p. 42

[xxxvi] Ibid, p.108

[xxxvii] Exec. Order No. 13583, 3 C.F.R. 13583 (2011), 76 FR 52845-52849 (2011)

[xxxviii] Delgado, R and Stefanic, J, Critical Race Theory, 3^rd Ed, New York, NYU Press, 2017. “Seminal” because Delgado, along with Derrick Bell and Alan Freeman, is a cofounder of CRT.

[xxxix] Ibid, pp. 167-186

[xl] Ibid, pp. 8-11, 19-39

[xli] Ibid, pp. 3-7, Delgado discusses the origins of CRT in critical legal studies and radical feminism, its growth with various identity variants, and its association with spin-off movements in education, philosophy, political science and similar fields.

[xlii] Ibid, p.3

[xliii] Ibid, pp.25-26

[xliv] Ibid, pp. 8-9, 26-29

[xlv] Ibid, pp. 66-71

[xlvi] Ibid, pp. 28-29

[xlvii] Ibid, p. 27

[xlviii] Ibid, pp. 103-104, 132-135

[xlix] Ruf, Jessica, “Chief Naval Personnel Says Removing Promotion Photos Has Hurt, Rather Than Help, Diversity Goals,” Diverse Military, August 6, 2012 (retrieved at: https://www.diversemilitary.net/other-news/article/15076207/chief-naval-personnel-says-removing-promotion-photos-has-hurt-rather-than-help-diversity-goals)

[l] 5 U.S.C. 2301 (b)(1)