Maneuvering into a New Acquisition Era

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. Marine Corps undertook a profound doctrinal shift, moving from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare through a series of organizational reforms that began in earnest with the publication of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP)-1 Warfighting.

Today, the Department of War is pursuing an equally ambitious transformation: converting the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System (WAS). This procedural and cultural change seeks to accelerate the delivery of urgently needed capabilities, placing speed at the center of acquisition strategy. Both reforms share striking similarities in the intent and philosophy, even as they differ in scope and mechanism.

The Department of War’s directives redefine acquisition as a warfighting function. The organizing first principle is clear: speed to capability delivery. This shift is operationalized through the creation of Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs), who hold expanded authority over requirements, resourcing, and contracting decisions.

The proposed cultural shift mirrors the process of the Marine Corps’ transformation to maneuver warfare. PAEs are incentivized to prioritize speed over cost and performance, embracing a wartime mindset that values rapid delivery and tolerates risk. This approach dismantles entrenched habits within the Force Development Enterprise and fosters collaboration from identified need to fielded capability. Just as maneuver warfare demanded decentralized decision-making and initiative, WAS demands empowerment of acquisition leaders to act decisively without bureaucratic delay.

Organizationally, the guidance consolidates programs under appropriately resourced PAEs to promote unity of effort and simplify processes. Authorities are restructured to enable rapid delivery of capabilities at the speed of relevance. The Marine Corps’ doctrinal emphasis on unity of command and main effort is analogous, translated here into acquisition terms through portfolio management and integrated decision-making.

Process changes are equally significant. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and scorecards will measure and prioritize timely delivery over granular requirements fulfillment. Internal review timelines are reduced, and requirements are designed for flexibility, allowing trade-offs to achieve velocity, mirroring the Marine Corps maxim that a 70% solution today is better than a perfect solution too late.

As in civilian enterprises, streamlined testing and evaluation will promote iterative development and learning. Competitive prototyping replaces lengthy analysis, echoing maneuver warfare’s emphasis on exploiting opportunities, maintaining tempo and risk-tolerant adaptability.

The guidance addresses industrial base fragility by expanding competition, stabilizing demand signals through multi-year contracts, and attracting private capital investment. Initiatives like the Economic Defense Unit (EDU) aim to leverage commercial innovation and incentivize industry participation.

To achieve interoperability, the guidance mandates MOSA and establishes the Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) for rapid experimentation and kill-chain integration. This approach parallels maneuver warfare’s emphasis on combined arms and synchronization, ensuring that new capabilities can be integrated across domains.

The Marine Corps’ adoption of maneuver warfare was a generational or greater change, replacing attrition-based methods to over match adversaries with exploitive actions and novel technologies. This change in mindset and processes required redefining culture, decentralizing authority, and institutionalizing new practices through education and leadership. While maneuver warfare focused on battlefield decision-making, WAS prioritizes cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs to achieve acquisition agility.

The results of these doctrinal adaptations to maneuver warfare were evident in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, where speed, initiative, and flexibility proved decisive. Today’s acquisition transformation seeks similar outcomes by delivering capabilities at the speed of relevance to outpace competitors.

For both Marine Corps strategic design and the Pentagon procurement systems, the transformations required to achieve success have emphasized and will demand speed, adaptability, and risk acceptance. Both require cultural change and empowerment of decision-makers. Maneuver warfare was initially a cognitive and doctrinal shift, while WAS prioritizes structural and procedural change. One transformed how Marines fight; the other transforms how the Pentagon delivers enhanced warfighting capabilities.

Both reforms, however, reflect responses to strategic urgency. Success depends not only on structural and procedural changes but on cultural adoption. The Department of War must overcome resistance, align incentives, and communicate the vision with clarity and urgency. If executed effectively, this transformation will position the U.S. military to enhance its competitive edge. We stand at a pivotal moment, and seizing this opportunity can define our future warfighting capability.

Lieutenant General Keith J. Stalder (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is the Founder and President of KSA Integration, LLC, an award-winning defense and homeland security provider that delivers advanced solutions through cutting-edge technologies, strategic partnerships, and operational reach. A former F-4 and F/A-18 pilot, LtGen Stalder served over 37 years in the U.S. Marine Corps, where he led U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and 3D Marine Aircraft Wing.