Conclude the Littoral Combat Ship Now

The USS Independence (LCS 2) makes a donut turn off the San Diego coast. (US Navy)

To its proponents, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is the surest way the Navy can maintain forward presence.  As such, the Navy had planned to build 52 Littoral Combat Ships.  But a recent classified memo issued by Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox directed the Navy to halt LCS production after 32 ships and begin development of a “more capable surface combatant,” most likely a frigate.

Based upon demonstrated performance and ship specifications, 32 is still too many.  The proper number should be about 20 ships concentrated on counter-piracy and drug control missions. Many such missions are now performed by other, more expensive ships or frigates nearing retirement.

Originally conceived as part of a package with a large destroyer that could operate independent of air cover, LCS has evolved into a multipurpose ship that does nothing very well. 

But the small LCS lived on despite huge cost overruns and delays. The ship was seen as a force builder.  But that needs to be reexamined given serious questions about its capabilities.

LCS was designed as a simple platform with flexibility to accommodate multiple payloads.  Modular system packages could be installed as needed for different mission sets, including anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures and surface warfare. There are better approaches to each of these domains, and more urgent (and limited) needs for the kind of capability the LCS provides.

The antisubmarine package faces a number of problems.  

ASW is not a part-time job, as proven by Cold War experience.  The concept of deployable modules requires operators to train with computer programs not reflecting the normal unstable acoustic condition. Mission module multitasking is a recipe for mediocrity, which the United States should not accept if expects to preserve undersea dominance.

LCS faces many other ASW challenges as well. Many submarines are not concentrated in the restricted littoral waters in which LCS operates. The ship has not been silenced, a necessary feature for maximizing detection ranges in either the active (pinging) mode or the passive listening mode. LCS sonar systems are inherently short-range systems, and the ship contains no anti-submarine weapons on board. Any weapon launch has to come from the onboard helicopters. Since sonar contacts can be fleeting due to sound transmission conditions, this would require a helicopter to be in the air at all times during contact prosecution. This is risky even if it is possible.

While many aspects of ASW are being addressed in submarine, air and fixed systems programs, the surface ship component is being relegated to the LCS solution. It’s time to reverse course. No Littoral Combat Ships should be purchased for this mission. 

But the worldwide increase in submarines needs to be addressed now. In particular, Asia has been the center of a killer submarine boom. American rivals China and Russia have each made significant submarine advances that could someday put America’s undersea advantage at risk. China’s submarine force is moving from regional to global as new strategic subs begin to sail far from its shores. Russia is introducing two new classes of submarines to its already advanced fleet, many of which will be focused on the Pacific. The U.S. Navy’s director of undersea warfare warned Congress late last year, “We have to continue to move or we do have the potential within 20 years of losing this crown jewel, this advantage that we have in the undersea domain.”

The Borei-class submarine is Russia’s first post-Soviet ballistic missile submarine class and will form the mainstay of the strategic submarine fleet. (RIA Novosti)

If America is to maintain its undersea advantage, it must have the full-spectrum of ASW capabilities, including a dedicated, blue water ASW ship built around the ASW systems and other ship system components common with Navy destroyers. Nothing less is likely to be successful.  

In order to investigate this possibility, a group consisting of two former Navy assistant secretaries responsible for managing the 1980s Navy expansion, former program managers of the DD963 and DDG programs, and technical experts in ship and combat systems convened to evaluate the possibility of acquiring a frigate size ship optimized for ASW.

The concept would be to use existing production items or those planned for the Flight II DDG. The ship would be built around the ASW sensor system, vertical launch missile system. It would be limited to local air defense and maximize commonality with other ship systems contained in the DDG. It would be in the 5000-6000 ton range, and powered by a single shaft line taken from the DDG program. Hull design would be one taken from the extensive inventory of efficient hull forms. Production would follow the efficient leader-follower program used in all recent destroyer and frigate programs.  Training and logistic support would be simplified by using DDG components and systems.

We concluded this program is readily achievable with the first ship available in seven years.  Cost in production would be comparable with the last guided missile frigates priced in today’s dollars or about $700 million after the lead ship.

Leave the Minesweeping to the Professionals

The LCS mine countermeasures (MCM) package has a set of different problems.  Most are unrelated to the ship, but deal with the inherent difficulty of finding mines and separating them from the rocks and trash normally found in coastal areas. Experience has shown that mine countermeasures are so difficult that specialized ships are needed resulting in wood or composite ships to minimize risk from magnetic influence mines often encountered in minefields. Technology has made great strides in providing remotely controlled detection and destruction methods, but current tests still show reliability problems. The Navy plans to conduct major tests of the MCM package in 2015. Even then, the magnetic signature of these ships (even the aluminum design) will place crews at risk since minefield location will never be clearly defined. 

For these reasons, no LCS ships should be procured for mine countermeasures, but a specialized ship designed to handle all the necessary equipment is in order. Based upon acquisition costs of two mine countermeasures ship classes purchased in the 1980s, this ship could cost less than half of an LCS.

LCS Can’t Fight Real Combat Ships, But Why Not Pirates?

Despite having a surface warfare package, the LCS is not a major surface combatant. To start with, if the other two mission modules are equipped, LCS is highly vulnerable to combat with other surface vessels. Even if the surface warfare package is on board, Pentagon weapons testers have concluded LCS is “not expected to be survivable in high-intensity combat.”

The LCS surface warfare package contains a 57mm main deck gun, twin 30mm Bushmaster cannons, and a MH-60R helicopter. It was originally planned to carry a surface-to-surface missile with a 25-mile range. Instead, LCS is equipped with the Griffin IIB missile with just a five mile range. Compare that with China’s similarly sized Type 056, whose anti-ship missiles have at least a 100-mile range.  A longer-range missile is not planned until at least 2019.

Chinese and U.S. Navy ships with anti-ship missile ranges. (Delex Systems, Information Dissemination)

Concerns about the lethality and survivability of the LCS are the primary reasons behind the Pentagon’s recent decision to cut back on the program.

Last week, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox took a not-so-subtle jab at the LCS saying, “Niche platforms that can conduct a certain mission in a permissive environment have a valuable place in the Navy’s inventory…[but] given more advanced anti-ship munitions being developed by potential adversaries, I believe it is an imperative to devote increasing focus and resources to the survivability of our battle fleet.” She added that Navy needs “more ships with the protection and firepower to survive against a more advanced military adversary.”

The LCS is not designed to be a major surface combatant, so let’s get past the rhetorical games of pretending it is. Yes, cut back on the LCS buy to free up more shipbuilding resources for a more lethal surface combatant. But it’s also time to recognize the value in the LCS’s true nature as a major patrol boat.

USS Freedom (LCS 1) in 2013. (US Navy)

Challenges to maritime control don’t just come from great power surface combatants. A few pirates nearly shut down commerce in the Gulf of Aden region a few years ago. Now piracy is moving to the area off Nigeria. It has been a longtime problem in the Straights of Malacca region. Controlling piracy is very important because it is reported to produce revenue supporting radical Islam and criminal elements. In areas off Florida and California drug smuggling traffic has been a major problem requiring Navy participation. Frigates have been used for this purpose, but they will soon be retired.

Either of the two LCS designs would make a perfect replacement.  Crew sizes are smaller.  Long-range weapons are not needed, but the 57mm gun combined with helicopter support provides overwhelming firepower and intimidation. The 40+knot speed will be useful against any choosing to attempt escape.  Hopefully all the engineering problems can be resolved, though these seem quite significant even for a new ship design.

How many are needed?  Consider an initial operational concept. Ships would operate from two US bases, Mayport, FL and San Diego, CA.  Deployable ships would be supported from a Mobile Logistics Platform or the Afloat Forward Logistics Base platform. Roughly five ships would be permanently based at each US port.  Deployable squadrons would include 3-4 ships and the support base ship. There would be 2-3 deployable squadrons.  The total would range between 16 and 22 Littoral Combat Ships needed for the low-end sea control mission. 

Additional ships would not be needed in the FY 2015 budget. Combined with assets from other countries or the Coast Guard, this should be adequate.

It is time to stop fooling ourselves by asking the Littoral Combat Ship to be something it’s not. Conclude the LCS now and let it go about the mission it’s truly designed for. And let the Navy move on to the design and construction of dedicated anti-submarine and mine countermeasure ships as well as a more lethal surface combatant. 

Everett Pyatt is the Leader of the Project for Defense Management and Acquisition Leadership at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University. He is formerly Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Acquisition Executive.