
How to Win Without Military Victory
Iran, the Fabian Strategy, and the Limits of American Political Endurance
Published Nov. 18, 2026 • Read time: 16m
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0The Iranian Paradox
Iran’s continued resistance presents a strategic paradox. Its conventional navy and air force have been badly damaged, its air defenses weakened, and much of its military infrastructure and senior leadership struck. Its economy is under extraordinary pressure. Yet Tehran has not accepted Washington’s terms. The regime remains in power and insists that the United States, not Iran, must make the concessions needed to end the conflict.
Iran may not believe it can defeat the United States militarily. It may believe it does not have to. It may need only to survive, preserve the regime, retain some capacity to impose costs, and wait for American political will to weaken. If Washington accepts a settlement that leaves the Islamic Republic in power, preserves some nuclear capability or knowledge, and fails to restore reliable freedom of navigation through Hormuz, Tehran may claim victory despite its losses.
After all, it is increasingly plain that the U.S. may have been forced to abandon Bahrain for good, and that’s a primary Iranian win.
This is strategic endurance, closely related to the Fabian Strategy. A weaker power avoids the decisive battle its stronger adversary wants, preserves its remaining strength, offers whatever resistance it can, imposes costs, and waits for time and politics to change the balance. Its object is to remain solvent, politically intact, and capable of resistance until the stronger opponent decides that continuing costs more than accepting an unsatisfactory result. The weaker state may endure losses considered catastrophic in a democracy because its government is less directly answerable to public opinion.
Iran may not have formally adopted a doctrine named for Fabius Maximus, but its conduct reflects the same logic. Tehran may expect the United States to tire of a costly conflict that disrupts energy markets, strains the economy, consumes military inventories, and lacks a clear end state. Vietnam and Afghanistan give that expectation a basis.
Ultimately, Iran may achieve its strategic purpose without winning a conventional military victory.
Frederick the Great, Fabius Maximus, and the Strategy of Endurance
Frederick the Great’s survival during the Seven Years’ War illustrates endurance. Prussia was surrounded by enemies with greater combined resources, and Frederick could not risk losing his army in a decisive defeat. He had to preserve it and remain in the war until circumstances changed. A line often attributed to him captures the idea: continue until one enemy grows tired, another has an election, and, God damn it, Prussia survives. While the quote is anecdotal, it reflects Fredreck’s winning strategy. Russia’s change of leadership in 1762 and withdrawal from the war helped save Prussia.[i]
The Fabian Strategy takes its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Roman commander appointed dictator after Hannibal’s devastating victories in Italy during the Second Punic War. Fabius recognized that Hannibal held a tactical advantage that made direct battle exceptionally dangerous. He avoided the decisive engagement, harassed the Carthaginian army, threatened its supply and movement, and preserved Roman forces. His approach frustrated Romans demanding immediate victory, but bought time for Rome to recover and rebuild.[ii]
Yet the Fabian approach is not passive waiting. It is active resistance designed to deny the stronger opponent a decisive result, impose costs, preserve the ability to fight, and let time do its work. It may, in fact, include harassment, attacks on logistics, political warfare, and limited engagements chosen to avoid destruction. Properly applied, the weaker side may endure losses that would politically intolerable in a democracy, calculating that its regime and core instruments of resistance can survive while the opponent’s public support erodes.
Frederick was not a pure Fabian commander; he fought major battles and sometimes sought decisive engagements. But his experience shows how a weaker state may survive stronger enemies by preserving its military instrument and waiting for circumstances to change. George Washington applied a related logic in the American Revolution. His priority was to keep the Continental Army in existence, not to defeat the British in every engagement. His army’s survival sustained the revolution and helped secure French support. Yorktown resulted from American endurance, French assistance, and a favorable opportunity.[iii]
Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of American political endurance. In Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords enabled the withdrawal of American forces in 1973; fighting continued, and North Vietnamese forces captured Saigon in April 1975. The outcome reflected North Vietnamese military effort, South Vietnam’s collapse, and the failure to sustain American commitments. In Afghanistan, the Taliban survived two decades of American and allied operations and returned to power after the Afghan government collapsed in 2021. The causes included weaknesses in the Afghan state, corruption, sanctuary, and political choices in Kabul and Washington. The shared lesson is that battlefield dominance does not guarantee a durable political result.[iv]
The weaker party’s opportunity rests on a vulnerability of the stronger one. Democracies can sustain extraordinary military effort, but their governments must continually justify its purpose, cost, and duration. Casualties matter, but so do economic disruption, energy prices, uncertainty, alliance cohesion, competing priorities, and the absence of visible progress. An adversary may not have to destroy the stronger country’s military. It may only have to make continuation of the war appear more costly than accepting an unsatisfactory outcome.
The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: Its Origins, Purpose, and Application
The American experience in Vietnam produced reluctance to commit forces without clear political objectives, a realistic strategy, and a credible understanding of what success requires. In November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated six tests: vital national interests must be at stake; the United States must commit forces wholeheartedly and intend to win; objectives must be clear; the relationship between objectives and forces must be reassessed; reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress must exist; and force should be a last resort.[v]
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993 and a Vietnam veteran, gave these principles operational emphasis. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine calls for decisive force, clear objectives, and the resources and authority needed to accomplish the mission. Military power should not be a gesture or diplomatic signal. If the United States chooses to fight, it must be prepared to win the war it has undertaken.
The 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War is often cited as the clearest demonstration. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States and its partners assembled a coalition and deployed sufficient forces to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. Operation Desert Shield created the capacity for an offensive while diplomatic and economic pressure continued. When Iraq refused to withdraw, Desert Storm combined an air campaign with a ground offensive that defeated Iraqi forces in Kuwait in about 100 hours. President George H. W. Bush stopped short of Baghdad because the stated objective had been achieved.
The Gulf War did not prove that overwhelming force guarantees political success. The 2003 invasion of Iraq showed how quickly the United States could overthrow a regime, while the insurgency and occupation exposed the difference between destroying a government and creating a stable political order. The doctrine’s lesson is that the nation should not commit its military unless it is prepared to provide the means, authority, and political support needed to achieve a clearly defined objective.
Iran’s Application of the Fabian Strategy
The conflict with Iran brings the strategy of endurance and the Weinberger-Powell doctrine into direct contact. The United States and Israel began major strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026. The campaign inflicted severe damage on Iran’s military capabilities and leadership. Its conventional navy and air force have been badly degraded, and its ability to contest American and Israeli air operations has been sharply reduced. Yet the regime remains in power. By September, the Congressional Research Service described the conflict as a war of attrition, with both sides weighing whether they could bear the military, economic, and political costs longer than the other.[vi]
Iran does not have to defeat the United States Navy or Air Force, sink a carrier, or destroy American bases. Still, it may succeed if the regime survives, retains enough capability to threaten the region, denies Washington its political objectives, and secures a settlement that leaves the central problems unresolved. The United States could win nearly every conventional engagement and still fail politically.
The destruction of much of Iran’s conventional navy has not eliminated its ability to threaten maritime traffic. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy retains smaller vessels and mine-laying capabilities. Iran also retains missile launchers and stocks, while its decentralized drone capability may regenerate faster than missile production. A mine, drone, shore-launched missile, or small craft can force a superior navy to expend time, attention, and costly defensive weapons.[vii]
The Strait of Hormuz is central to this strategy. Iran does not need to close it permanently. It needs to make commercial transit uncertain, dangerous, or prohibitively expensive. Intermittent attacks or credible threats can cause shipping companies and insurers to reconsider whether to send vessels through the waterway. Energy markets, global commerce, American consumers, and U.S. allies all feel the consequences. American naval superiority does not eliminate the continuing task of protecting commercial shipping against mines, drones, missiles, and small craft.
Maritime reporting as of November 8, 2026, continued to record incidents involving commercial vessels near the Strait, while traffic remained far below normal. Some claims remain unverified. But Hormuz is plainly both a military problem and an economic lever: Iran’s ability to threaten shipping gives it influence beyond the reach of its remaining conventional fleet.[viii]
The blockade attacks one of the regime’s most important financial lifelines: oil exports and the revenue they provide. Oil receipts have historically accounted for roughly one-third of Iran’s budget, although broader estimates that include indirect oil-linked income are higher. The precise share varies. The point is that the blockade imposes serious economic pressure, but economic pain does not automatically produce political surrender.[ix] Not when the evidently ruling IRGC is willing to endure pain that would whither a democracy.
Iran can widen the conflict through missile and drone attacks against Gulf energy infrastructure and U.S. partners. Aligned groups, cyber operations, and attacks on infrastructure can add uncertainty. These tools need not defeat American forces; they impose costs and give more governments an interest in ending the conflict.
The regime’s willingness to absorb punishment is critical. Iran’s government is not accountable to its population as an elected American government is. Economic hardship, damaged infrastructure, and civilian suffering do not automatically produce surrender. Tehran can transfer the burden to its population and portray the war as a struggle for national survival. This does not mean Iran can endure indefinitely, but destruction alone is an unreliable measure of how close it is to capitulation.
For Iran, victory may be modest: survival. If the Islamic Republic remains in power, retains some ability to threaten shipping and regional targets, and forces Washington to accept a settlement that leaves the nuclear and regional problems unresolved, Tehran may claim that it has endured the world’s strongest military power, and assert itself afresh throughout the region.
The American Problem: Military Success and Political Endurance
American military power is immense, but operations consume precision munitions, interceptors, aircraft hours, maintenance capacity, and naval deployment time. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that operations cost $38 billion through August 1, 2026. A September 2026 Lead Inspector General report cited strategic munitions shortfalls and industrial-base bottlenecks. These figures do not mean the United States cannot continue; they show that continuation has real costs.[x]
Ships, aircraft, missiles, and trained personnel committed to Iran are unavailable for other contingencies. A prolonged conflict strains allies, complicates regional relationships, and unsettles shipping and energy markets. The burden grows when objectives are unclear or military success fails to produce a visible result. Iran may calculate that it can tolerate punishment longer than an American administration can sustain the political costs of imposing it.
This is where the Fabian Strategy intersects with the American political system. Iran may expect the United States to tire of a war that continually stresses its economy. Afghanistan is a recent warning: after twenty years, American leaders and the public no longer accepted the costs of sustaining the Afghan government, and its collapse followed the withdrawal. Vietnam remains the more consequential example. In both cases, the adversary did not defeat the United States conventionally; it simply outlasted the American commitment.
Iran may calculate deliberately or simply exploit circumstances. Either way, Tehran has reason to believe that a democracy will struggle to sustain a costly war without a persuasive explanation of its purpose and necessity. The American public has not been convincingly shown why this war is urgent, what precise result must be achieved, or why Iran’s nuclear danger cannot be managed by a lesser settlement. Many Americans continue to regard the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as effective. Whether that belief is justified is a separate question. The point is that the administration has not built broad public understanding of the continuing nuclear danger or the consequences of an inconclusive war.
The administration has neither sought nor achieved durable congressional buy-in of the kind contemplated by Weinberger. This is not to say that a formal declaration of war or new authorization was indispensable. Weinberger’s test was reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress. Consultation, constitutional authority, formal authorization, and sustained political support are distinct. A campaign may begin without a new authorization and still enjoy some backing, but that support cannot be assumed to endure if the conflict becomes prolonged, costly, and difficult to explain.
The administration has committed substantial air and naval power and inflicted serious damage. But it has not committed ground forces, secured broad congressional support, or persuaded much of the public that the war’s purpose and urgency justify its costs. The challenge is not simply Iran’s remaining military capability. It is Iran’s willingness to absorb punishment while waiting for American resolve to weaken.[xi]
The Strategic Endgame
The decision not to commit ground forces may be defensible. A campaign in a country the size of Iran would carry extraordinary risks and could become the prolonged quagmire Tehran would welcome. Ground forces should not be introduced merely to satisfy a doctrinal formula. But avoiding a ground war does not remove the requirement to define a credible end state, explain how it will be achieved, and provide the resources and political support to enforce it. Air power can destroy; a blockade can strangle. Neither automatically compels surrender.
The danger is a half-hearted application of force against a determined enemy. The United States may choose not to occupy Iran, but it cannot assume that a limited campaign will compel Tehran to abandon objectives it considers essential to regime survival. If Washington is unwilling to bear the costs of achieving its objectives, it must revise them honestly rather than continue a campaign that consumes resources while allowing Iran to wait. A half-hearted application of force against a determined enemy can only lead to mission failure, precisely the outcome the Weinberger-Powell doctrine was designed to prevent.
Iran may need only to deny the United States a clear victory. It may accept enormous damage if the alternative is surrender on terms that threaten the regime’s existence. The political calendar, economic disruption, congressional opposition, and public fatigue can strengthen this strategy. None guarantees Tehran will prevail, but each creates an opportunity to outlast the American commitment.
If the United States withdraws or accepts a settlement short of its original objectives, Iran may emerge with its conventional military shattered, its economy badly damaged, and its nuclear program delayed, yet with the regime intact and some nuclear knowledge and residual capability preserved. If Hormuz remains subject to Iranian coercion, Tehran may claim to have survived and retained leverage over a vital waterway. That outcome is not inevitable. The United States may still secure a verifiable outcome that prevents an Iranian nuclear weapon, restores commercial navigation, and removes Iran’s ability to threaten its neighbors.
That requires more than destroying targets. It requires clear political objectives, a credible end state, a plan to enforce the result, and the national will to sustain the effort. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine exists because Vietnam taught that military superiority cannot compensate for a failure to align force, purpose, and political commitment. Afghanistan reinforced the lesson. A democracy confronting an adversary largely insulated from popular opinion must recognize that the enemy may accept losses politically catastrophic in the United States. Washington must explain the stakes, secure congressional and public support, and commit the means necessary to achieve its objectives.
The lesson of Fabius, Frederick, Washington, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Weinberger-Powell doctrine is not that the weaker side always wins by waiting. It is that military superiority is not self-executing. Iran has taken a terrible beating, but the regime remains and retains ways to impose costs. The decisive question is whether the United States has defined what it must achieve, what it is prepared to pay, and what conditions will constitute an acceptable end. If those questions remain unanswered, Iran may not need to defeat America. It may only need to outlast its willingness to fight.
Captain Kevin Eyer is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served on active duty for 27 years. He deployed in seven cruisers and commanded three Aegis cruisers: USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), USS Shiloh (CG-67), and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62). He completed tours on both the Navy Staff and Joint Staff and earned a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He was the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year in 2017 and a three-time winner of the Surface Navy Association’s Literary Award.
notes:
[i]George Washington’s Mount Vernon, “Frederick the Great,” accessed November 8, 2026, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/frederick-the-great.
[ii]“The Second Punic War,” Dickinson College Commentaries, accessed November 8, 2026, https://dcc.dickinson.edu/nepos-hannibal/second-punic-war.
[iii]George Washington’s Mount Vernon, “Frederick the Great.”
[iv]U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Ending the Vietnam War, 1969–1973,” accessed November 8, 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ending-vietnam.
[v]U.S. Department of Defense, “Caspar W. Weinberger,” Historical Office, accessed November 8, 2026, https://history.defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571286/caspar-w-weinberger/.
[vi]Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, R48887 (September 18, 2026), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48887.html.
[vii]Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, sections on Iranian military capabilities and strategy.
[viii]Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran; Reuters, “Trump Says He Is Highly Unlikely to Order Iran Strikes If Talks Progress,” November 8, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-suggests-blasts-are-not-us-attacks-both-sides-report-ships-hit-2026-11-08/.
House of Commons Library, “Iran: Introductory Country Profile,” Research Briefing CBP-10588 (2026), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10588/CBP-10588.pdf.
[x]Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, summarizing the Congressional Budget Office estimate and September 2026 Lead Inspector General report.
Reuters, “Rubio Says US Can Achieve Iran Objectives Without Ground Troops,” March 27, 2026.

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