China and Russia Expand Strategic Cooperation in Arctic Against West

Executive Summary:

Over the last decade, China’s role in the circumpolar North has grown rapidly, something Russia simultaneously welcomes and fears. On the one hand, Moscow welcomes Beijing’s growing presence, as it bolsters Moscow’s support in the region and compensates for the shift of resources to its war in Ukraine. Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic Council was suspended, further isolating Russia (see EDM, September 28, 2023, September 5). On the other hand, Russian officials fear the possibility that, over time, China will push Russia aside in the Arctic and become the predominant power. This development would contradict the Kremlin’s thinking about Russia’s proper role in the world (see EDM, June 12, 2019, May 6, 2021, February 1, 2022, April 4, 2023). Until recently, these conflicting calculations explained why talks between the two on the Arctic were cautious for so long.

The meeting and the agreement it produced  built on a number of developments in recent months. These include a series of high-level bilateral meetings, joint Chinese-Russian naval exercises in the Northern Pacific, Beijing’s increasing involvement in the Northern Sea Route and resource sites, (such as lithium at its Western end), and even promises that Chinese ships would take part in Russia’s Ocean 2024 exercises (though these promises were not kept) (The Barents Observer, August 29, September 9, 17;  SCMP, September 9; WindowonEurasia2.blogspot.com, September 13).

China shows little signs of slowing its advance into the Arctic and Russia appears willing to continue to welcome an expansion in China’s role. This will likely remain the case for, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues and relations with the West remain in a deep freeze.The fact that China did not send ships to take part in Russian naval exercises in the Northern Atlantic in August as it had previously promised suggests there are limits to its willingness to exacerbate tensions with the West. This is despite the apparent importance of the exercises to Putin personally, who attended the exercises’ opening.  As such, it would be a mistake to think that the new agreement has eliminated each side’s concerns, however. Differences across the broad relationship are likely to have uneven impacts on relations between Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic and elsewhere; and Western powers will need to navigate this minefield so as to not threaten Western interests in the Arctic region.

Fissures in the relationship could be exploited by Western actors. Pointing out tensions and mistrust between China and Russia are important both tactically and strategically in countering the countries’ emerging but still fragile Chinese-Russian partnership. Both parties are ready to make use of each other, but are concerned that they will be exploited if given the chance. For instance, Russia will not tolerate being marginalized while China becomes the dominant player in lithium mining in Murmansk oblast or in shipping in the NSR. Neither will Beijing accept Russia failing to recognize its growing power and seeing it as the junior partnership in the relationship.  

The two countries are also far apart in how they think. Russian thinking, especially under Putin, is short-term. The current Kremlin leader may not now be looking beyond the war in Ukraine and thus is prepared to provoke conflicts that might help his cause in the short term but could prove disastrous in the long term. The leadership in Beijing has tended to think in longer time horizons. Henry Kissinger famously recounted a story about Zhou Enlai, the former Premier of the People’s Republic of China, who claimed that it was “too soon to tell” what the effects of the French political tumult in the 1960s were. The story captures something that many in the West have forgotten. In contrast to Russia, China may be quite prepared to back away now if it thinks it will be advantageous in the long term. This suggests that there is an opportunity for the West to focus on keeping China from going too far in supporting Russia, provided China sees that as a means of achieving more later. If the West does not consider China’s long-term goals, it may have fewer chances of changing Chinese behavior—an approach that will drive Beijing into Moscow’s arms.  

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.