The Utility of Deterrence

In a recent Inkstick article, “The Privilege of Deterrence: It’s time to look closer at the privilege, white supremacy, and racism behind deterrence theory,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies student Mackenzie Knight uses responses to her TikTok posts to argue that deterrence theory is premised in white supremacy. In reply to her advocacy for nuclear disarmament, TikTokkers _fellas_in_paris_, boltyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy, smackhead_alek, irocktreefiddy, saiyanddrake, ladon_dracorex, and beakerfrog suggest that a proxy war in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or elsewhere is better than a nuclear war between Russia and the United States.

Nuclear deterrence is not premised on white supremacy. When it was developed by early deterrence theorists in the years and decades following World War II, it was designed as a way for the United States to deter the Soviet Union. American deterrence theory was certainly premised in anti-communism, but not racism. Knight’s willingness to assume she knows the motivation behind her TikTok detractors and then attribute her bias to the work of deterrence scholars and practitioners is lazy thinking.

Thus, Korea and Vietnam were divided between Soviet-backed communists and American-backed anti-communists at the end of World War II. It is therefore puzzling that Knight wants to eliminate nuclear weapons and make the world safe for great-power war again. Perhaps she is unfamiliar with the consequences of World War I and II. More than 180,000,000 people perished as a result of these wars and the communist regimes they precipitated. Careful analysis of the conflict in Vietnam, for example, illustrates that the fear of escalation to nuclear war led American, Chinese, and Russian leaders to show restraint and avoid World War III.

By constraining the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by both sides in Vietnam, lives were saved in Vietnam and elsewhere. It goes without saying that Korea and Vietnam were not divided because Caucasian communists and capitalists had racial animosity toward Asians. Let’s not forget that Germany was also divided by Americans and Soviets. A look at the borders between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact was largely a delineation between the countries liberated by the Soviets and those liberated by the Americans. The fight was never about race but about ideology. In all these cases, details matter—sweeping assertions do not.

Knight dismisses ample evidence from scholarly studies of the Berlin Airlift,  Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam Conflict, which show that a fear of escalation to nuclear war led to restraint; deterrence worked and World War III was avoided. Instead of challenging the work of historians with new scholarship, Knight suggests that deterrence theory is “hidden behind a thin veil of moral superiority that, when lifted, reveals white supremacy and racism.”

Rather than offering sound arguments to support her proposition that are based on supporting evidence, Knight relies on ad-hominem attacks against Caucasian males because they are today’s popular target; no evidence is required. As a female nuclear engineer about to defend my doctoral dissertation, I am thankful for the support and education given to me by my dissertation co-chairs, both heterosexual Caucasian men. Perhaps Knight should set aside her leftist advocacy and woke outrage and allow the facts to speak for themselves.

Any aspiring scholar or practitioner of nuclear deterrence must understand that the evidence will not always conform to your ideology. When it does not, it is not the facts that must change but your ideology.

The reality of nuclear deterrence is that the fear of escalation to nuclear war causes nuclear-armed adversaries to show restraint. We are seeing this very effect in the United States’ limited support for Ukraine right now.

Margaret Thatcher was right when she once said, “There are monuments to the failure of conventional deterrence in every village in Europe.” Perhaps Knight and her TikTok posse should remember that.

Robyn Hutchins is Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a PhD candidate in the Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering at Kansas State University. She previously spent time at several labs in the nuclear enterprise.