An Independent Air Force: Problem Solver or Problem?
Published March 10, 2015 • Read time: 21m
(Editor’s Note: The below is a lightly edited excerpt from the book Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force which has just been released in paperback.)
Bureaucracy may be boring, but it matters for policy. The modern state has grown into a vast collection of bureaucratic institutions, each tasked with certain critical jobs. Inside and outside the state, individuals, interest groups, and bureaucratic organizations strive against one another for influence and resources. In the United States, Congress, the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the various organs of the intelligence community, and each of the military services contributes to national security policy. The arrangement of these organizations matters for how the policymaking process plays out.
While the fundamental purpose of foreign policy and military organizations is to disarm enemies, deter aggressors, safeguard commerce, pierce the fog of war, and defend whatever other interests are deemed crucial to national survival and prosperity, each organization sees the world in a particular way, and each tends to seek to maximize its own influence and autonomy. The importance of specific organizations for policy often depends on the personality and background of the executive as well as the relationships between major policymakers. However, the simple fact of an organization’s existence can grant it a “seat at the table,” through which it can have an impact on policy. Institutional design thus privileges certain foreign policies and forms of war at the expense of others. Organizations working together suffer from what Clausewitz terms “friction,” the inability of the component parts to function together seamlessly.
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The American system for managing airpower is best described as the result of evolution rather than intelligent design. When the air force left the army in 1947, the services tried to settle the distribution of air capabilities between them. However, changes in technology, not to mention bureaucratic turf fights, have caused extensive changes over the years, changes often resolved by political power rather than careful analysis.
The themes of organizational conflict and airpower culture have played out in the recent history of U.S. airpower cooperation. While airpower parochialism may seem a theme of the distant past (dead arguments by dead men), the organizational structure of the U.S. military continues to support a vision of airpower that creates substantial problems for U.S. war fighting, procurement, and international influence.
The Justifications for Air Force Independence
Air force independence was controversial from the start. The appendix of a British Air Ministry memorandum of June 1921, entitled “Some Arguments for and against a Separate Air Force,” detailed seven arguments against independence. In this section, I boil these arguments down to five rationales for air force independence. Some of these rationales speak directly to the idea of an independent air force, while others justify bureaucratic division in a more general sense. The most important rationales for air force independence are that operations in different media require different services (the division between earth, air, and water means that we need three services); that service differentiation should depend on the ability to plan and conduct independent campaigns; that the need for redundancy in critical capabilities should guide division of service responsibilities; that states should follow the leaders, looking for international cues regarding how to organize their defense establishments; and that national and organizational tradition should inform service divisions. In this section I examine all of these rationales, arguing that none can fully justify the existence of independent air forces.
The Medium Makes the Service
Airpower advocates have long argued that the medium of the air requires a different set of professional and strategic skills than the media of land or sea. There is much to recommend this argument. Military professionals specializing in air operations do indeed require different skills than artillery officers in the army or submarine officers in the navy. Maintenance and procurement of equipment also depend on knowledge of the technical details of flying. Pilots have a better sense of what makes an aircraft or weapon effective than a soldier who has never flown.
However, airpower advocates take this argument too far. First, every modern military service includes a number of jobs that require distinct professional skills. For example, the submariner in the U.S. Navy cannot easily transfer to the surface fleet without considerable training. Armor officers in the army have different skills than infantry or artillery officers. These officers are capable of working in the same service because while their professional and technical skills differ, their military skills are compatible and substantially similar.
Independent armies and navies arose during a period (the age of sail) in which the difference between naval and military professionalism was at its zenith. Skills useful for naval warfare were not useful for land warfare and vice versa. In the modern context, this is less true. The advance of technology has universalized the military skill set even as it has led to a profusion of specialized technical professions under the military rubric. Individual military officers will differ widely in terms of their vocational expertise, but they generally share a similar set of professional military skills, which involve a mastery of systems of military thinking and analysis. In the terminology of Sam Huntington, professional military officers all share a relationship with the state, with enlisted personnel, and with one other. “Joint” service requirements in the U.S. military after Goldwater-Nichols have reinforced this shared sense of military professionalism.
Mission Autonomy
The most common, and most important, justification for air service independence elevates the concept of mission autonomy. Under this logic, military services derive their independence from the ability to plan and conduct major campaigns according to their own strategic conceptions. The infantry branch of the U.S. Army cannot wage war on its own but requires the close cooperation of armor, artillery, and a variety of other suborganizations in order to do its job. An air force, on the other hand, can conceptualize war independent of the projection of land power, just as a navy can develop a campaign that never touches the shore. At the borders these distinctions break down (an air force requires land bases that require land defense, for example), but the mission justification nevertheless provides some traction on the question of whether a particular military subunit deserves full autonomy.
The logic of mission autonomy was used widely during the interwar period to defend RAF independence and to advocate USAF independence. Strategic bombing does not simply promise to end wars with a minimum of fuss and muss; it allows an air force to plan and conduct a full campaign without more than cursory use of either army or navy assets. Airpower advocates such as Billy Mitchell, Giulio Douhet, and Hugh Trenchard insisted repeatedly on the necessity for independent air forces to plan and wage strategic bombing campaigns in order to win wars. Moreover, they contended that as long as airpower was subjected to the parochial interest of army and naval officers, the doctrine and equipment necessary for truly independent, decisive, war-winning strategic campaigns would not be available.
Justification of service independence in terms of mission creates at least two problems. First, when the independence of an organization depends on its ability to develop its own autonomous capabilities and doctrine, it has little incentive to work with other organizations on missions that may require joint action. Unsurprisingly, airpower advocates focused on strategic bombing (a mission requiring minimal collaboration with land or sea assets) tended to neglect missions that did require cooperation with military and naval organizations. Second, as technology developed in ways that failed to conform to organizational roles, the walls that exist between military organizations tended to become confused. The development of ballistic missiles, for example, left the three U.S. services at a loss as to responsibility. The U.S. military as attempted to address these issues through a series of ad hoc agreements between the services and finally through the legislative hammer of “jointness,” an effort to force the military organizations to work more closely with one another in the wake of failures in Iran and Grenada. Jointness became an important objective of U.S. military policy after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Organizational Redundancy
Organizational redundancy represents another justification for air force independence. The organizational redundancy argument calls for embedding key capabilities in several different military organizations in order to avoid failure. Military organizations fail all the time for a variety of reasons. Some choose poor equipment, others have destructive internal conflicts, and yet others have made improper doctrinal decisions. Embedding a key war-fighting capability in only a single organization runs the risk of national disaster. Daniel Drezner makes a case for the redundancy argument in the context of terrorism:
Say a single bureaucracy is tasked with intelligence gathering about threat X. Let’s say this bureaucracy represents the best of the best of the best—the A-Team. The A-Team does its job and catches 95% of the emergent threats from X. That’s still 5% that is missed. Now say you have another independent bureaucracy with a similar remit. This agency is staffed by different people with their own set of blind spots. Let’s even stipulate that we’re talking about the B-team here, and they’ll only catch 80% of the emergent threats from X.
If these two bureaucracies are working independently—and this is an important if—then the odds that a threat would go unobserved by both bureaucracies is .05*.2 = .01 = 1%. So, by adding another bureaucracy, even a less competent one, the chances of an undetected threat getting through are cut from 5% to 1%.
This argument has some evidentiary support. In the Vietnam War, the U.S. Air Force proved inadequate at the tasks of air mobility, close air support, and air superiority. Naval, Marine, and army aviation helped fill this gap. Naval aviation proved more adept at fighting North Vietnamese air assets than its air force counterparts. Marine aviation concentrated on the provision of close air support to Marines engaged in direct combat. Army aviation proved very innovative in bringing the helicopter both to the close air support and air mobility missions.
However, the argument also poses some logical challenges. As justification for an independent air force, the redundancy argument does not discriminate between a single independent air arm and air assets spread across several organizations. In the Korean War, the smaller air assets controlled by the army, navy, and Marine Corps successfully remedied air force inadequacy by concentrating on missions specific to their organizational responsibilities. Moreover, many critical assets do not benefit from any kind of organizational redundancy. The United States has not seen fit to equip its Coast Guard with submarines in order to guard against the failure of the USN. On land, the USMC and the U.S. Army do enjoy some degree of organizational redundancy, but this relationship has not always worked to the benefit of doctrine. Some historians argue, for example, that collaboration with the U.S. Army in Vietnam actively made the USMC worse at its job. Finally, the redundancy argument runs up against a concrete fiscal problem. Each redundant capability increases cost, not simply in the capability itself but also in the administrative and organizational structure needed to maintain the capability. Moreover, every organization created on the behalf of redundancy adds another bureaucratic actor lobbying for funds and for a piece of the wartime action.
Institutional Isomorphism
While the precise division of responsibilities between organizations varies across the world, no observer can miss a considerable degree of similarity in global military establishments. Virtually every country in the world operates according to a similar set of ranks and with similarly sized units. Variation notwithstanding, the world’s 182 countries do not have 182 separate and distinct military systems. Rather, military organizations come to resemble each other in form and structure over time. Organizational theorists refer to this phenomenon as institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism happens for two reasons. First, the dangers of the international system can force all states to evolve in a particular direction. In order to survive, states need armies and these armies perform well when they have certain characteristics. This is the neorealist logic for isomorphism: states trying to survive will become functionally similar. An alternative logic for isomorphism is known as “world society.” Operating according to a sociological logic, the world society argument suggests that there are templates of “appropriateness” that states take into account when designing their institutions. Why does virtually every state have a navy, including landlocked countries? Because global norms of appropriateness suggest that modern, legitimate nation-states have navies, even if they cannot use them. In the context of this argument, states create independent air forces because other states have independent air forces.
This argument both explains the existence of independent air forces and provides a reason for creating such an organization. If the United Kingdom has an independent air force, airpower advocates in the United States can point to the “successful” example of British military power, arguing that the United States risks being left behind if it lacks such a force. During the cold war, the Soviet Union and the United States sometimes created “mirror image” institutions out of competitive concern. Similarly, when postcolonial states achieve their independence, they take cues from modern, wealthy, successful states regarding how to structure their military organizations. For example, India and Pakistan adopted military structures substantially similar to that of the United Kingdom because of the heritage of British colonialism. The creation of the Royal Air Force quickly spurred South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to create their own independent air forces. Moreover, adopting the international standard can make military cooperation, integration, and procurement much easier for states and can reduce the amount of information that governments need to collect about alternative institutional models. Finally, some research indicates that the push for institutional isomorphism may come directly from military officers who develop expectations about their professional futures from observing similarly placed personnel in other states.
However, there are limits to the virtues of a “follow the leader” strategy. First and foremost, some states, by virtue of their size, wealth, and importance, are the leaders. A decision on the part of the United States to abolish its independent air force might incline other countries to consider doing the same. Had the British not granted independence to the Royal Air Force, the Dominion forces would probably not have come into existence in quick succession. Similarly, the French, German, and U.S. air forces might not have won independence when they did. A “follow the leader” strategy can give important clues to small or new states trying to design their military organizations and can provide indicators of success to larger countries concerned about their security. However, emulation for the sake of parity does not always represent the best strategy for cutting-edge military establishments.
Tradition
A final argument justifying the independent air force invokes tradition. Many military organizations enjoy long traditions and appeal to these traditions in an instrumental way. A sense of history explains to new recruits how they fit within the body of the organization. As R. Lee Ermich memorably put it in Full Metal Jacket: “Today, you people are no longer maggots. Today, you are Marines. You’re part of a brotherhood. From now on until the day you die, wherever you are, every Marine is your brother. Most of you will go to Vietnam. Some of you will not come back. But always remember this: Marines die. That’s what we’re here for. But the Marine Corps lives forever. And that means you live forever.”
This perspective suggests that whatever administrative or other gains might be reaped by amalgamation of services would be overwhelmed by the loss of esprit de corps associated with the elimination of an old service. While scholars can imagine perfect constellations of military power for particular times and places, organizations are made of people and their dissolution will have human consequences. Experienced officers may retire, instability may frighten off new recruits and, in general, readiness and capability may suffer. At an extreme the tradition argument may seem to suggest “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” but a reasonable interpretation might be “Even if it’s broke, some fixes may make things worse.” Whatever the theoretical problems with granting air force independence in 1947, folding the service today into the army and navy would serve little purpose beyond generating chaos.
Although this perspective has some compelling elements, it also has some serious limitations. Military organizations undergo traumatic cultural transformations on a regular basis. For example, the U.S. Army suffered from the diminution of the role of cavalry in the twentieth century, while the U.S. Navy endured the obsolescence of the battleship. More recently, the U.S. Army had to transition from a conscript to an all-volunteer professional force. While none of these crises of identity quite rise to the level of eliminating an entire branch of service, they do suggest that military organizations can survive and thrive after major cultural transitions. More important, taken too far, the logic of service tradition can lead to bad decisions about technology, modernization, and doctrine. The U.S. Army had a long and proud tradition of cavalry warfare in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which it abandoned slowly and under considerable pressure. Similarly, in the United Kingdom some officers resisted mechanization because of concerns over losing their horses. The logic of tradition suggests that we should view change with caution, but caution is different than stasis.
Interservice Conflict and the Design of New Institutions
Military institutions are only occasionally “designed” in the sense of policymakers trying to create an optimal division of military labor. More often, military organizations result from a clash of history and politics. Like other institutions, military organizations often defy the efforts of policymakers (or even their own leaders) to change or restructure them. It is important not to mistake messy reality for optimal design. Today, as through history, there is no obviously ideal way to organize a nation’s military forces.
On the rare occasions that policymakers have the opportunity to design or redesign institutions, they must take into account several realities of organizational behavior. As James Q. Wilson argued in his classic Bureaucracy, there is little support for the idea that all organizations want greater resources and more responsibilities. Rather, organizations want autonomy, or “turf.” Autonomy involves control of the means through which an organization accomplishes tasks and freedom from the interests and interference of other organizations. Once created, organizations tend to seek greater autonomy, although how they define this often depends on organizational culture. One way in which the air force seeks to maintain its autonomy is through espousal of the principal of “centralized control, decentralized execution,” wherein theater air assets come under the control of an air officer who allocates them according to local need. This principle also emerges from the experience of decentralized control in World War II. Organizations will tend to resent and resist intrusions into their specified bureaucratic territory and will rarely hold unbiased interpretations o their own capabilities. Organizations can lobby policymakers and other interested actors (the general public, for example) in pursuit of their preferred ends. Finally, tasks and missions that lie along the borders between organizations almost always suffer from serious coordination problems.
The creation of new bureaucratic organizations invariably leads to conflict over administrative boundaries. The new organization always takes up some responsibilities of older institutions, and the full delineation of new responsibilities involves bureaucratic conflict. The development of independent air forces created particularly difficult problems. Within fifteen years of its invention, the aircraft became a key part of almost every meaningful military mission, both on land and at sea. Aircraft became, if not absolutely necessary, at least very important to such traditional military tasks as reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and frontal assault. Not unlike the rifle, the mortar, or the machine gun, the aircraft became an organic part of basic military tasks. Unlike the tank, the submarine, or the artillery, however, the aircraft then received a service of its own. This made conflict between services over resource allocation, training, and procurement particularly likely. To be sure, civilian policymakers have long understood that they can benefit from interservice conflict and have sometimes welcomed (and even encouraged) services to fight one another. When services attack one another, it provides rationales for cost-conscious budget cutters to kill particular programs. But interservice conflict can take two forms: resource conflicts and mission conflicts. While both help civilian policymakers cut costs, they do not have the same effect on the military’s overall strategic preparedness.
The first type of interservice conflict, resource allocation, involves grand strategic emphasis and (as the name implies) resource conflict. Because different services perform different missions, not all contribute equally to certain grand strategic tasks. For example, the ability of the Royal Navy to commit its full strength to the war in Afghanistan is severely limited by geography, just as the ability of the British Army to contribute to the antipiracy fight in Somalia is limited by the unwillingness of the British government to seize and hold pirate havens. Interservice conflict focusing on resources, therefore, is about the prioritization of particular strategic goals. In general, services tend to support resource allocation toward goals that they can contribute to. Services, like any other bureaucratic organization, tend to believe that their own parochial goals fall in line with national security goals. Services develop arguments about strategic orientation and resource allocation that support their own organizational interests. The classic example of a resource conflict involves warship versus army brigade; the units have different capabilities, perform different jobs, and suggest a different focus for national strategic priorities.
These arguments represent a boon for civilians interested in managing strategic affairs and creating a sustainable defense budget. Civilians can borrow arguments from the services in order to politically justify reduced defense expenditures. These arguments insulate civilians from appearing weak on security issues. However, while resource conflicts have the potential to shift a nation’s strategic orientation, they typically leave a military organization with a set of tools appropriate to meeting the challenge of those new strategic goals. Interservice conflict on resource allocation provides civilians with a useful tool for managing defense budgets and for keeping the military services in line. For example, in the “Revolt of the Admirals” in the United States, the U.S. Navy supplied civilians with a plethora of data on the shortcomings of the B-36 Peacemaker strategic bomber.
By contrast, interservice conflicts involving mission allocation rarely create positive externalities. Warfare has required the cooperation of different military organizations for as long as professional military organizations have existed. However, in the last century the need for collaboration between air, ground, and sea assets has increased dramatically. The primary driver of such integration has been the expansion of warfare into the third dimension. As argued earlier, aircraft now represent an organic part of most military missions, from ground assault (close air support) and interdiction (exploitation) to antisubmarine warfare and countersea operations. Aircraft are as necessary to the efficient and successful execution of tactical and operational level military tasks as infantry, armor, and artillery. Erecting bureaucratic walls between services makes the development of tacit experiential knowledge difficult and conflict between services on emphasis, doctrine, training, and command structure inevitable. Classic examples of such conflicts involves control over close air support, or control over the aircraft carrier air wings. In both cases the debate regards the proper allocation of authority over an intrinsic aspect of the mission; carriers cannot operate without aircraft, nor can modern infantry brigades operate without air support.
According to historian Steven L. Rearden, “Disputes and disagreements over the respective functions of the Army and Navy did not pose a significant problem until the 20th century.” Army and navy officers of the Civil War might disagree with such a sweeping claim, but there is little doubt that the expansion of war into the third dimension, combined with the advocacy of airpower enthusiasts, helped to create bitter divisions within and between the services. An independent air force arose from this battle with a culture inimical to cooperation with the other two services. Giulio Douhet predicted this tension and proposed to resolve it simply by making the air force dominant.
Conclusion
As the complexity of military tasks has grown, organizational borders have developed between professional services. These borders both solve and create problems. Organizations inevitably focus on their preferred mode of operation and try to maximize their autonomy. This makes services very good a certain jobs and not so good at others, especially those jobs that involve collaboration with others. In the United States, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 tried, with some success, to limit the problems created by organizational boundaries. However, basic institutional borders tell only half the story. Organizational culture, or the way organizations define and understand their missions, also affects how services interact with one another. Giving an air force the freedom and autonomy to pursue its own interests may have some benefits, but it reduces the ability of armies and navies to do their jobs. The question becomes a simple cost-benefit calculation: Does giving an air force independence solve more problems that it creates?
Robert M. Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky.

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