Yes, the U.S. Can Afford To Deter a Nuclear War

As the security environment darkens across Eurasia, the U.S. defense establishment must prepare to meet the gathering storm. Despite the pervasive myth in Washington that fiscal realities call for restraint, America can afford to rise to the occasion and stave off mounting nuclear threats.

That growth will be necessary if the U.S. military hopes to remain competitive in today’s deteriorating security environment. China’s vast nuclear buildup, alongside Russia’s daily nuclear threats, means that the U.S. will soon face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers at once. And meeting this threat will require a defense budget that permits the simultaneous modernization of nuclear and conventional forces. 

As my contribution to Affording Defense underscores, there is a certain interdependence between nuclear and conventional deterrence. One cannot operate effectively without the other. And if one were to become the bill payer for the other’s reinforcement, it would only serve to weaken America’s overall deterrence. But by raising spending levels to those suggested in Affording Defense, the U.S. can finance the nuclear deterrent it needs even as it strengthens conventional forces.

What exactly would such a multi-theater nuclear force look like? Two upgrades in particular are required in the relative short term. First, a broader range of nuclear options is needed in the European and Asian theaters. The American posture in Europe is currently limited to dual-capable fighter aircraft stationed in countries far from the Russian border like Germany. This remoteness makes frontline allies like Poland anxious that they fall outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And in East Asia, the American posture is effectively bare, depending as it does on strike aircraft generated from the U.S. homeland or swung from Europe.

Forward-stationing nuclear-capable aircraft in Poland would soothe concerns among frontline allies and impress upon Moscow that Washington is firmly committed to NATO. And deploying nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles on stealthy attack submarines would impress upon China, Russia, and North Korea that a conventional war in their respective locales would still raise the risk of a prompt U.S. nuclear response.

Second, the U.S. needs to load additional warheads from the reserve stockpile on existing strategic missiles based in the American homeland. China’s rapid nuclear buildup means that those longer-range American forces won’t have the capacity to cover two nuclear peers at once. China and Russia must know, however, that they cannot coerce Washington into submission by threatening to cripple the U.S. strategic force.

Loading more warheads on existing land- and sea-based ballistic missiles would boost America’s targeting coverage while raising the threshold for a successful adversary attack. In the long run, the U.S. will also need to grow the planned fleet of strategic missile submarines from 12 to 14 (if not more) and expand the next-generation B-21 bomber program.

It goes without saying that these upgrades are not without cost. But as former Secretary of Defense and Affording Defense contributor James Mattis once quipped, America can afford survival.

The U.S. learned the hard way in World War II that preserving the peace is far cheaper than grinding out a war. After defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, it therefore resolved to bear the burden of a multi-theater military to ensure that the Cold War with the Soviets stayed cold. It is that hard-won struggle against Soviet Communism that yielded the unprecedented levels of peace and prosperity that Americans enjoy today.

The U.S. can choose to either relinquish global responsibilities as it did after the First World War or assume the burden of peace as it did after the Second. History—and Eaglen’s book—demonstrates that America can afford to make the right decision.

Kyle Balzer is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.