Washington Misunderstands Crisis Communication With China

On April 1st, 2001, the skies above the South China Sea turned from routine to perilous. A U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane, silently patrolling international waters near Hainan Island, suddenly found itself in the crosshairs of a Chinese J-8 interceptor. The jet, in a reckless fashion, closed in on the American aircraft. Through such fateful miscalculation, it collided with the EP-3, sending the Chinese pilot to a tragic death. Miraculously, the U.S. crew managed to coax their damaged plane to a forced landing on Chinese soil and survived. 

Relations between China and the United States are even more fraught today. Rising nationalism on both sides mean that should something like the EP-3 incident happen again, there is no guarantee cooler heads will prevail, explaining why America has dedicated so much diplomatic capital on this issue. These efforts, however, though commendable, fundamentally misunderstand China’s interests and may even undermine deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Paradoxically, to strengthen its deterrence in the region, the United States needs a more risk-tolerant approach that reduces its overemphasis on communication. 

For Americans with decades of familiarity with crisis communication, China’s conduct in this regard is difficult to comprehend. As tensions rise it is natural to seek ways to communicate misunderstandings and de-escalate. Yet these beliefs misread the sources of Chinese conduct.

China’s regime operates through a top-down model. On everything from society and the economy to the military (PLA), China’s system is one of centralized control. This means lower-level PLA officers lack the authority to make decisions without higher-up’s acquiescence. But this explanation alone is unconvincing; local and bureaucratic actors still exercise agency in China, and the PLA’s systematic unprofessional behavior near or around U.S. troops and allies dispels the notion that Beijing’s leaders are unaware of their military’s conduct.

A more compelling explanation for China’s behavior lies in its post-colonial history and broader international ambitions. Historically, China was the dominant power in its region, but the West's rise disrupted what Beijing considered this natural harmony. As a result, China resents Washington’s hegemonic role in the current global system, viewing America’s economic and political dominance as contrary to the rightful course of history. Accordingly, Beijing now seeks to weaken U.S. influence and ultimately create a new Asian and global order centered on its economic and political interests

A key aspect of this ambition is Beijing’s desire to end America’s security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Therein lies the connection to LOCs. From China’s perspective, Washington’s focus on LOCs serves to institutionalize an American military footprint in its periphery. Establishing and maintaining these lines would require Beijing to tacitly accept the long-term presence of American forces around China; consequently, Washington’s means by which to put a ceiling on tensions serves instead to legitimize American military dominance.

Relatedly, for China to establish LOCs with the American military would mean giving up an important means of coercive leverage. Because a direct attack on an American ally is likely to be costly in lives and treasure, Beijing has instead employed a strategy deemed by the Pentagon as “gray zone” warfare: provocative military actions that do not cross the threshold of constituting a direct attack, but that, through their persistence and rising intensity, gradually erode allied capabilities or resolve.

For China, these actions are designed to slowly undermine America’s security blanket. By psychologically or materially exhausting allies and gradually encroaching on established red lines, China aims to rupture America’s security system by either convincing allies that American protection is moot, or by creating a fait accompli whereby an ally’s continued security position would be untenable. A textbook example of this dynamic is the recent tension between the Philippines and the PRC over the Sierra Madre whereby China’s gray zone tactics have sought to gradually erode the Philippines’ position in the South China Sea by upping the ante of aggressive conduct.

Establishing LOCs would harm this strategy. Gray zone salami-slicing inevitably involves taking unpredictable actions; under these circumstances, keeping the enemy guessing about what will result in an escalation lends greater coercive credibility to threats. To communicate with Washington, therefore, would be to undermine what makes gray zone action so attractive. As the U.S. lacks a clear understanding of what might trigger open conflict, the absence of communication fosters restraint on American officers and presidents they may otherwise avoid, enabling China to take advantage of its brinkmanship.

This situation should give American leaders pause. China’s post-colonial identity and security goals make it cautious in establishing LOCs, yet Washington’s intense diplomatic focus on this issue risks sending the wrong message. Persistent American efforts to de-escalate through establishing LOCs might unintentionally signal a lack of resolve to confront China, which could embolden further aggression. Moreover, by making LOCs a central point in its diplomatic agenda, Washington allows Beijing to turn communication into a political football of bilateral relations. The results neither serve U.S. interests nor help ease tensions.

What, then, should Washington’s approach be? Counterintuitively, the answer lies in the U.S. demonstrating a willingness to court greater risk in military hotspots, even in the absence of LOCs, as well as in greater American engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. This signals to China that U.S. resolve is high through its demonstration of a higher risk threshold, thereby undermining incentives for Beijing’s present conduct. Moreover, by raising the risk of escalation, America signals to Beijing the greater need for crisis communication; given the many domestic economic and political issues China already faces, a more risk-tolerant Washington may even push Beijing to be more amenable to crisis contacts.

These prescriptions should not be overly confrontational, however. China’s recent aggressive conduct has alienated many countries; for Washington to match it in unprofessionalism would do greater harm than good. America should instead strive to be firm yet responsible in its more assertive conduct. For example, Washington could use Coast Guard cutters to escort Philippine resupply vessels to the Sierra Madre, backed with over the horizon capability to maintain America’s escalation dominance. Washington’s freedom of navigation maneuvers should also be more willing to encroach upon Chinese outposts in the South China Sea, and U.S. naval vessels and aircraft should be more present in and around Taiwan during Chinese exercises. Allied vessels and aircraft should accompany all these measures to the greatest extent possible to signal multilateral displeasure with Beijing.

These are among some of the policy recommendations that would demonstrate to Beijing America’s higher resolve. Concurrently, Washington should signal a stronger commitment to its Indo-Pacific allies through other means to bolster its credibility. Greater U.S. security assistance to the region, a strengthened network of American alliances, more dispersed and durable bases with forward-deployed forces, and greater U.S. economic engagement are all ways to enhance American credibility in the region. Fortunately, the Biden Administration has made progress on most of these fronts.

More broadly, this issue cannot be viewed outside the context of wider competition: it is inherently linked to U.S. national interests. The preservation of the American alliance system in Asia is essential to Washington’s core security objectives. By showing a willingness to tolerate higher risk, America demonstrates that its resolve to preserve its alliances is ironclad.

A paradox of deterrence is that sometimes states must be more risk-tolerant to preserve peace. The return of great power competition means a return to these Cold War games of chicken. Expecting China to embrace the values of communication is unrealistic absent a more sustained willingness by the United States to signal its staying power. Otherwise, America’s Indo-Pacific position will deteriorate. This is not to say that LOCs are not important––they are vital to prevent catastrophe; to aspire to their sustained maintenance in the context of U.S.-China competition is a laudable foreign policy objective. But Beijing will weaponize laudable aims if it serves its interests.

For decades, Washington has sought to maintain LOCs with China, only to be rebuffed, ignored, or engaged in bad faith. As Einstein is believed to have said: “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.” China has made its intentions clear. It is about time we changed our approach.

Lucas de Gamboa is a senior at Columbia University. He is a Saltzman Student Scholar at SIPA’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace and was co-president of Columbia's Alexander Hamilton Society chapter. He is also a research assistant at Columbia Law School and was a Hamilton National Defense Fellow.