Russia Strengthens ASEAN Nuclear Ties

On October 15–17, on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Energy Business Forum (AEBF) in Malaysia, Russian state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on nuclear energy cooperation with ASEAN Centre for Energy (Rosatom; TASS, October 21).[1] Until now, most Russian nuclear engagements in Southeast Asia have been bilateral in nature. This MoU marks the most tangible step thus far toward broader institutional cooperation, as envisioned in the Russia–ASEAN Comprehensive Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership for the period 2021–2025 (President of Russia; ASEAN, October 28, 2021).  

Rosatom’s intentions may be strategic, but ASEAN members appear to be aligning with Russia for practical reasons. ASEAN Secretary-General H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn has stated that collaboration with Russia, particularly in civilian nuclear energy, supports ASEAN’s energy security, economic resilience, and sustainability as the region’s energy demand continues to rise (ASEAN, February 19). Hourn said this during the opening of an exhibition on the prospects for Russia–ASEAN nuclear cooperation at the organization’s headquarters in Jakarta earlier this year (Mission of the Russian Federation to ASEAN, February 18). 

Civilian nuclear energy is a crucial component of the energy transition and energy security objectives outlined in ASEAN’s Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016–2025 (ASEAN, 2016). Electricity demand across ASEAN is on track to triple by 2050—from 1,200 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2022 to 4,300 TWh in 2025 (Energy for Growth, June 30). Many ASEAN member states consider nuclear energy to be a viable low-carbon solution to meet that demand (ASEAN Hub, September 10). 

For ASEAN member states interested in nuclear energy, the options Russia offers are more feasible and accessible than those provided by the West, and even the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the immediate term. Most ASEAN members are interested in SMRs or floating NPPs rather than conventional NPPs. This places Rosatom in a position to gain an advantage over other potential vendors, as it was the first to operate a commercial floating SMR, and it is on track to become the first country to export an SMR after signing an agreement with Uzbekistan in 2024 (Rosatom, June 2024; Kun.uz, September 11, 2024). Other SMR options are not yet commercialized for export. The PRC’s Linglong is the first commercial land-based SMR (Global Times, October 16). It was expected to enter commercial operation in late 2025, but testing is still underway, and it is unclear if this goal will be met (Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), October 24). CNCC has partnered with ASEAN member states in the past to introduce nuclear and radiation technologies for medical, agricultural, and environmental applications (Nation Thailand, August 18, 2024). The PRC has, however, yet to move beyond the discussion phase and complete any agreements for nuclear energy capabilities with ASEAN member states (CNNC, September 19, 2023; Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development, accessed November 4). Beyond Russia and the PRC, European, Canadian, and U.S. SMR construction projects are mostly in the design, site assessment, or licensing phases (Nuclear Engineering International, June 4, October 28; World Nuclear News, August 6, August 21, October 28; Canada Energy Regulator, August 20; Ansaldo Energia, September 16; European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, 2025). 

Political and legal obstacles remain in ASEAN–Russia nuclear cooperation. Western sanctions do not currently prohibit civilian nuclear cooperation with Rosatom. A number of its senior personnel and subsidiaries, however, have been directly sanctioned (U.S. Department of State, January 10). This includes Rosatom’s Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions, Andrey Nikipelov, who jointly hosted the session at the ASEAN AEBF, where the MoU was signed (Rosatom, October 21; Nuclear Asia, October 31; Companies House; Office of Foreign Assets Control; U.K. Sanctions List, accessed November 1). 

Further complicating ASEAN–Russia nuclear cooperation is the divergence in ASEAN member states’ positions toward Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ASEAN itself has not condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, instead expressing deep concern and attempting to remain somewhat neutral (ASEAN, February 26, 2022). Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines have directly condemned Russia and, along with Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, and Thailand, voted in favor of Russia withdrawing all military forces from Ukraine at the UN General Assembly in 2022 (European Union External Action, March 2, 2022; CamNess, March 28, 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, June 16, 2024; Manila Bulletin, March 2). Laos and Vietnam abstained. Singapore has gone so far as to impose its own sanctions on Russia (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 2022; Vedomosti, April 4). 

Rosatom’s stance toward Southeast Asia suggests a Kremlin-directed strategy to position itself as a necessary partner in the region’s long-term energy needs. The states in this region are left with few nuclear-related options to resolve their immediate-term energy needs without Russia, while also attempting to balance their commitments to a clean energy transition and energy security. This makes ASEAN a prime environment for Russia, via Rosatom, to ensure its indispensability to the global nuclear industry. The more Russia is able to do this, the more difficult it becomes to place meaningful pressure on the Kremlin through sanctions.

Dr. Anna J. Davis is an expert on nuclear policy and international relations, with a focus on the Eurasia region and the Arctic. She is a Fellow and Contributing Editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor at the Jamestown Foundation, Tutor at the University of Oxford, and Director of Sefton Analytics.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Note:

[1] ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization established in 1967, which now includes a total of eleven member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and  Timor-Leste (East Timor) (ASEAN, October 26).

2025 Russia-ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation

Brunei

Brunei is “carefully exploring” nuclear energy for energy security and economic growth, but has yet to begin any substantive initiatives (International Atomic Energy Agency, September 17).

Cambodia 

Cambodia has held discussions with both Russia and the PRC (Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development, accessed November 4). On September 19, Rosatom and Cambodia signed an intergovernmental agreement on nuclear energy cooperation (Rosatom, September 19).

Indonesia

In September, Rosatom and Indonesia’s PLN Nusantara Power signed an MoU to conduct a feasibility study on NPP construction (Rosatom, September 26).

In November, during a visit to Indonesia ordered by Putin, Russian Maritime Board Chairman Nikolai Patrushev suggested that Indonesia consider Rosatom’s SMR technology (Interfax, November 5). Patrushev’s delegation included representatives from Rosatom and Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade.

Laos

In July, Rosatom and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) signed a nuclear energy roadmap for the period 2025–2026 (RIA Novosti, July 31). Putin described the roadmap as the “basis for providing the Lao economy with cheap and environmentally friendly energy” (Interfax, July 31).

Malaysia

In June, a Malaysian delegation expressed an interest in Rosatom’s nuclear technology and floating NPPs after visiting the Leningrad NPP and ATOM Museum in Moscow (TASS, June 27). A month prior, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev claimed that Rosatom had offered to construct an NPP in Malaysia (Interfax, May 14). 

Myanmar

In September, on the sidelines of World Atomic Week in Moscow, Myanmar and Russia signed a roadmap for nuclear energy cooperation in the period 2025–2026 (see EDM, September 19). The roadmap includes the implementation of a construction project for an SMR NPP. It builds on an SMR cooperation agreement signed earlier in the year (RIA Novosti, TASS, September 26). 

Philippines

During a joint Russian–Philippine commission on trade and economic cooperation in September, Rosatom expressed its interest in offering the Philippines an agreement on constructing SMRs and floating NPPs (TASS, September 19).

Singapore

Singapore has expressed interest in adopting nuclear energy, primarily focusing on SMRs, but it has not agreed with any potential vendors. It was included among the countries that signed a 123 Agreement with the United States. The agreements reference Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement before any significant nuclear material or equipment can be transferred from the United States (U.S. Department of Energy, July 11). Other ASEAN states that signed a 123 Agreement with the United States are Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam (U.S. Department of Energy, July 11).

Timor-Leste (East Timor)

Timor-Leste (East Timor) is ASEAN’s newest member state with no concrete plans for nuclear energy development (ASEAN, October 26).

Thailand

Thailand’s energy strategy aims to commission its first experimental SMR by 2037, and the country is interested in Russian technologies (Bangkok Post, June 20, 2024; Thai Times, October 20). In September, Rosatom’s Director General of its International Network said that the corporation has been discussing such possibilities with Thailand (Interfax, September 4).

Vietnam

On the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, Vietnam and Russia agreed to accelerate their plans to construct the first NPP in Vietnam, Ninh Thuận-1  (TASS, October 27). The Ninh Thuận-1 NPP project was suspended in 2016 due to financing issues and insufficient electricity demand, as well as delays resulting from the 2011 Fukushima NPP disaster (Nuclear Engineering International, November 15, 2016). The Vietnamese government announced the project’s restart in 2024, emphasizing the need to ensure the country’s energy security (The Saigon Times, November 25, 2024; Government News; VNExpress, November 30, 2024).