
Time To End New Start
Last updated 07:15 AM EDT • Read time: 5m
Various analysts and arms control proponents are salivating over President Trump’s recent comment that Vladimir Putin’s proposal to extend the numerical limits of the New START arms control treaty for one year after its formal expiration next February “sounds like a good idea.” Arms control advocates see New START—the last remaining strategic nuclear arms control treaty still in force—as a necessary brake on a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control and lead to massive increases in nuclear weapons. Even foreign governments are urging Trump to agree to Putin’s proposal and to negotiate further arms reductions. For example, the Austrian Foreign Ministry stated, “We welcome the readiness by Russia & the U.S. to adhere to the New START limits for a year after expiry. More nuclear weapons won’t make anyone safer – neither the U.S., nor Russia nor the rest of the world. Let us use this time to get to deeper cuts through a new agreement.”
Such thinking is misplaced and naïve. It ignores the lessons of history, the extensive record of Russian arms control cheating, the disparity in Russian and U.S. nuclear modernization programs, and the wildly divergent strategic goals and objectives of both sides. The New START Treaty is not in America’s national security interest and President Trump should kill it or at least let it die a natural death.
Here is why proponents of extending the treaty are mistaken. First, the treaty was negotiated 15 years ago when the relationship between Russia and the United States was thought to be improving. That world no longer exists. Since then, Russia has illegally annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, signed a “no limits” friendship treaty with China, expanded military cooperation with North Korea and Iran, launched aerial incursions into NATO airspace, upgraded its existing nuclear arsenal, developed more modern and exotic nuclear weapons unrestricted by any arms control agreement, and brandished nuclear threats against the United States, NATO, and Ukraine. Clearly, Russian actions belie Putin’s expressed desire to avoid “steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.”
Second, Russia has been violating the treaty for years. Despite President Biden agreeing in 2021 to extend the treaty for five years, Moscow ceased allowing mandatory inspections required by New START in 2022, effectively eviscerating the transparency and predictability that the treaty was intended to guarantee. In 2023, Russia officially “suspended” its participation in the treaty. Moscow has armed some of its bombers with long-range cruise missiles, refusing to count them as strategic systems even though the treaty makes them legally accountable. This places Russia above the New START limits. And there is mounting evidence of other Russian missile and warhead deployments that exceed allowable New START levels. It makes no sense to extend the numerical limits of a treaty when the other party is a serial violator of it.
Third, Moscow has been engaged in a massive, across-the-board nuclear modernization program that has resulted in the deployment of an up-to-date, sophisticated nuclear arsenal and has used coercive nuclear threats to deter the United States and NATO from providing more robust support to Ukraine. Early last year, Putin declared Russia’s strategic modernization efforts to be 95 percent complete. By contrast, the U.S. nuclear modernization program has been long delayed and is under constant siege by those who support an anti-nuclear, pro-disarmament agenda. Moreover, virtually all U.S. nuclear forces are accountable under New START while thousands of Russian nuclear warheads are unconstrained by the agreement. Given this gross asymmetry, the assertions of arms control advocates that New START is necessary to cap the “arms race” lacks credibility when only one side—Russia—is racing.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, arms control treaties cannot address the profound underlying political differences that define the U.S.-Russian relationship. The United States has looked to arms control in general, and New START in particular, to enhance strategic stability. Yet, Russia is not interested in preserving the stability of a world in which the United States is the dominant power. Indeed, Russia is seeking to overturn the existing world order and displace the United States as the predominant global power. Putin himself has declared that “a serious, irreconcilable struggle is unfolding for the development of a new world order.” Under these conditions, where the strategic goals and objectives of the parties are intractably at odds, the belief that arms control can benefit U.S. national security interests is wishful thinking at best and dangerous naivete at worst.
The New START Treaty is a relic of a bygone era, and its expiration should be welcomed, not lamented. In light of Russia’s massive nuclear weapons buildup, violations of New START, frequent coercive nuclear threats, and desire to overturn the existing U.S.-led world order, Washington should move expeditiously to strengthen its deterrent by fully modernizing its own ageing nuclear arsenal and deploying a robust Golden Dome missile defense system to protect the American people in the event deterrence fails.
After Biden extended New START, Putin suspended it. President Trump should not make the same mistake. The president should rethink his initial reaction to Putin’s “good idea” and just say “nyet.” It is time to end New START.
James H. Anderson & David J. Trachtenberg both served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the first Trump Administration.

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