What Happened to Putin's Little Green Men?

Russia's massive offensive against Ukraine seems to have come off the rails. Prior to the invasion, virtually all the military experts predicted a swift and successful Blitzkrieg. The conventional wisdom was that the Russian military had all the advantages: numbers, technology, position, information dominance, tactics, and timing. This was based on the fact that the Russian military was coming off more than a decade of intensive modernization and had gained useful experience from various operations in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian hackers have been tramping through European and U.S. networks on the cyber front for years.

Russia made a point of using local forces as a cover behind which to conduct its conventional military operations. In the Donbas, Russian-backed forces demonstrated capabilities that proved a surprise to the U.S. military. In one instance, Russian forces employed a combination of electronic warfare (EW), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS), and long-range fires with precision-guided and special munitions to wipe out two Ukrainian Army battalions in a matter of minutes.

But Moscow's assault on Ukraine seems to contradict what we had anticipated about how a future high-end conflict with Russia would unfold. Moscow's vaunted information warfare capabilities have not served it well in light of the U.S. and European responses to Russian aggression. While there have been disagreements within and among Western governments and media circles over the conflict and how to deal with Russian tactics, there has not been the kind of internal disarray that many experts feared would occur.

Although information coming from Ukraine is often incomplete, it is clear—as the Director of National Intelligence recently observed—that the Russian military began operations with a defective plan, poorly trained forces, abysmal logistics, limited cyber operations, inadequate air support, insufficient precision munitions, and bad intelligence. What is particularly remarkable is that the Russian operation in Ukraine looks like a throwback to one by the Red Army of World War II. So too do the tactics which rely on frontal assaults, ponderous logistics, and extensive use of indirect fires.

What happened to Putin's Little Green Men, who were so effective in seizing Crimea in 2014? Other than reports of hit teams that failed to take out Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, there have been no reports of Spetsnaz, or the fifth column of Russian-speaking Ukrainians as an advance element, repeating the tactics used in the 2014 campaign, anywhere. This is despite Russia already having a foothold in Eastern Ukraine. Overall, Russia's Spetsnaz and airborne units have been largely absent from the battlefield, apart from a few reports of deep raids, which appear to have had limited success.

What about Russia's much-discussed cyber capabilities? Before the invasion, the consensus was that Russia would be able to take down Ukraine's network-dependent infrastructure like flipping a light switch, paralyzing both its government and military command and control. This has not happened. While there were reports of cyberattacks prior to the initiation of conventional hostilities, they were nowhere near as comprehensive or effective as many thought they would be. Putin has not been able to stop his own people from communicating their disapproval of him to the world.

Likewise, the Russian Air Force has not achieved air dominance. Ukrainian fighters and runway-based unmanned aerial vehicles were still flying more than two weeks after the war started. Some Ukrainian airfields have yet to be hit. In addition, some reports indicate the Ukrainian air defenses, particularly low-altitude systems such as U.S.-made Stingers, have been particularly effective against Russian strike aircraft and helicopters. Some Western experts have suggested that coordination between air and ground forces appears all but nonexistent.

At the same time, Russian forces appear to have been unprepared for Ukrainian forces’ effective use of drones. This suggests that the Russian military failed to learn some of the lessons of the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, notably the need for counter-UAS capabilities.

It also seems clear that the Russian military’s logistical plans for the war were inadequate. There is a string of reports of Russian forces running out of fuel, ammo, and food. In addition, the Russian Army created long columns of road-bound supply vehicles that were sitting ducks for Ukrainian forces.

Finally, it is evident that the Russian Army has lacked sufficient personnel for the magnitude of this operation. While it is not clear that Russia is actually recruiting Chechens and Syrians, it has called up reserves, and some sources have even spoken about a national mobilization.

What are the implications of what we see in Ukraine for the U.S. military and its efforts to prepare for the possibility of high-end conflict? One is the need for more air and missile defenses, including counter-UAS capabilities. In the intense air defense environment of future conflicts, NATO will need the F-35 more than ever, and the U.S. Army will require both of its new vertical lift platforms, FLRAA and FARA.

Another implication is the importance of logistics. For the U.S., this includes figuring out how to get equipment and supplies from CONUS to Europe and offloading material at protected airfields and ports. Yet another is the need to re-equip European forces with heavy armor, and the sale of 250 M1 Abrams to Poland is a good start.

Finally, it may be that Western cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive, maybe much better than those wielded by Russia. This could give the U.S. an important advantage in the long-term competition with Russia.

Dan Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Gouré has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.