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Graham Warwick • Aviation Week

DARPA's Multifunctional Enhanced RF Systems Project

DARPA is seeking proposals to develop a prototype-staring, radio-frequency sensor that would cover a wide field of regard and large frequency range...

48mins agoRead it on Aviation Week
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48mins ago
Defense

We Keep Funding ‘Shared Infrastructure.’ Nobody Has Defined It.

Frederick Gale • RealClearDefense • November 18, 2026

A Patriot interceptor costs about $4 million. The Shahed drone it often gets fired at costs $20,000 to $50,000. In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has pushed the same math against the world’s most powerful navy, using lightly built fast-attack craft, mines, and fishing dhows rigged for minelaying. The U.S. degraded Iran’s conventional navy, and the strait stayed contested anyway. You can win the battle and lose the financial war.

Our defense industrial base still runs on a handful of large primes making Wunderwaffe. A growing startup scene, in autonomous platforms, is starting to buoy it. Excellence in small numbers becomes a weakness the moment a war runs long. Iran is showing it. The Pentagon’s own inspector general found that munitions spending in the war, which began in February, created inventory shortfalls and exposed bottlenecks in resupply that predate the conflict. Officials say we still have enough for current operations amidst a backdrop of yearslong deficits. Enough for now is not a plan.

48mins ago
Frederick Gale • RealClearDefense

We Keep Funding ‘Shared Infrastructure.’ Nobody Has Defined It.

A Patriot interceptor costs about $4 million. The Shahed drone it often gets fired at costs $20,000 to $50,000....

48mins agoRead it on RealClearDefense
1d ago
Defense

Can Commanders Tell When Artificial Intelligence Is Wrong?

Jonathan K. Corrado • RealClearDefense • November 17, 2026

In January, the Department of War directed the military to become an “AI-first” warfighting force. Its strategy included an initiative called Agent Network, intended to advance AI-enabled battle management and decision support from campaign planning to kill-chain execution.[1] The attraction is clear. A system that processes large amounts of information quickly could help commanders assess a changing situation and consider options while there is still time to act.

But an AI-generated recommendation can be wrong even when the software operates exactly as designed. A system may misinterpret a sensor report, rely on outdated information, or produce a plausible assessment from an incorrect assumption. The resulting recommendation may arrive faster than a staff could develop it and appear more certain than the evidence warrants.

1d ago
Jonathan K. Corrado • RealClearDefense

Can Commanders Tell When Artificial Intelligence Is Wrong?

The Pentagon needs to establish whether commanders and their staffs can identify those errors before acting on them....

1d agoRead it on RealClearDefense
2d ago
Ayeza Areej • RealClearDefense

Can Robots Bring Maneuver Warfare Back?

Kyiv’s Operation Vivaldi represents a transformative shift in the character of land warfare...

2d agoRead it on RealClearDefense
2d ago
Defense

Can Robots Bring Maneuver Warfare Back?

Ayeza Areej • RealClearDefense • November 16, 2026

In the Russia-Ukraine war, the persistent use of drones for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations has made it difficult to conceal concentrations of troops and vehicles, while the use of mines, electronic warfare, artillery and First-person-view (FPV) drones has made maneuvering on the battlefield increasingly dangerous and costly. Even ground robots, crossing several kilometers of open terrain, can be destroyed by an FPV or mine before accomplishing their mission. For many operations, getting to the target is the most costly and challenging phase of a mission.

Even the frontline itself is complex to define in real-time as both sides operate in a dense environment of drones and small, dispersed infantry units rather than along clearly established defensive lines. All these conditions have made the three elements of maneuver warfare—movement, concentration of force, and surprise—extremely difficult to achieve. Conventional forces attempting a breakthrough are exposed long before they reach their objective, and the result has been a largely positional war of attrition.

5d ago
Gleb Tsipursky • RealClearDefense

The Army’s AI Cyber Defenders Need a Proven Stand-Down Order

The Army’s October 13 push to develop three AI cyber-defense projects poses an operational question: what happens when a useful defender refuses to...

5d agoRead it on RealClearDefense
5d ago
Karl Horst • The Defense Post

The Operational Standard for Counter-Drone Procurement

The faster the Pentagon moves to acquire and replace capabilities, the more rigorously it must demonstrate that its decisions are justified by...

5d agoRead it on The Defense Post
5d ago
Stephen Clark • Ars Technica

Anduril Says Its First Satellite Can See Adversaries Maneuver in Orbital Night

“What’s unique is it’s got a huge dynamic range. We can see things in full dark.”...

5d agoRead it on Ars Technica