The Marines Must Think Bigger Than Small Units

An oft-cited military maxim holds that strategy without tactics is the slowest path to victory, while tactics without strategy is the noise before a defeat. This concept is discussed in the writings of respected commentators from Thucydides to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz and is presented as an enduring principle to students in our War Colleges to this day.  Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has allowed tactical thinking to cloud its strategic imperative.

Unfortunately, decisions taken several years ago by senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders to drastically reduce crisis response capabilities and allow the Marine Corps to unilaterally transform from a mobile, forward deployed, global crisis response force to a regional, static, redundant, missile force through a controversial effort dubbed “Force Design” have reduced the ability of U.S. Forces to maintain global deterrence.

The Marine Corps senior leadership has demonstrated a small unit focused, tactical perspective of warfighting.  For over six years, their focus has been on building tactical capability to field isolated and widely separated Stand-in Forces and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs).  The billpayers have been the combined arms Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs).   The 38^th and 39^th Commandants’ unwise “divest to invest” approach to transformation crippled combined arms.  The absorbed and narrow focus on the MEU robbed the MEBs and MEFs of the intellectual capital needed to invigorate and enable them as viable options for forceable entry and sustained operations.   

The small Stand-in Forces, as currently envisioned, are neither effective nor survivable inside contested areas during hostilities. To be blunt, these formations are aspirational and unwisely consume limited resources better spent on real innovation and relevant warfighting capabilities.  There is no viable means for positioning, repositioning, or logistically supporting these insignificant units now or in the future.  The missiles and missile launchers advertised as “ship killers” are long delayed and will probably never be fielded in the numbers requested. Even those fielded will only have a range of 162 nautical miles.  

The U.S. Navy has been a willing accomplice in the Marine Corps’ effort to redefine itself. The Navy’s underinvestment in maintenance for the amphibious fleet has left it unable to meet longstanding requirements to provide enough ships to maintain three forward deployed Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs).  MEUs are a potent and versatile tool that help establish and maintain regional deterrence and are the preferred crisis response capability of the Regional Combatant Commands. While self-contained and well equipped, they have limited sustainment and endurance. Unless quickly reinforced, these regimental-size units will quickly run out of “beans, band aids, and bullets.”  And that’s the dilemma - - from where does the rapid reinforcement come?  At one time, it could come from other forward deployed ARG/MEUs, surge forces dispatched on additional amphibious ships, maritime prepositioning ships and fly-in forces, and strategic airlift.  The Corps’ ability to provide this support has been dramatically reduced to fund other priorities. Seldom are two ARG/MEUs forward deployed simultaneously.  There is no amphibious ship surge capacity available today nor is any likely to be available for the next 10 years and beyond. The legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons with their brigade equipment sets and 30 days of combat sustainment have been reduced from three global squadrons of twenty ships to two squadrons of seven ships spread across the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. 

The ability for fly-in forces to marry up with Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) in forward operating areas, offload the ships, and reorganize for combat should not be taken for granted: it requires specialized training, detailed standard operating procedures, and close coordination between the Marines, Navy and Military Sealift Command.  The capability to build or composite from a MEU to a larger MEB and even larger MEF takes considerable training and frequent practice.  We see no indication today that either the Marines or Navy value MPS operations or compositing. 

Three MEUs continually forward deployed aboard amphibious shipping is not the Marine Corps “North Star,” as the Commandant is fond of saying. The true North Star of the Marine Corps is the rapidly tailorable Marine Air Ground Task Force, which can be task-organized for every crisis and contingency from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to major combat against a peer competitor.  Only a task-organized MEB or MEF has the organic combat power to fight in an expeditionary environment until the joint force or theater commander can establish the supply lines necessary to prosecute a campaign. If the Marines need a Stand-in Force or any other unique formation, they should task-organize it (vice purpose building it) with the guidance of the supported commander defining the requirement in accordance with longstanding practice.

Now is the time for strategy to take priority over tactics. The Marine Corps and Navy, working with a more engaged Congress, must commit the resources necessary to regenerate the nation’s amphibious force projection and maritime prepositioning capabilities and capacity. The Marine Corps must abandon the flawed reforms directed by Force Design that degraded the power of the Marine Air Ground Task Force to conduct full spectrum, combined arms combat operations anywhere, anytime, and against any enemy. The President and Secretary of War have articulated the requirement to generate forces and capabilities that enable the United States to compete and win the global competition in which we are committed. It is time to meet those requirements.

Anthony (Tony) Zinni is a retired U.S. Marine Corps general. He was a career infantry officer.  His assignments included Commander, United States Central Command and Commanding General, First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).

Jerry McAbee is a retired Marine Corps brigadier general.  He was a career artillery officer.  His assignments included Deputy Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command and Deputy Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Central Command.

Timothy (Tim) Wells is a retired Marine Corps colonel.  He was a career infantry officer.  His assignments included Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Marine Corps Forces Central Command during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center.