History Shows Wagner's Mutiny Was Just the Beginning

The Prigozhin Mutiny of June 23-24, 2023, and its aftermath still mystifies many observers of Russia and many Russians themselves. On one hand, the Kremlin is purging Russian military officers suspected of disloyalty during the coup. Conversely, despite a media campaign to discredit him, Prigozhin remains free and reportedly even met with Putin just days after Wagner’s march on Moscow. For many Russians, it is inexplicable that Putin negotiated with a putschist yet arrested military officers who may have had only tangential involvement in the event. To them, this makes Putin look both weak and fearful. What can we make of these events and are there precedents to help us decipher what may come next?

While the circumstances of Prigozhin’s sortie differ from Kornilov’s, once again in Russian history, a military force attempted to march on the capital in wartime for a political objective.

For Prigozhin, once he realized that military and security leaders (the Siloviki) would not defect to his Quixotic quest, he had to stop his march and accept the reality of the correlation of forces between Wagner and the Kremlin. Having taunted the military for months, this should not have been unexpected. What defeated Prigozhin was not unconditional Siloviki support of Putin, but their near total loathing of him and Wagner.

Numerous conspiracy theories swirl around Prigozhin’s Mutiny just as they still do about the Kornilov Affair. The best way to analyze them is to apply the Qui Bono (who benefits) principle.

In official Russia, no one has benefitted making this less likely a conspiracy and more likely a train wreck of passions and misjudgments.

Prigozhin has lost his media empire and his future (along with Wagner’s) is at best "uncertain." Russia’s war in Ukraine has lost one of its few capable fighting forces at a time such forces are desperately needed. Putin may appear to be in fuller control after suppressing a threat to his rule. However, his authority was weakened by Wagner’s revolt and the need for an outside figure (President Lukashenko of Belarus) to ostensibly stop it. Moreover, Putin is now dependent on those who supported him against Prigozhin (and aware that many others stood on the sidelines waiting to see the outcome).

One dilemma for Putin is what to do with Prigozhin’s “overseas possessions,” especially in Sudan and the Central African Republic, where gold smuggling provides considerable wealth to the Kremlin kleptocracy. Will Wagner's lucrative overseas contracts go to the military, the intelligence services, or a favored Kremlin oligarch-courtier who creates a new private military shell company? Putin’s ability to arbitrate Russia's spoils system, the key to his power, may no longer be as definitive as it once was because of his new dependence on the forces that remained loyal (for now). Furthermore, if Wagner's overseas operations remain in Prigozhin’s hands, then Putin will incur the enmity of those expecting to obtain those riches plus those angered that Prigozhin remains alive while military leaders are purged or imprisoned. A lack of consequences for Prigozhin may embolden others to settle scores via armed rebellion, and those angered by the military purges may not be so loyal the second time around.

If that is the case, then Prigozhin’s Mutiny will be best understood not as an updated Decembrist Uprising but as a modern-day Kornilov Affair meaning this may not be the last challenge to Putin especially if Russia's war in Ukraine deteriorates further.