We have had the last seven Presidents advocate for either major reductions in nuclear weapons or their near abolition, but almost no analysis has been forthcoming as to what reductions have secured for U.S. security, and whether one should try practically to get to or toward abolition. When such an analysis is completed, the maze of contradictions in the arguments for complete abolition became apparent as does the troubling impact such abolition narratives have on the current nuclear strategic balance including arms reductions.

It is true that even before the use of atomic weapons against Japan ended World War II, there were those who wished nukes could be banned altogether. After August 1945, and absent abolition, there were calls for such weapons and all uranium mining and research to be controlled by a UN organization under what was known as the 1946 Baruch Plan. All nations would allow inspections by a UN authority to ensure nuclear activity was peaceful. The U.S. would unilaterally give up its nuclear capability while Russia promised they would do so some time in the future.

As America marks 250 years of independence and commemorates the 245th anniversary of the British surrender at Yorktown, that victory remains one of the Revolution’s clearest examples of a military success producing a decisive strategic outcome. It also offers a less obvious lesson for modern leaders thinking about war and strategy. Having several options on paper does not always mean having several independent ways forward.

Engineers face a similar problem when redundant systems that appear independent share the same vulnerability. Three backup generators may look reassuring until the same flood reaches all three. Each may work exactly as designed and still provide no real redundancy against that shared hazard. Engineers call the resulting loss of multiple systems from a shared cause a common-cause failure—a failure that can undermine the protection that redundancy is supposed to provide.