How to Deter China

When it rolls out its new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS), the Pentagon will reportedly de-emphasize China in favor of a more balanced global readiness posture with emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.

Elbridge Colby’s intent to deter China in the NDS and, then CJCS Gen Dunford’s NMS, never intended for the Marine Corps to shed their global force in readiness capabilities in favor of an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) force in readiness.

Putting small Marine Corps units armed with obsolete, short-range missiles on sand spits in the South China Sea and China’s first island chain isn’t a deterrent to anyone, let alone a rapidly expanding Chinese military.

While I believe a war with China is unlikely, we need to be prepared for a technologically advanced multi-domain conflict that could occur across the globe, not simply the South China Sea.

The Marine Corps will need a large number of expendable drones, high volumes of munitions, and a sufficient number of ships, perhaps a hybrid amphibious fleet, to survive losses. Today, we lack those capabilities. The current administration is well aware of the evolving global threat environment and taking action to accelerate responses through investments in unmanned systems and military AI.

If the U.S. wants to deter such aggression without myopic lenses focused solely on China, we must make it clear that a war would be disastrous departure from Sun Tzu.

A more effective deterrent to China among other growing global threats would be through the effective use of the economic element of national power, a concept of mutually assured economic destruction (MAED).

Exploiting Chinese export dependence could trigger a devastating domino effect within China. Exerting MEAD would include pressuring allies to limit or forgo Chinese imports along with impeding China’s ability to ship goods overseas by means of a comprehensive maritime and naval strategy would serve as a powerful deterrent.

Such a strategy would cause short term damage to the U.S. economy, but minor in comparison to the damage to the Chinese economy and the CCP’s authoritarian regime. The U.S. and allies have already started to shift from dependency on Chinese exports to reliance on goods and services internally and other sources of production outside of China.

A MAED deterrence strategy would allow the U.S. time to bolster shipbuilding, restore munitions stockpiles, and advance new military technologies such as the use of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems integration, and offensive and defensive space systems.

This would not only deter China but also position the U.S. and the Marine Corps to deter the evolving global threats including Russian expansion, Middle East belligerents, North Korea, etc.

A MEAD strategy would be a force multiplier for the upcoming NDS and NMS in deterring not only China but the growing and evolving challenge to the U.S. and Western international order driven by China, Russia, and their loosely held alliances.

This should drive the Marine Corps to rebuild themselves as global reaction force along with the rest of the armed services as expeditionary forces in readiness. Future combined and joint exercises would exemplify U.S. capabilities in modern multi-domain warfare and serve as a powerful deterrent, not just readiness but a stated intention to use it effectively.

Gary Anderson retired as the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and is the author of Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century