
The Future of Warfare Is Electromagnetic
Published Aug. 31, 2026 • Read time: 7m
Much has been written about the political ramifications of the Ukraine war. Less has been said about how the conflict is revolutionizing the very nature of warfare.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has become the world’s first large-scale drone war. Drones regularly buzz over the battlefield, launching precision strikes against any enemy forces that come into sight. In 2024, Ukraine created its Unmanned Systems Forces, the first military branch in the world dedicated exclusively to drone warfare. Drones have been integrated into both armies’ militaries at every level.
In the Battle of Bakhmut, which saw the worst carnage in the conflict so far, witnesses described a scene out of World War I, except with drone strikes standing in for traditional artillery. The omnipresent drones meant “there’s no place that’s safe in the entire city,” said one veteran, forcing soldiers to take cover in trenches or behind buildings.
Clearly much has changed since the U.S. fought its last major ground war in Iraq in 2003, where the military doctrines at hand were rapid maneuver warfare (“shock and awe”) and then counterterrorism. Drones are inexpensive, easy to build, and allow for rapid precision targeting. They represent a fundamental shift in how wars will be waged going forward. The drones themselves are cheap, easy to build, and increasingly autonomous, and the Pentagon is right to invest heavily in them. But a drone is only as good as its ability to communicate, and that is where the contest is now being decided.
That’s why it’s encouraging to see the Pentagon updating its thinking and investing heavily in autonomous aerial systems. But the Pentagon doesn’t just need drones. It also needs to secure the electromagnetic environment, the spectrum of communications, targeting, and other signals that are given off by these autonomous systems in wartime. Drones must constantly exchange signals, from targeting data to telemetry to battlefield coordination, and every one of those transmissions is an emission an adversary can exploit.
In modern warfare, all this communication can turn a drone into a flashlight. Once detected, the enemy can geolocate and attack the drone or create signal interference and try to jam it. One analysis notes, “Many skeptics argue that it won’t be long until jammers are employed everywhere” on the battlefield.
Worse, because most drones must stay in constant contact with their controllers, enemy forces can intercept signals and pinpoint where drone operators are. In Ukraine, human drone controllers have become high-value targets. Just this month, the Ukrainians trumpeted an airstrike against a compound in the city of Khrustalnyi where Russian drone operators were stationed and being trained.
There are limitations to counter-drone warfare. Jamming equipment, for example, is often cumbersome to carry around and limited in its effectiveness. It also switches on an even brighter “flashlight” than the drones themselves, opening up forces to potential attack.
But what’s clear is that the battlefield of the future isn’t just drones but the electromagnetic spectrum where those drones are sustained and countered. Victory will go to the military that can operate drones while remaining difficult to detect electronically.
This is why the Pentagon needs to get serious about electromagnetic warfare. Winning tomorrow’s wars will depend not only on who fields the best drones, but on who can communicate, maneuver, and strike without being detected.
The Department of Defense’s substantial investment in encryption is no longer enough. An adversary doesn’t need to read the contents of a communication; it just needs to detect it so it can be geolocated or jammed. The U.S. needs to update its drone communications technology to make that harder to do while also itself contesting the electromagnetic spectrum.
Future military communications must emphasize Low Probability of Intercept and Low Probability of Detection technologies that allow autonomous systems to exchange data while minimizing their electronic signatures. Drone networks must also be resilient enough to operate in degraded and contested environments where jamming, spoofing, and signal interference are routine.
That points to three concrete steps. First, the Pentagon should make a low electronic signature a hard requirement in drone and counter-drone contracts, the same way stealth is a requirement for aircraft, rather than a feature left to industry to offer or omit. Second, it should fund the spread-spectrum, frequency-hopping, and mesh-networking waveforms that let unmanned systems pass data without lighting up the spectrum, and field them at the scale of the cheap drones that need them, not just on a handful of exquisite platforms. Third, it should build emission discipline into how units actually train, so that operators learn to manage their signature in the field rather than discovering its absence under fire.
So why isn’t this happening already? Part of the answer is that electromagnetic warfare has no natural champion. It is not a platform a service can point to, name, and parade, the way it can a fighter or a carrier, so it loses the internal budget fights to programs that are easier to show a member of Congress. Part of it is institutional memory: the United States spent two decades fighting insurgents who could not contest the spectrum, and a generation of officers came up assuming friendly control of it was a given. And part of it is acquisition itself. The signature problem demands cheap, software-defined systems refreshed on the timeline of the threat, while the Pentagon still buys communications gear on multiyear cycles built for hardware that is meant to last.
None of these obstacles is unfixable, but each requires a deliberate choice. Congress and the department can give electromagnetic warfare an owner with real budget authority, rather than leaving it split across services and program offices that each treat it as someone else’s job. They can carve out spectrum survivability as a protected line in the unmanned-systems budget, so it is not the first thing cut when a flashier platform runs over cost. And they can buy low-signature communications the way Ukraine fields drones, in small competitive lots that can be updated in months, instead of in decade-long programs that are obsolete before they reach the field.
There are signs the Pentagon is beginning to move. The Army is working to shrink the electronic signature of its field command posts, which for years sat in the open as some of the largest emitters on the battlefield, and it is putting new emphasis on speed and adaptability in electromagnetic warfare. That is the right instinct. But a command post is one node. The same discipline has to reach the thousands of cheap, expendable drones that will define the next fight, and that is a far larger and more expensive undertaking than anything the current budget supports.
The United States is not a direct combatant in Ukraine and this, of course, is a good thing. But the risk is that we become a sideline spectator, failing to absorb the realities of twenty-first-century warfare because we’re not directly involved.
The United States has the engineers, the spectrum expertise, and the budget to win this fight before it starts. What it has not yet done is decide that the contest for the spectrum is as central to the next war as the drones flying through it. The fiber spooling across Ukrainian fields is a warning that the side that fails to make that decision will be found, jammed, and targeted first. We should make it now, on our terms, rather than relearn it under fire.
Rob Joyce is a cybersecurity leader with more than 34 years in the intelligence community. Previously, he served as acting homeland security adviser and special assistant to the president on the U.S. National Security Council, and as director of cybersecurity for the National Security Agency.

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