America's Allies Are More Dependent on Washington Than Ever Before

At the latest G-7 summit in Japan, President Biden signaled he would allow Ukrainian pilots to be trained on American-made F-16 fighter jets, moving toward permitting other countries to transfer the planes to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. It was the latest in a series of policy decisions his administration has made this spring to apparently bolster America’s international partners as they face potential threats.

Washington’s alliance network is often praised for ostensibly helping to strengthen America’s global influence, to enhance U.S. credibility, and to reduce the costs incurred for accomplishing national foreign policy objectives.

American partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific initially reacted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by pledging to rapidly increase their defense spending and expand their military capacities, but over a year later, there is little evidence this has occurred.

Three days after the invasion began, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, Europe’s wealthiest country, proclaimed a Zeitenwende in German defense policy and committed 100 billion euros to significantly expand Germany’s military budget. Yet since then, Berlin has slowly backtracked on this commitment for several reasons: Russia poses a much more limited threat to European security than initially feared and Washington has sent additional U.S. troops to Europe and provided the bulk of military aid to Ukraine.

In fact, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has laid bare the shocking state of U.S. allies’ defense capabilities. Germany, for instance, only has enough ammunition stocks for a few days of combat. The German military possesses 300 coveted Leopard 2 tanks, but less than half are serviceable. Spain has a similar number of Leopard tanks, but over one-third of them are combat ineffective or in disrepair.

Europeans’ artillery reserves are not much better and are being greatly depleted by supporting Ukraine. France, for example, has sent more than one-third of its artillery pieces to Ukraine while Denmark has nearly donated its entire arsenal. There are also scarce supplies of gunpowder, plastic explosives, and TNT throughout the European Union due to underinvestment, hobbling the EU’s ability to scale up defense production and replenish these stockpiles. This has left the United States in a position where it continues to backstop its rich European partners.

America’s Indo-Pacific allies are similarly accustomed to Washington’s protection. South Korea, for instance, invests a considerable amount in its defense at nearly 3 percent of its GDP, but Seoul’s military strategy is premised upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella safeguarding it from a North Korean assault or invasion. As Pyongyang further develops its nuclear capabilities, South Korea’s defense posture indicates Seoul expects Washington to come to its aid in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Australia and Japan, two important U.S. allies which are members of the Quad, also rely on American largesse. The Australian military is modern and well-equipped, but it is small and the country lacks a self-sufficient defense industrial base. Canberra is massively dependent on U.S. munitions production, leaving it vulnerable in a military conflict. At the same time, Japan is the third-wealthiest nation in the world, but consistently fails to boost its defense spending due to its generous security alliance with the United States.

Washington is not blameless for this state of affairs. For decades, it has called on U.S. allies to sustain greater shares of the defense burden while largely neglecting to take concrete actions to make this happen. This has helped allow other countries to become dependent on American military protection while letting their own defense capabilities atrophy.

The United States must begin to end this dependency by taking steps to shift the defense burden to its allies. Burden shifting is often dismissed by many analysts in Washington because they argue it is risky, would save little money, and could sever important ties between America and its overseas partners.

These concerns are exaggerated. The United States cannot confront its main adversaries indefinitely while Washington’s international allies are affluent enough to provide for their own defense. For starters, retooling U.S. defense commitments by drawing down American forces stationed in wealthy allied nations would help enable burden shifting and permit Washington to redirect its limited resources toward core national security objectives, such as completing the pivot to Asia.

If Washington truly wishes to have a robust global alliance network, it must take tangible actions to create more balanced and sustainable international partnerships that prioritize core U.S. national interests. Having capable allies is a necessary foundation for promoting a safe and peaceful world. 

Grant Golub is an Assistant Professor of American History at the U.S. Army War College and a Non-Resident Fellow at Defense Priorities. His views are his own and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.