Intelligence Needs a New Language

The discussion about a “revolution in intelligence affairs”, a term introduced nearly two decades ago, is recently gaining prominence. Many intelligence scholars and former practitioners highlight the need for adaptation to the “age of information” and emerging technologies. They also stress there is a “declining market for secrets”, and therefore intelligence agencies must change their “secret-inclined culture” and embrace open-source intelligence. But for great power competition, this is not enough. Like national security, more broadly, intelligence needs a new language. The current one fails in describing, let alone guiding, the evolving practice.

Many also acknowledge that the differentiation between collection disciplines – such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), or open-source intelligence (OSINT) – is also partially obsolete as an overarching concept. A visual image and geolocation of a terrorist published on social media make it hard to determine whether this is SIGINT, OSINT, or GEOINT. When using commercial satellites, OSINT overlaps with GEOINT. Moreover, machines do not differentiate between sources of collection when exploiting, sorting, and analyzing data.

Traditional terminology differentiates between intelligence and counterintelligence or between foreign and domestic intelligence. But detecting and thwarting a Russian or a Chinese intervention in U.S. elections is foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence and counterintelligence at the same time. When considering the last crisis in Afghanistan, it is hard to differentiate between current, strategic, or anticipatory intelligence – another accepted terminology in American IC doctrine. Moreover, traditional methods for collection and analysis, created for engaging political and military challenges, do not suffice for non-military challenges – for instance, when the IC is tasked with determining the origin of COVID-19 or anticipating the implications of climate change.

A discussion about technological, cultural and organizational reforms is already taking place and is undoubtfully important. However, this must be complemented by a discussion of concepts. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) established the Office of Net Assessment a few years ago, which aims at adapting the IC to its future environment. Together with the National Intelligence University and broader academia, this can be a relevant platform for such a conceptual effort. Moreover, on top of conceptual ideation, an "innovation through adaptation" approach should be manifested, where new concepts are tested in real-life challenges. Indeed, this bears some risks. But so does inertia, or an attempt to fully understand future challenges as a prerequisite for reforming the current practice.

Intelligence is a crucial condition for executing “a mindset of campaigning," which is imperative in the current strategic and operational environment. This is true for the great-power competition with Russia and China, where simply preparing for conflict might harm deterrence, and therefore active engagement is also needed. It is true since counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) missions will still be relevant even after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is true that since Iran continues to create political and military challenges and threaten regional stability through its nuclear ambitions, and therefore, political negotiations alongside military measures and deterrent actions must be executed. The same goes for North Korea, which has not given up its political or military ambitions.

In all these cases, intelligence must allow constant formulation and execution of policy, strategy, and operations. The IC does not have the luxury of developing innovative ideas while competing based on outdated ones. While innovative practices and organizational structures such as cooperation between the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the private sector, interaction between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the private sector, or new “mission-centers” in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have evolved, these practices require a compatible theory to make them better suited for competition.

Language, therefore, is an important aspect of the revolution in intelligence affairs, not less than technologies or organizational structures. True, a conceptual discussion might seem abstract and disruptive, but disruption can be constructive, and abstraction is needed to augment practice. A new language might create confusion, but so can the over-stretch of obsolete terminology. Intelligence practitioners should therefore learn from theory, and intelligence scholars should theorize not only about the future but also about emerging practices. Such a combined effort can create a competitive advantage of its own for the U.S. and its partners and allies.

Itai Shapira is a retired colonel from the Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI), with more than 25 years of experience in various analytical and management roles. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Leicester, and the Director of the Red Team Thinking Academy™.

Itai has published articles about intelligence, national security, strategy, and Middle Eastern topics in Intelligence and National Security, War on the Rocks, Defense One, The National Interest, Strategic Assessment, and RealClear Defense.