The Strategic Implications of Effective Population Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

Before the 20th century, wars were often confined to distant battlefields. The advent of air power brought wars to home fronts. A new strategy for winning wars not by Clausewitzian decisive battles but by the use of airpower against home fronts was first offered by Giulio Douhet in 1921.[1] His writing influenced military thinking between the two world wars and led to the establishment of strategic air forces in the U.K. and the U.S. whose contribution to ending World War II is still controversial.[2]

Missile power joined air power in terrorizing home fronts as soon as Nazi Germany perfected its V1 cruise missiles and V2 ballistic missiles in 1944. The impact of those spectacular weapons on the course of World War II is judged today to have been insignificant.[3] Following the war, ballistic missiles graduated into nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. Today ballistic missiles are perceived as adjuncts to the nuclear issue. Their non-nuclear capability to complement or replace conventional air power has been largely trivialized. The Iranian nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which excludes ballistic missiles, is a case in point.

Yet conventional ballistic missiles played a strategic role in the Middle East wars of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The two most prominent examples were the use of Saddam Hussein's extended range, conventionally-armed Scud missiles against Iran in 1988 and against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991. In the first instance, the end of the Iran-Iraq war was attributed by many observers to the devastating effects of the Iraqi missiles on Iran's major cities. While the total number of casualties was miniscule in proportion to battlefield casualties, the costs in damages, dislocation, and trauma may have reached intolerable levels.[4] In the second instance, Saddam Hussein's conventional missiles threatened to wreck the U.S.-led coalition, which in turn might have stopped the war against him.[5]

Rockets—in essence small, short-range unguided ballistic missiles—have featured in Middle Eastern conflicts for almost half a century. Rockets have been extensively used against populations in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars. Palestinian rockets fired from secure bases across international borders have been terrorizing Israeli population centers since late 1968 with significant destabilizing results. With no effective defense save sheltering, Israel responses were offensive, seeking to dissuade and deter. Thus, the 1982 Lebanon War came in response to incessant Palestine Liberation Organization rocket attacks on northern Israel.[6] In the next decade, Hezbollah rocket attacks on the Israeli towns of Naharia and Kiryat Shmone triggered massive Israeli retaliation on Southern Lebanon in 1992 and again in 1996.[7] Hezbollah's rocket fire in July 2006 triggered a massive Israeli air offensive against Lebanon followed by a ground invasion.[8] Similarly, the escalating Palestinian rocket fire from Gaza on the Israeli southern and central districts brought Israeli air and ground retaliatory attacks, with real consequences to Palestinian civilians.[9] With its population centers exposed to rocket attacks and with diplomacy achieving only shaky, short-lived cease fires, Israel had no other response option except escalation.

The need for an alternative, non-escalatory strategy became obvious to Israeli planners in the mid-1990s. Defense against rockets is a demanding technical challenge due to the short timelines involved. Hence the first attempt to devise active rocket defense revolved around speed-of-light directed energy weapons (i.e., high-power lasers). The inherent limitations of the technology doomed the effort, and Israel reverted to more conventional interceptor missile technology.[10] The result of this effort was the Iron Dome short range missile defense system, deployed since mid 2011.

The Middle East is a cockpit of wars, making it a veritable proving ground for weapons, tactics, and strategies. The introduction of Iron Dome to the battlefield provided an opportunity to evaluate the strategic implications of population defense against rocket fire in limited wars. From Israel's perspective, population defense exceeded expectations. If the purpose of the Palestinian rockets was to wage an attritional war against Israel's population in order to gain political concessions, the successful defense of that population inverted the attritional equation and forced the aggressors, rather than the defenders, to seek a ceasefire with no tangible political gains.

Israel's Iron Dome Missile Defense System (VOA)

Overseas critics however challenged this conclusion on two counts: first, that Iron Dome was less successful than claimed; and second, that the success was qualified and temporary. The first claim was made by two scientists Dr. Ted Postol, a nuclear scientist from MIT, and Mr. Richard Lloyd, a missile warhead expert.[11] Based on open-source, two dimensional images, the two concluded that Iron Dome's score was poorer than claimed, although their estimates diverged considerably between 5% (Postol) and 40% (Lloyd). In contrast, Israelis were unanimous in their confidence that Iron Dome worked as advertised. This was supported by Israel's Treasury information on damage claims and payments, which showed a steep decline compared to previous rocket attacks in 2006 and 2012.[12] On a more personal note, the present author who during the 2014 war commuted every weekday to his Tel Aviv office never witnessed any rocket hit the city or its suburbs, in spite of more than 130 rockets targeting it.[13] Similar testimonies abounded in Israel's media.[14] The critic's claim of marginal success fails to explain this reported tranquility.

Other critics accept the success of Israel's population defense but argue that it was both strategically qualified and volatile.[15] Such arguments were made, for example, by Elizabeth M. Bartel’s recent article in The Strategy Bridge. Bartels make three arguments in support of her claim: first, that the casualty imbalance brought about Iron Dome's successful defense of Israel's population came at a strategic cost; second, that the success is destined to be short-lived; and third, that it denied Israel a decisive military victory. These arguments will be addressed sequentially.

The Iron Dome reduced Israeli civilian deaths and enhanced the effectiveness of Israel's population defense during the 2014 Gaza War. Out of the 5 Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian fire, only two were caused by rockets.[16] The toll among Palestinian civilians is in dispute, but, in any case, constituted a sizable proportion of the total death toll of more than 2000 persons.[17] Bartels argues this disparity in the death toll between Gaza and Israel, accentuated by the success of Iron Dome, carried a strategic cost to Israel. In her words, "Palestinians suffered while Israelis remained relatively safe."[18]

While this argument does not offer specific suggestions on how this cost might have been mitigated, some options can be envisaged. Other than giving in to Hamas demands, two options come to mind: either allow an increase in the Israeli death toll by foregoing defense, or decrease the Palestinian death toll by foregoing offense. The first option is a non-starter: no democratic government would intentionally expose its citizens to the risk of death if defense is feasible. The second option may sound tempting to uninvolved observers: after all, since its citizens were relatively safe, Israel could afford to passively absorb the Palestinian rocket fire without retaliating. Similar suggestions have been made by other observers.[19]

A house in Sderot hit by a Qassam rocket (Oren Rosenfeld/Wikimedia)

In real life, this too is non-starter. The economic, political, and social impact of high-intensity rocket fire on population centers is not limited to the number of civilian deaths; it has wider implications. The reduction in the number of fatalities does not reduce the terror itself. Life stops whenever the alarm is sounded, and the constant threat disrupts the economy and traumatizes the population. Fortunately for Israel (and the Palestinians), the 2014 Gaza War happened during the annual school recession. Had it taken place during the school year, the rocket threat would close all schools and other educational institutes, compelling the labor force to stay at home and practically shutting down the economy.

A prolonged passivity would sway public opinion towards a more aggressive policy and precipitate a political crisis. Neither Israel nor any other country can sustain rocket attacks against its citizens indefinitely, even when the casualties are relatively light. Prolonged passive sustainment might have mitigated the strategic cost of casualty imbalance but at a higher overall strategic cost.

WITH THE ROCKET FIRE LARGELY NEUTRALIZED BY IRON DOME, THE ATTRITIONAL EQUATION WAS OVERTURNED AND IT WAS THE HAMAS WHO COULD NOT SUSTAIN ISRAEL'S COUNTER ACTIONS ANY LONGER.

In more general terms, the casualty imbalance argument misses the wider strategic implications of successful population defense. The clash of arms between Israel and the Palestinians in the summer of 2014 had some attributes of a full-scale war in which both sides had explicit political goals. Israel's declared objective was a return to the previous ceasefire situation and the cessation of rocket attacks from Gaza.[20] The Hamas declared war aims—elucidated by then Hamas leader Ismail Hania—were the unconditional lifting of the siege on Gaza including open borders and the construction of a Hamas-controlled international airport and seaport in Gaza.[21] In short, the unconditional recognition of Hamas sovereignty in Gaza without any obligation to make peace with Israel.[22] After 53 days of fighting, albeit with some temporary lulls, Hamas opted for what turned out to be an unconditional ceasefire without gaining anything substantial in return. Thus, and without escalating the fighting beyond what was strictly necessary to block the Palestinian tunnel threat, Israel achieved both its immediate war objective and a significant long term strategic gain: blunting the Palestinian's rocket terror, thereby broadcasting a strong deterrent message to its foes in the region. This was due to a successful population defense. With the rocket fire largely neutralized by Iron Dome, the attritional equation was overturned and it was the Hamas who could not sustain Israel's counter actions any longer.

Bartels argues this achievement is destined to be temporary, because "adversaries will adapt and learn how to circumvent the system." This is a generic argument that is hardly specific to Iron Dome but applicable to any innovative weapon system or, in fact, to any new commercial venture. The competition will always strive to adapt and circumvent anything that threatens its own weapons or commercial gains. The argument of advantage volatility is often cited by opponents of missile defense, who believe that missile defense is particularly prone to countermeasures—in fact, there is a rich literature on how aggressors can deploy so called cheap and simple countermeasures that are likely to circumvent the most sophisticated missile defense system.[23] This is a fallacy: nothing in the art of countermeasures is simple or cheap. Moreover, the defenders are at least as adaptive as the aggressors, and often even more so. In the case of Iron Dome, the Palestinians have been trying to circumvent it ever since its first operational debut in April 2011, with no discernable success to date. Doubtlessly, they will continue to try. Doubtlessly, Israel's defenders will continue to improve their defenses. This is another manifestation of the eternal race between offense and defense, where the advantage lies with the side that holds the technological high ground.

Lastly, the question of whether or not Iron Dome denied Israel a decisive military victory needs to be discussed. Such opinions were indeed aired by retired Israeli officers, probably echoing the disappointment of some serving Israel Defense Forces officers at their government's refusal to endorse a full-scale assault into, and the re-occupation of, the Gaza strip with the aim of crushing the Palestinians armed forces.[24] Similar opinions were voiced by numerous Israeli analysts and lawmakers, while most critics attributed the reluctance of the Israeli government to hesitant leadership, some attributed it to the lulling effects of effective population defense that gave the government the leeway to avoid a counterproductive policy.[25]

Burning factory in Sderot, which was hit by a rocket from Gaza (Natan Flayer/Wikimedia)

In fact, the architects of Israel's missile defense aimed exactly to achieve such a leeway, providing the political leadership with a non-escalatory option.[26] In the 2014 Gaza War, it was Israeli government policy neither to seek a final showdown with Hamas nor to reoccupy the Gaza Strip.[27] The former might have brought to power an even more radical, Islamic State-like Palestinian factions; the latter would have embroiled Israel in years of protracted urban guerrilla war in the dense population centers of Gaza. A high number of casualties from Palestinian rockets would have forced the government to revert to an escalatory option, with its inevitable human toll for both Israelis and Palestinians. Effective population defense allowed Israel to practice restraint and see the fighting to a successful end.

LIMITED WARS BETWEEN ASYMMETRIC OPPONENTS TEND TO TARGET THE RESILIENCE OF POPULATION RATHER THAN THE CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES.

Combatants at war have mutually exclusive objectives, and the winner is the side that gains its objectives or prevents the other side from gaining theirs. From this perspective, Israel clearly won the 2014 Gaza War. The key factor was successful population defense. That Israel's war aims were achieved by a defensive rather than offensive strategy does not diminish it. In the history of warfare, defensive victories such as Gettysburg or the Battle of Britain have had major strategic implications no less than offensive victories. Limited wars between asymmetric opponents tend to target the resilience of population rather than the capabilities of armed forces. One of the most important lessons from the 2014 Gaza War is that effective population defense can level the ground and bring back a degree of symmetry to the balance of power between the contenders.

Uzi Rubin is an aerospace engineer. He was the founder and first Director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization in the Israel Ministry of Defense.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] Van Creveld, M. (1991) Technology and War, The Free Press, New York pp 193-194.

[2] Ordway, F.I., Mitchell, R.S. (1982) The Rocket Team, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusett, p. 250

[3] The total number of casualties from missiles is given by Iranian sources as nearly 14,000, of which approximately 2,300 were fatalities. The total number of Iranian casualties in that war is variously estimated between 600,000 and 1,250,000. For the number of Iranian casualties from missiles see Falladoust, K, Movangar, R. “Civilian Casualties of Iraq Ballistic Missile Attacks on Tehran, Capital of Iran,” Chinese Journal of Traumatology, 2012 pp. 162-165. For a discussion of the the various estimates of the total number of Iranian casualties, see for example Kurznam, C. “Death Toll of the Iran Iraq War, October 31, 2013, http://kurzman.unc.edu/death-tolls-of-the-iran-iraq-war/ (retrieved January 23 2018)

[4] The Staff of US News and World Report (1993) Triumph Without Victory, The History of the Persian Gulf War, Times Books, New York p. 299

[5] Schiff, Z. Yaari, E (1984) Israel’s Lebanon War, Simon and Schuster, New York.

[6] For objectives and description of the 1992 Operation Accountability see “Operation Accountability” YNET News, January 8, 2006. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3284732,00.html. For objective and description of the 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath see “Operation Grapes of Wrath” YNET News, January 8, 2006. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3284744,00.html

[7] Harel, A, Isacharoff, A. (2008) 34 Days, Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon, Saint Martin Press, New York.

[8] Rubin, U. (2011) From Nuisance to Strategic Threat, the Rocket Attack From Gaza on SouthernIsrael, The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Middle East Security Perspective No. 8, pp. 22-26.

[9] For the rationale of Israel’s switch from directed energy to interceptor technology, see: Asher, D. “US Military Presents: The Return of the Laser,” Israel Defense, March 9, 2017. http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/28793 (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[10] Axle, D.”Israel Iron Dome is More Like an Iron Sieve” Reuters July 25, 2014. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/07/25/israels-iron-dome-is-more-like-an-iron-sieve/(Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[11] Rubin, U. (2015) Israel Air and Missile Defense During the 2014 Gaza War, The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast Security and Policy Studies no. 111, p. 29.

[12] Rubin, U. (2015) Israel Air and Missile Defense During the 2014 Gaza War, p. 16.

[13] “Ion Dome.. safeguarded Ashkelon’s residents and saved women and children” from Mishali, O. “Ashkelon is Grateful to Amir Peretz: You Have Saved Our Children” NRG News, September 9, 2014. (In Hebrew) https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/616/921.html (Retrieved January 23, 2018), “Due to the accomulated experience and the response of Iron Dome we have succeeded to calm the population” From the Municipality of Ashdod website report on the visit of the PM Office Director General, July 16, 2014. (In Hebrew) https://www.ashdod.muni.il/he-il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8-%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A8/%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/2014/7/%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%9B-%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%93-%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%90%D7%A9%D7%93%D7%95%D7%93/, (Retrieved January 23 2018) “If it hadn’t been for the Iron Dome, this war would have been a very different story," from “Iron Dome changes game, opinions in Israel, though Hamas rockets still land” Fox News, July 22, 2014. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/07/22/iron-dome-changes-game-opinions-in-israel-though-hamas-rockets-still-land.html (Retrieved January 23 2018)

[14] See for example Morris, B. “Should Israel and the US Rethink Iron Dome Usefulness?” Los Angeles Times, August 21, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-morris-iron-dome-disastrous-for-israel-20140822-story.html (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[15] Shapir, S.Sh. “The Rocket Warfare During the 2014 Gaza War” Israel Institute for National Strategic Strategy Studies, November 2014 p.3. (In Hebrew) http://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%A7%20%D7%90%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%9F%20%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%9F%20%20XX%20%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99.pdf (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[16] “Gaza Crisis: Toll of Operations in Gaza,” BBC News. September 1, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28439404 (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[17] Bartels, E.M. "Is Iron Dome a Poisoned Chalice? Strategic Risks from Tactical Success," The Strategy Bridge, November 29, 2017.

[18] E.g., “Given Israel's overwhelming military superiority and its vastly lower exposure to fatalities (more than 100 Palestinian civilians have been killed for every one Israeli civilian), surely it could afford to be less enthusiastic in its utter destruction of civilian-heavy areas” Fisher, M. “Why 70% of the people killed in Israel-Gaza violence are innocent Palestinian civilians,” Vox. July 30, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/7/30/5937119/palestinian-civilian-casualties-gaza-israel (Retrieved January 23, 2018):

[19] Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu televised speech on July 8, 2014. (In Hebrew),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlJqC1WiAjE (Retrieved January 24, 2018)

[20] Chairman of Hamas Political Arm Khaled Mashaal in a BBC interview, July 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGxlRD6kpDo (Retrieved January 24, 2018)

[21] Chairman of Hamas Political Arm Khaled Mashaal in a BBC interview, July 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGxlRD6kpDo (Retrieved January 24, 2018)

[22] e.g. Sessler A.M., Cornwall J.M., Dietz, B., Fetter S., Frankel S., Garwin R.L., Gottfried K., Gronlund L., Lewis G.N., Postol T.A., Washington, D.C. Countermeasures, Union of Concerned Scientists, MIT Security Study Programme. April, 2000. https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pd (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[23] E.g., “In addition to its excellent qualities, Iron Dome also erodes the senses and the willpower of the ground forces” Harel, I. “Iron Dome Is a Tactical Treasure but Strategic Danger” Haaretz English Edition, July 17, 2014,  “At the political level, Iron Dome relieves pressure on policymakers to achieve quick results and so mitigates the need for Israel to push rapidly ahead with a ground operation” (Interview with an Israel officer).  Cohen, R.S et al: (2017) “From Cast Lead to Protective Edge, Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza” Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, p. 186.

[24] E.g., Sessler A.M., Cornwall J.M., Dietz, B., Fetter S., Frankel S., Garwin R.L., Gottfried K., Gronlund L., Lewis G.N., Postol T.A., Washington, D.C. Countermeasures, Union of Concerned Scientists, MIT Security Study Programme. April, 2000. https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pd (Retrieved January 23, 2018)

[25] E.g., “Brig. Gen. (res.) Ophir Shoham, Director of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) Directorate for Research and Development (known by its acronym MAFAT), said that the system’s strategic goal is to allow the political leadership room for maneuver and to provide an alternative to escalation” Rubin, U. “Iron Dome in Action: A Preliminary Evaluation” The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspective Paper No. 151, October 24, 2011.

[26] E.g., “In addition to its excellent qualities, Iron Dome also erodes the senses and the willpower of the ground forces” Harel, I. “Iron Dome Is a Tactical Treasure but Strategic Danger” Haaretz English Edition, July 17, 2014,  “At the political level, Iron Dome relieves pressure on policymakers to achieve quick results and so mitigates the need for Israel to push rapidly ahead with a ground operation” (Interview with an Israel officer).  Cohen, R.S et al: (2017) “From Cast Lead to Protective Edge, Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza” Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, p. 186.

[27] “A highly placed military source explains why destroying Hamas was not defined as an objective: We wanted an indentfiable entity to prevent a Somalization of the Gaza Strip” Zeutun, Y., Kais, R., “We could have overrun Gaza in 10 days, but to defeat Hamas would have required two years”, YNET News August 3, 2014 (In Hebrew) https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4554260,00.html (Retrieved January 23, 2018